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ABSTRACT 
The use of agent-based simulation (ABS) allows government emergency planners 
to analyze urban counterterrorist operations and observe environmental behaviors that 
may not obviously demonstrate themselves in live simulation. This study demonstrates a 
framework in which future counterterrorism response procedures can be analyzed for 
training and development.  The study analyzes the acute phase of an emergency response 
to a terrorist bomb and chemical attack in an urban commercial setting.  Using the ABS 
platform Pythagoras, explosive and chemical agent effects, civilian behavior, and 
responder tactics were represented in the simulation.  Using a Nearly Orthogonal Latin 
Hypercube (NOLH) design to analyze four attack scenarios rendered in simulation, data 
farming techniques identified the most significant controllable and uncontrollable factors 
related to estimating percentage injury and death.  Statistical comparisons indicate that a 
marginal increase in the percentage of injured civilians is associated with an emergency 
response.  Specific emergency response elements may have a direct or inverse 
relationship to civilian survivorship.  Given the independent, emergent behavior of the 
civilian population, functions supporting containment and evacuation may conflict with 
each other.  This suggests the need to improve crowd management at the perimeter of the 
security cordon; particularly, the need to differentiate between those who were affected 
by the bomb or chemical gas and those who were not affected. 
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THESIS DISCLAIMER 
The reader is cautioned that the simulations presented in this research may not 
have been exercised for all cases of interest. While every effort has been made, within the 
time available, to ensure that the simulations are free of computational and logical errors, 
they cannot be considered validated. Any application of these programs without 
additional verification is at the risk of the user.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 The Republic of Singapore values the importance of multiagency exercises as a 
critical part of “Total Defence,” particularly when local, regional and global security 
trends over the past seven years require increased vigilance from Singapore’s defense and 
security agencies.  While Singapore adopts a multilevel approach to implement 
counterterrorism measures, its security agencies continue to acknowledge the 
complexities of a joint emergency response.  These complexities arise out of the need to 
take into consideration all dimensions of its society in the creation of counterterrorism 
measures, such as military defense, internal security, border and infrastructure security, 
civil defense, medical readiness, and psychological preparedness.  At the heart of these 
counterterrorism measures is the need to establish clear roles and actions for all agencies 
during a confirmed incident. 
The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), in conjunction with the Singapore Ministry 
of Home Affairs (MHA), have conducted three major exercises in the past involving 
nonconventional terrorist attacks against an urban population setting, the most recent 
being Exercise NorthStar V. The nature of such efforts are neither unique to the country, 
nor have they been implemented recently, as many developed countries that demonstrate 
established frameworks of emergency preparedness and response, engage in large-scale 
emergency exercises.  The dynamics and aftermath of the September 11 attacks, 
however, as well as the London train and bus bombings, show that no exercise can fully 
inoculate a populace against a terrorist event.   
A major caveat of large scale, full-troop exercises is that such organized events 
alter their test environments by introducing administrative elements and invariably 
contaminate exercise evaluation results when troops and exercised elements interact with 
administrative elements.  In addition, it is common for the political and social objectives 
of a public exercise to gain more emphasis than the learning goals of the event, resulting 
in these exercises becoming nothing more than a panacea against terrorism. 
 It would therefore be prudent to accept the limitations of mass exercises and 
acknowledge the need to augment their value with additional analysis tools.   
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 Modeling and simulation (M&S) has become an important enabler for military 
experimentation.  It is therefore timely that the Singaporean National Security 
Coordination Centre (NSCC) is also interested in using data mining techniques, such as 
the efficient use of information and high-performance computing (HPC), to enhance 
national security.  This study proposes that, with the use of HPC as a key technology 
enabler, a simulation can be generated for urban military and counterterrorist operations, 
given a specific terrorist threat (such as improvised explosive devices) and area of 
operations (such as high-risk public and private buildings).  Findings from such a design 
could help improve real incident response.   
This study applies a suitable M&S technique to analyze a theoretical scenario.  
The intent is to gain additional insights into the interactions between civilian behavior, 
the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) of emergency responders, and the impact of 
chemical agent effects on both civilian and first responder populations.  The objectives 
are to apply a suitable computer simulation technique to analyze a multiagency 
emergency response to an improvised explosive device with a chemical payload (CIED) 
in Singapore.  The establishment of a suitable framework for achieving this can extend to 
the assessment of installation-specific consequence management, the design of chemical, 
biological, radiological and explosive (CBRE) support operations, and multi-agency 
planning.  The use of agent-based simulation (ABS) allows for the potential observation 
of emergent behaviors in a scenario, granted the requirement that the simulation 
appropriately represents the key behaviors under study.  For the purposes of this study, 
analysis is conducted on the immediate response by Singaporean police, civil defense 
(medical and fire service), and military CBRE to a theoretical activation of a CIED along 
a major shopping belt in downtown Singapore, and scoped to the following research 
questions: 
 How feasible are existing operational templates, TTPs, and information-
making processes? 
 
 How robust are current procedures for containing civilians exposed to 
chemical agents? 
 
 What factors influence the efficiency of emergency response procedures? 
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 To what degree does civilian compliancy affect the performance of casualty 
treatment? 
 
To design a believable scenario for the simulation, the study refers to several 
major regional and global incidents, as well as the open source details on Exercise 
NorthStar V.  The simulation models the acute phase of the emergency response, a 
multisided event that sees various interactions between the affected environment, the 
populations involved, and the leadership available in these conditions.  Given these 
considerations, several features in Pythagoras 2.0.3—an agent-based platform that was 
initially developed under the United States Marine Corps’ (USMC) Project Albert, lend 
themselves well to the simulation of a crisis response.  A visualization of the resultant 
simulation model generated in Pythagoras is shown in Figures ES1 and ES2.  
 
 
Figure ES1. Global view of scenario map generated for study, illustrating isolation 
zones and approaches of different emergency response elements.  
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Figure ES2. Enlarged view of incident site activity after 30 minutes into the response, 
showing the location of the chemical hazard (in red), civilians (in cyan) 
and emergency responders (in blue).  
 
The experiment involved data farming techniques that used high-performance 
computing (HPC) to generate data from multiple experimental design points. Specific 
design parameters, selected as variables, are varied systematically and efficiently in an 
efficient way to broadly explore the experimental design space and the interactions 
between various factors.  The primary measure of effectiveness (MOE) of interest is the 
change in survivorship of the civilian population with the emergency response, the 
improvement of which is determined in this study as the primary focus of the emergency 
response.  Four incident conditions were studied using the same experimental design 
techniques; 
 A simulation without emergency response;  
 A theoretical activation of an indoor CIED with an emergency response to the 
incident site;  
 An outdoor activation of the same CIED, and  
 A response to a Vehicle-Borne IED (VBIED).   
 
As the primary DOE technique, the study used a “Combined Nearly-Orthogonal 
Latin Hypercube” (NOLH) design, using both controllable and uncontrollable factors in 
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the NOLH configuration.  Scenarios were run on the Air Force Research Laboratory 
(AFRL) HPC cluster.  Two prototypes, four full scenarios, and one re-run were 
submitted, totaling 16,460 design point replicates.  Nineteen uncontrollable factors, 
representing the environment outside the influence of the responders, were analyzed to 
determine the most influential factors.  To enable a more robust analysis, these were 
implemented with 21 controllable factors related to the emergency response, generated a 
29-factor combined NOLH experimental design.  The completion of all experimental 
runs, including administrative time, error correction and re-submission, took only 32 days 
using the HPC cluster. 
 Data analysis of the simulation results determined the following: 
 With respect to the percentage of civilians injured by an indoor CIED 
incident, there is a statistically significant, but marginal increase associated 
with emergency response activation.  The few actions associated with a 
statistically significant decrease in the percentage of civilians injured only 
improve the percentage injured by 1 to 4%.  
 The follow-on force, particularly with respect to the patrol officers who 
conduct much of the site clearance, must complement the efficiency of the 
initial first response car (FRC) patrol officers.  The Incident Manager should 
compensate for a less effective effort in the initial response by the FRC patrol 
officers, or an operational situation that hinders police influence, with more 
follow-on police officers.  An increased maximum influence on the part of the 
patrol officers is positively associated with a reduction in the average 
percentage of injured civilians, subject to a reduction in influence by the 
special operations command (SOC) tactical officers. 
 To limit the potential increase incurred with an emergency response, factors 
that prevent the exacerbation of civilian injuries include the earlier entry time 
of first responders and follow-on police officers, the reduced maximum 
influence of SOC tactical officers, and potentially the later arrival of larger 
elements from the Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF).   
 The early arrival of response elements, particularly security cordon and 
decontamination elements may inhibit the civilian intentions for self-
preservation.  The data suggests the association of lower average percentage 
of injured civilians with the later arrival of such elements, and vice versa.  
Interestingly, the earlier arrival of follow-on police officers is always 
associated with positive gains.  
 No direct association of medical assets is observed in the statistical analysis 
for CIED incidents.  If there is any influence, the possible response is likely to 
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tend towards reducing mean percentage deaths and transferring the saving of 
civilian lives to an increase in the mean percentage injured.  
 Panic associated with the incident site demonstrates itself in varying degrees.  
In the context of the simulation, the representation of panic is subject to 
sequestering and proximity to the incident site. 
 Increasing chemical agent detector (CAD) broadcast range is beneficial in 
scenarios involving a chemical agent (CA).  This ranges from six to nine 
meters.  
 For a VBIED incident, the early arrival of security and cordon elements 
before the SCDF leader and his associated elements may be significant in 
limiting civilian injuries. 
 
 Following the analysis, the study reaches the below-mentioned conclusions to the 
initial research questions: 
 Assessment of the feasibility of the response gave some counter-intuitive 
results.  When focused on improving civilian survivorship, simulation results 
prove inconclusive in showing any statistical difference between civilian 
deaths incurred from an indoor CIED incident and subsequent emergency 
response, vis-à-vis no response.  The percentage of civilians injured associated 
with the emergency response to the same device prove significantly higher 
than would be expected with no response.  Key actions associated with the 
response, however, are inversely associated with a decrease in civilian 
casualties.  In general, earlier arrival of the first responders improves civilian 
survivorship, while increased influence over the population by security forces 
serves to increase civilian injuries. 
 
 Current procedures are robust as the flexibility of the initial and follow-on 
configurations allow Incident Managers (IMs) and response force leaders to 
manage the consequences of complications, in the time and compliancy 
domains.  If a direct relationship is assumed between the responses and the 
experimental factors, then several follow-on actions can be implemented to 
compensate for problems reducing responder arrival time and civilian 
compliance.  The entry time of the first responders composing the initial 
response is a significant factor in limiting the exacerbation of casualties at the 
incident site.  The maximum influence that each response forces exerts on the 
affected population should vary in relation to the impact it has on the civilians.  
Security and cordon elements should be careful in limiting their control of the 
population.  Rescuer influence should be slightly greater than that of patrol 
officers. 
 
 Assuming that the civilian behavioral model is valid, the intrinsic compliancy 
of civilians is not as dominant a deciding factor of civilian casualties, as much 
as the size of the population is.  This suggests that irrespective of his 
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compliance towards an emergency response, the civilian is likely to be able to 
find a way to escape the hazard.  Public compliancy towards emergency 
responders should, therefore, not be a primary concern to emergency planners, 
who should focus instead on the proper identification of persons affected by 
the incident. 
 Major obstacles, preventing the use of Pythagoras Agent Based Modeling (ABM) 
for studying emergency response procedures to a terrorist chemical or explosive attack, 
include: 
 The exponential increase in simulation run time with larger scenarios, 
 
 The man-hours required to generate large, new maps, and  
 
 The need to accommodate for caveats in the decision-making processes of 
individual agents in Pythagoras.  
 
 
In addition, future research efforts that may expand out of this study include the 
following:  
 Simulation and analysis of the effectiveness of medical decontamination and 
support during an emergency response.   
 
 Simulation and analysis of secondary device search during an emergency 
response.  
 
 Analysis of human intangibles via low-resolution simulation.   
 
 Command, Control, and Communications (C3) analysis for emergency 
response.   
 
 Scenario analysis for a multi-pronged terrorist incident.   
 
  This study represents a combined analysis of emergency response procedures, 
crowd behavior, and a non physics-based simulation of chemical release and IED effects.  
Granted, the findings are controversial and prompt more questions than they can 
currently answer.  The insights, data, and calculations performed here, however, provide 
a good foundation for planning and analyzing effective response from an operational 
research point of view.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Knowing how to exploit the potential of technology will help us to create 
new solutions to deal with emerging security challenges. The increasing 
sophistication of IT systems now makes it possible to conduct complex 
analysis of massive amounts of data. Data mining, link-analysis 
technologies and sophisticated intelligent systems can help to provide us 
with early indications of threats and opportunities. 
Professor S. Jayakumar, 
Deputy Prime Minister, Coordinating Minister for National Security  
and Minister for Law, 27 March 2007   
A. BACKGROUND 
 The Republic of Singapore values the importance of multiagency exercises as a 
critical part of their nation’s “Total Defence” framework.  This framework comprises 
military, social, psychological, economic and civil defense.  Since realizing that 
Southeast Asia would continue to evolve into a major theater for terrorist operations, 
Singapore has had to become more proactive in dealing with transnational threats (Boey, 
2006).  Its military and para-military forces conduct island-wide exercises on an annual 
basis to establish and maintain cooperation across different government services. 
Normally, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) is responsible for island defense, with the 
Singapore Police Force focusing on internal security and the Singapore Civil Defence 
Force (SCDF) dealing with major civil emergencies.  These exercises are platforms for 
Singapore to demonstrate its defense capabilities to both its populace and international 
observers.  Such events would typically be conducted with a military or para-military 
agency as the main coordinating authority.   
1. Chemical and Explosive Terrorist Devices 
 Global and regional security trends over the past seven years now require 
increased vigilance from Singapore’s defense and security agencies.  Homeland security 
elements now adopt a global and regional approach to assess terrorist trends on their 
likelihood of occurrence in the country.  For example, recent chlorine tanker truck attacks 
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in Iraq demonstrate their feasibility as a crude chemical weapon (Multi-National Corps – 
Iraq, 2007a, 2007b).  In response to this, the SCDF has implemented satellite tracking 
and vehicular immobilizers for all land-based hazardous cargo carriers (Sua, 2007).  
Similarly, the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London train bombings (The Stationary Office, 
2006) demonstrate the technical sophistication of terrorists and their shift towards a 
campaign targeting public transport systems.  The result of this is the establishment of a 
transit police department, specifically focused on patrolling Singapore’s extensive 
underground train system, as well as an extensive media blitz to educate the public on 
their role in countering attacks in these public places.  
 Domestic terrorism falls under equal purview.  For example, in 2006, an incident 
occurred involving an incendiary device released a “stinging smoke” after being left on a 
public bus (Teh, 2006).  In a separate incident, the accidental release of gaseous chlorine 
at a recreational club in a residential part of Singapore sparked panic and concern over 
the security of public and private establishments, causing an outcry on whether 
establishments were prepared in the event of a terrorist attack (Chong, 2005).  Public 
concerns continue to persist over the country’s readiness against a real chemical attack; a 
good example of which is the 1995 Tokyo subway attack (Kaplan, 2000).  
 Perhaps nothing else can summarize Singapore’s need for vigilance in peacetime 
than the realization of the Jema’ah Islamiah (JI) terrorist network’s plans to attack several 
Singaporean and U.S.-related targets in 2002, as part of an assumed collaboration with al 
Qaeda (Internal Security Department, 2003).  To this day, authorities have no 
confirmation on the whereabouts of four tons of ammonium nitrate fertilizer procured by 
JI, which was initially meant for the construction of truck bombs to be used in Singapore 
and the region.  Singapore, however, continues to be associated with the West, and thus is 
an “ally of the enemy” to Islamic extremists.  This is reason enough for first responders 
and their parent agencies to conduct interagency exercises, thus enabling a combined 
effort against such possible events in the future. 
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2. Incident Response and Management in Singapore 
 While Singapore adopts a multilevel approach to implement counterterrorism 
measures, its security agencies acknowledge the complexities of a joint emergency 
response.  These issues arise out of the need to take into consideration all dimensions of 
its society in the creation of such measures, such as military defense, internal security, 
border and infrastructure security, civil defense, medical readiness, and psychological 
preparedness.  At the heart of this is the need to establish clear roles and actions for all 
agencies during a confirmed incident.  For example, the Ministry of Home Affairs 
(MHA) educates the public on the measures and responsibilities of the individual citizen 
in the event of a possible attack, with the hope that better public knowledge will improve 
emergency response.  The SAF maintains chemical, biological, radiological, and 
explosives (CBRE) defense and response capabilities on a high-readiness standby, which 
are activated in response to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and weapons of mass 
destruction (WMDs), as well as post-blast investigation teams that facilitate forensic 
analysis of bombing incidents.  The Singapore Police Force has a dedicated tactics team 
to deal with terrorist incidents and has revamped its service with operational and 
logistical support in preparation for counterterrorism operations. 
These efforts are neither unique to the country, nor have they been implemented 
recently.  The United Kingdom, Australia and the United States, each with an equally 
sophisticated security framework, put as much emphasis on their own emergency 
response exercises as Singapore, if not more so.  The dynamics and aftermath of the 
September 11 attacks, however, as well as the London train and bus bombings (The 
Stationary Office, 2006) show that no exercise can fully inoculate a populace against a 
terrorist event.   
 4 
 
 
B. EXERCISE NORTHSTAR V 
It’s a little bit artificial…you assume that people will take two hours to 
turn up…now they turn up in 10 minutes. 
 
Hiccups are always welcome because we can learn from them.  We find 
the bottlenecks and deal with them. 
Khaw Boon Wan 
Health Minister, Ministry of Health 
on Exercise NorthStar V 
 
  
The SAF, in conjunction with the Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), have 
conducted three major exercises in the past involving nonconventional terrorist attacks 
against an urban populated setting.  The most recent exercise, NorthStar V (Henson, 
2006), involved a scenario similar to the London bombings demonstrating a multiple-
location attack on the island’s public bus and rail public transport system (Singapore 
Civil Defence Force, 2006).  
As it is common for the political and social objectives of a public exercise to gain 
more emphasis than the learning goals of the event; lessons learned from table-top 
exercises (TTX) conducted prior the actual full-troop exercise (FTX) are retained to 
augment the lessons learned during the FTX.  In the case of NorthStar V, 170 officers 
from participating agencies conducted an indoor planning exercise prior to the FTX (Sua 
and Goh, 2006), to expose and correct operational and administrative gaps in a 
multiagency effort.  This activity is driven by the need to publicly demonstrate that 
responding agencies have the capacity to respond seamlessly, allowing Singapore to 
“remain an oasis of safety” in a region threatened by terrorism (Ng, 2006).  Nonetheless, 
for any “emergency-preparedness exercise” to be effective, certain elements must be 
fulfilled.  One point is the suspension of the participants’ “disbelief,” by creating enough 
“exercise realism” to facilitate exercise troop responses close to real operations.  Since 
exercise planners and organizers have little control over this factor, more resources are 
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channeled towards implementing the following three aspects, which are kept in 
consideration to ensure that not only exercise objectives are successful, but that they also 
remain relevant. 
1.  Stressing of the Emergency Response System  
 Overloading systems and processes in an emergency response helps determine 
weaknesses inherent in existing protocols.  Doing so exposes process and organizational 
flaws that may not otherwise demonstrate themselves at lower workloads.  
2.  Effective After-Action Review 
 The documentation of lessons learned from an exercise entails a separate 
collection agency called the neutral observer, charged with the sole responsibility of 
reporting key observations and critical operational shortcomings.  Nonetheless, under-
reporting and the omission of the neutral observer’s findings can occur. The 
modernization of military instruction and doctrine development in the SAF has 
encouraged the central reporting of findings to a separate exercise control group.  At 
times this agency may not have the capacity to influence the implementation of change in 
doctrine or established standard operating procedures (SOPs), which are commonly 
assigned to the agencies at the forefront of the response, and hence, the primary 
participants in an exercise.  
3.  Review of Lessons Learned 
 Commonly, evaluators address lessons learned in an exercise as soon as possible 
to determine if proposed solutions really work.  Otherwise, their documentation serves as 
a reference for the following year’s exercise.  Roginski (2006) describes this in the 
United States context for Exercise TOPOFF, emphasizing the need for quick 
documentation, implementation, and comprehensive analysis at the end of the major 
exercise to gain final insights into the qualities of the response.  Similarly, for the SAF, 
the SAF Operations and Training Hub implements a sound series of training and 
evaluation processes to ensure that as many beneficial lessons as possible can be learned.  
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C. THE PANACEA OF PUBLIC EXERCISE 
 A major caveat of large-scale, full-troop exercises is that such organized events 
alter their test environments and invariably contaminate exercise evaluation results.  
Locations are made accessible and are cordoned off, the public is given several days’ 
notice on what to expect during the exercise, and (as in the case of NorthStar V) a high 
degree of civilian compliancy is observed.  It would be difficult to gauge whether control 
over the public is the direct result of personnel operating directly in exercise roles or 
simply because the civilians have already preempted their roles in the context of an 
exercise. 
 For example, a public poll by a major news agency in Singapore suggested that 
although the majority of Singaporeans believe that a terrorist attack can occur in 
Singapore, only 50% of them truly know what to do in the event an attack occurs (Boey 
and Tan, 2006).  While public exercises are rare, there needs to be a way to understand 
the implications of civilians on emergency first response, a caveat that cannot be 
completely observed by elaborate exercises.  For example, in NorthStar V, the public was 
prewarned that the exercise would be held during a weekend in January, 2006, and the 
participating agencies were given as long as six months to prepare.  The exact date, time 
and locations of the exercise were not disclosed until 15 minutes before the drill 
commenced, but the expectation of the exercise is reason enough for the populace to 
respond accordingly and comply with responders and support staff when encountered. 
In addition to the caveat described above, several operational issues prove difficult to 
solve or even observed in a controlled exercise, and may not be answered easily without a 
fair degree of subjective assessment. 
1. Friend or Foe Identification 
Identifying a friend or foe in a public location under a security lock-down presents 
certain challenges.  An excitable force of responders may act against uncooperative 
civilians.  Civilian resistance and failure to respond to police instruction may hamper the 
overall effectiveness of the response effort, and it is to this degree that civilians must 
 7 
 
 
understand their roles when encountering a counterterrorist response or risk being 
engaged by security elements.  This was evident with the shooting of a Brazilian national 
in the aftermath of the London bombings, resulting in several repercussions for the 
London Metropolitan Police (Independent Police Complaints Commission, 2007).   
2.  Multiple Secondary Devices 
Secondary devices threaten emergency responders as they force a change in 
zoning and a shifting of forces, in an attempt to ensure the security of working areas.  
This results in a response lag, a need for work site re-organization and (depending on the 
magnitude of the secondary event) an activation of a new tier of responders.  Existing 
protocols have to be flexible enough to accommodate a relocation and troop 
reinforcement, if necessary. 
3.  Maintenance of Public Order 
Public order remains a challenge to maintain in any populous city when hysteria 
spreads at the occurrence of a terrorist attack (Stokes, 1997).  Responders need to contain 
any hysteria that may ensue from the panic of civilians directly affected by an incident. 
Civilians under emotional distress complicate the emergency response, or they may 
respond poorly to authorities or disregard public peace.   
D.  THE CONCEPT OF SIMULATION IN SINGAPORE  
It would therefore be prudent to accept the limitations of mass exercises and 
acknowledge the need to augment their value with additional analytic tools.  This method 
should demonstrate limited political undertones, to avoid resistance by users, and ensure 
that exercise objectives are fulfilled and recommendations can be tested.  Computer-
based modeling and simulation (M&S) is proposed as the ideal tool, providing planners 
with a versatile range of decision support tools.  M&S allows decision makers to draw 
useful insights from various theoretical scenarios commonly put into play in mass 
exercises.  Defense applications have been the major drivers for the use of M&S in the 
government sector in Singapore (Tay, 2006).  Owing to the organizational needs of a 
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peacetime military, the experience of the country’s defense research arm is heavily 
grounded in enabling highly virtual simulations, or in the design and production of 
simulator aids for live training. 
 In recent times, M&S has also become an essential technology and tool for 
military experimentation.  More recently, the defense services and defense science 
organizations have begun applying M&S for operational mission planning and rehearsals, 
decision support, as well as testing and evaluation.  Several academic efforts have 
demonstrated the use of multi-agent simulations in the context of Singaporean defense 
applications, such as in the tracking of surface vessel intent in Singaporean ports (Tan, 
2005) and the study of emergent behavior by swarm robotics employed for search and 
detection missions (Ho, 2006).  Central to these ideas is the need for a flexible platform, 
schema for abstracting various operational elements such as civilian behavior and time 
(Tan, 2007), as well as map-sets and scaled data configurations to improve 
implementation (Roginski, 2006).  
Thus, it is timely that the Singaporean National Security Coordination Centre 
(NSCC) is also interested in using data mining techniques to enhance national security 
(Jayakumar, 2007), though it is likely that current plans will tend towards efforts in 
horizon scanning and threat “prediction.”  This study proposes that a simulation can be 
generated for urban military and counterterrorist operations, given a specific terrorist 
threat (IEDs and WMDs) and area of operations, such as high-risk public and private 
buildings.  Findings from such a design could help improve real incident response.   
E. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
  Exercise planners and staff previously restricted by the caveats of a live 
simulation can be presented with new options by employing MAS in conjunction with 
future mass exercises (Lucas, Sanchez, Sickinger, Martinez, & Roginski, 2007).  This 
thesis project applies a suitable M&S technique to analyze a theoretical scenario in an 
attempt to garner additional insights on civilian behavior, the tactics, techniques and 
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procedures (TTPs) of existing first responders and the impact of chemical agent effects 
on both civilian and first responder populations.   
F. MOTIVATIONS AND BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
The main motivation is to capitalize on high-performance computing power to 
augment consequence management planning.  Applying simulation to study emergency 
responses in the context of Singapore allows us to revisit and explore scenarios practiced 
in prior exercises.  This allows the assessment of solutions prescribed during these 
exercises to determine their validity, in silico.  Of course, this must be demonstrated first.  
Analyzing emergency procedures by simulation also allows planners to explore 
different scenarios that would not normally be achievable in the context of a physical 
troop exercise.  Simulation analysis techniques allow for the assessment of factors 
responsible for limiting casualty numbers to both civilians and first responders.   
In brief, the objectives are to apply a suitable computer simulation technique to 
analyze the multi-agency emergency response to an IED with a chemical payload (CIED) 
in Singapore.  This study focuses on the first hour of activation after an incident occurs.  
The second objective is to provide a methodology for the implementation of MAS in 
analyzing multi-agency emergency response to a terrorist incident.   
Ultimately, the establishment of a suitable framework for the computer-based 
simulation of an emergency response to a CIED in a civilian environment can extend 
itself to the following: 
1. Installation-Specific Consequence Management Planning 
The vulnerability of staff and personnel to terrorist devices can be assessed using 
installation-specific simulations.  Military camp layouts and duty staff procedures can be 
analyzed for their efficacy in responding to a bomb threat.  The possibility of such a 
scenario has been suggested by information from the Internal Security Department (ISD) 
that the JI cell in Singapore had considered an attack on at least one military installation 
with a car bomb (Internal Security Department, 2003).  As such, more can be done in the 
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planning and assessment of installation-specific consequence management.  A 
demonstration of this by the United States Pacific Command (PACOM) for a civilian port 
(Smith, 2008) is based on the works by Kent (2005) and Roginski (2006). 
2. Design of CBRE Support Operations  
The process of developing the scenario in this research can be extended to 
assessing render safe procedures for the disposal of CBRE threats, either in peacetime 
settings, peace-support operations or post-war operations.  Current response plans and 
procedures in Singapore either use fixed isolation zone templates which do not accurately 
reflect the severity of the hazard in context of the environment or physics-based 
simulation software that is limited to only modeling the threat.   
3.  Multi-agency Planning  
Joint planners and multi-agency task forces can reasonably demonstrate the result 
of combined efforts in a simulated setting.  The implications of joint operations with a 
heterogeneous force organization can be tested in a simulation.  Factors such as arrival 
time, process rates, information flows, and command responsibilities (such as leadership), 
can all be accounted for in an agent-based simulation (ABS) such as a Pythagoras ABS or 
Map-Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA). 
G. APPROACH 
The use of ABS allows for the observation of emergent behaviors in a scenario, 
granted that the simulation appropriately represents the key behaviors under study.  This 
study generated a Pythagoras ABM for a theoretical emergency response situation.  The 
choice of Pythagoras as the software platform is due to its capacity to model human 
“soft” factors such as desires, tolerances, leadership traits, and “color” sidedness (Bitinas, 
Henscheid & Truong, 2003).  The study also uses simulation analysis concepts and 
design of experiment (DOE) methodology suggested by Sanchez (2006) to analyze the 
measures of effectiveness (MOEs) that are outputs from the scenario, allowing the 
investigator to draw reasonable scientific conclusions to the demonstrated behaviors 
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while relating them to the operational problems being studied.  Across this analysis is the 
ability to investigate many potentially influential factors and sources of uncertainty 
(Lucas, et al., 2007).  
H. SCOPE 
 This research focuses on the immediate response by Singaporean police, civil 
defense (medical and fire service), and military CBRE to a theoretical activation of a 
CIED along a major shopping belt in downtown Singapore.  The scenario attempts to 
base the response of these forces on the open source information published in 
Singaporean media for Exercise NorthStar V, relevant first response procedures within 
the SAF.  Where appropriate, weapon, sensor, and communications data available in open 
source and from United States Army Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center 
Monterey (TRAC-MTRY) is used.   
 The work focuses on the following research questions: 
 How feasible are existing operational templates, TTPs, and information- 
making processes? 
 
 How robust are current procedures in containing civilians exposed to chemical 
agents? 
 
 What factors influence the efficiency of emergency response procedures? 
 
 To what degree does civilian compliancy affect the performance of casualty 
treatment? 
I. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The following chapters will provide specific background on the simulation area, 
details on the development of the model, the manner in which the data will be collected 
for analysis, and the resultant conclusions.  Figure 1 shows an illustration of the scientific 
design and approach.  
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Figure 1.   Scientific design and approach taken in the course of the research (From: 
Sanchez, 2006). 
 
Chapter II describes in detail the framework of the Singaporean Incident 
Response and Management system and serves as a primer to the reader in understanding 
the procedures conducted by elements under the MHA and the SAF.  For creating the 
simulation scenario, the study also references pertinent historical examples that serve as 
major case studies to the Singaporean system.  To scope the design of the model, this 
research interprets the Critical Operational Issues (COIs), MOEs and Measures of 
Performance (MOPs) for the emergency response.  The study elaborates on these using 
various scenarios for the simulation.  
Chapter III describes the modeling methodology used to create the scenario, 
inclusive of the how various elements are captured in the modeling of agents and the 
environment.  Chapter III also draws attention to certain qualitative factors of importance.  
It describes how this study departs from the works of Kent (2007) and Roginski (2006), 
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which this study builds on.  Chapter IV describes the experimental design and simulation 
analysis, followed by the treatment of output to extract the relevant MOEs.  Chapter V 
summarizes the data, introduces the analytical tools, and an assessment is made using 
data plots, curve fitting, regression trees, and other simulation output analysis methods.  
Chapter VI discusses the results from the analyses and draws conclusions relevant to the 
research questions posed.  Chapter VI also discusses the suitability of Pythagoras for 
modeling deliberate and emergency responses at the national level.  The chapter 
concludes the research by suggesting future research opportunities and extensions, based 
on the current work.  
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II. SCENARIO OVERVIEW 
A. HISTORICAL REFERENCES  
 To design a believable scenario for the simulation, the study relies on a select 
number of historical examples, much in the same way Exercise NorthStar V referenced 
recent terrorist events.  Figure 2 shows scenes that represent critical functions in the 
emergency response during these historical incidents.   
 
 
Figure 2.   Images from historical incidents used for reference in the study.  Each 
image demonstrates a specific role required for emergency response. (A) 
Casualty evacuation: Tokyo subway attack; (B) Site security: London train 
bombings; (C) Site decontamination: Tokyo subway Attack; (D) Post blast 
investigation: Jakarta Marriott bombing (A and C from 
http://aboutjapan.japansociety.org; B from www.bbc.co.uk; D from 
Associated Press). 
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NorthStar V incorporated the characteristics of the following major incidents 
(Singapore Civil Defence Force, 2006):    
1.  Tokyo Subway Attack (1995) 
The attack executed by the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo on March 20, 1995, was 
the deadliest and most notorious attack that involved the use of a chemical warfare agent 
on a target population in a public place.  A total of 600 grams of 2-(Fluoro-
methylphosphoryl)oxypropane, commonly known as sarin (NATO classification GB), 
was used in the form of multiple devices distributed and released in an underground 
subway station running under several prominent government buildings.  In total, 12 
people were killed and thousands were injured, with official numbers for injuries 
estimated at below 4000 (Kaplan, 2000).  It was acknowledged by the Japanese 
authorities that, of the majority of victims treated by hospitals within the first 24 hours of 
the incident, close to 74% could be classified as “worried well,” as they had no evident 
signs of nerve agent exposure (Stokes, 1997).  The Tokyo subway attack is significant as 
it demonstrated the effectiveness of a small chemical payload in generating both physical 
casualties and mass hysteria.  As a landmark incident, the attack lends itself to replication 
by terrorist groups as a means to create fear.  The impact of mass hysteria is also a 
significant research question, as the impact of a panicked population may affect both the 
efficiency of an emergency response and unnecessarily load the public healthcare system.  
 
2.  Jakarta JW Marriott Hotel Bombings (2003) 
The vehicular bomb used by JI in the execution of this incident exemplified an 
emerging trend in terrorist attacks in the region, one that was repeated September 28, 
2008 in Islamabad, Pakistan, targeting another hotel under the Marriott label.  The earlier 
incident involved an IED concealed in a mini-van on the periphery of the JW Marriott 
Hotel in South Jakarta, killing 12 people and injuring 500 bystanders, mostly Indonesian 
with the exception of a few Danish and Chinese tourists (Associated Press, 2003).  The 
second incident was reported to have involved a dump truck as the vehicle bomb, which 
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exploded at the security fence of the hotel (Rupert & Sharif, 2008).  These incidents 
signify a prolonged association of such private organizations with the real targets of the 
perpetrators.  This association is a case for concern for private and public institutions 
alike and often means that collateral damage is unavoidable.  With this in mind, prior 
planning for consequence management can mitigate the impact of such events in the 
future.  A thorough understanding of the environment surrounding a high profile target 
can improve emergency response.  A series of scenarios will be generated in this study to 
demonstrate an analysis to prove this point. 
3.  London Public Transport System Bombings (2005) 
 The bombings in London are of particular interest to the Singaporean MHA, given 
the similarities between London and Singapore, and also because of the Singaporean 
reactions following the Madrid train bombings in March 2004.  The London bombings 
also differed from the prior experiences of the British with domestic terrorism by the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA), where the impact of large payload devices would at times, be 
mitigated by deliberate tip-offs from the IRA (Dillion, 1996).  For instance, the 1993 
Bishopgate bombing involved an activation of a one-ton fertilizer bomb within a dump 
truck in London, resulting in a single death and 44 casualties (Schmidt, 1993).  By 
comparison, the 2005 London bombings were an unannounced but coordinated multi-
effort attack, distributed over both underground and surface levels, the latter in buses, 
resulting in 52 dead and 700 injured from four man-portable devices.  In response to the 
bombings, Singaporean authorities immediately enforced security measures on the public 
transport system, drastically altering the public security landscape.  Armed patrols 
established themselves within mass rapid transit (MRT) stations by police officers from 
the special operations command (SOC) (Singapore Police Force, 2005a).  The 
government proposed plans for closed-circuit television (CCTV) installation in all trains 
and buses.  Then, to assure public concerns, the MHA updated the public on the progress 
of the planned MRT security unit (Singapore Police Force, 2005b), unlike in the past, 
when the public would go about their lives unaware of such matters.  Security was also 
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enhanced for the 117th International Olympic Committee (IOC) session in Singapore, in 
addition to the dedicated response force elements already allocated for the two weeks of 
the session’s assembly.  It can be said that the occurrence of the London bombings have 
resulted in a shift in resources to the daily assurance of public security vis-à-vis deliberate 
operations for high profile events.  It would therefore be interesting to observe the effect 
of routine armed patrols at popular venues, such as Orchard Road, a major shopping belt 
in the business district, or Holland Village, a residential area known for its large 
expatriate population.  
B. EXERCISE NORTHSTAR V  
 Exercise NorthStar V was a national exercise involving a “worst-case scenario” 
terrorist attack across the island of Singapore, a scenario that was based on the events of 
the above historical examples (Singapore Civil Defence Force, 2006).  As a part of the 
nation’s concept of “Total Defence,” the exercise’s further motivations include the 
following:  
 The continued implication of Singapore as a probable terrorist target (Internal 
Security Department, 2003; Henson, 2006). 
 
 The need to assess the responsiveness of the existing protocols for the different 
agencies involved in a response (Loh, 2006).  
 
 The (then) global trends in terrorist actions on public train and bus systems. 
 
 The increased dependence of the population on this infrastructure in the future. 
 
 The need to ensure emergency preparedness for subterranean incidents.   
 
Five attacks (five explosive, with one chemical payload) were role-played at four 
train stations and one bus interchange within a span of 15 minutes (Henson, 2006).  The 
“impact” of the attacks was meant to affect 13 different underground train stations and 
lead to a 3-hour emergency response period followed by a longer post-blast investigation 
phase.  Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of these affected areas by geography.   
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Figure 3.   Affected areas in Exercise NorthStar V, Singapore (From: Google Earth 
and Google Maps, 2008; locations From the New Paper, 2006). 
 
It is difficult to determine if future responses will be typified by that demonstrated 
by NorthStar V because of the considerable administrative preparations prior to the 
exercise event, reported to have taken place as early as six months before the incident.  
Nonetheless, local press brought attention to several observations worth mentioning 
(TODAY News Desk, 2006): 
1.  Response Time of CBRE Responders 
CBRE elements took up to 30 minutes to arrive at the major incident sites in the 
exercise.  It was explained by the SAF that the CBRE elements would respond with an 
advanced party on site within 15 minutes and a main body within 30 minutes.  At a 
glance, this issue appears to be a routing problem from the main base of the CBRE 
elements to the rest of the island, a problem that is common to all elements responding to 
the incident.  This research attempts to capture this response time as a reference and 
determine the impact of first responder arrival time on the civilian casualties incurred.  
The research will not answer the question on routing or base camp placement because it 
is beyond the scope of the experiment. 
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2.  Exposure of Non-ambulatory Casualties to the Environment 
Two instances suggest an apparent lack of focus on limiting the exposure of non-
ambulatory casualties to the environment. One observation noted a deficit of chemical 
respirator hoods for casualties as they were transported out of a “sarin-contaminated” 
incident site on gurneys.  Another observation involved the exposure of casualties to the 
open rain.  In the context of a low-resolution simulation, exposure can be demonstrated 
by the continued presence of chemical agents in the affected area, up to the time of 
reasonable dilution to non-lethality.  Constant interaction of civilian casualties with these 
agents can therefore be recorded as an accumulation or degradation of a civilian attribute, 
an abstraction of human health.  When configured this way, the impact of specific actions 
scripted in a simulation might be able to determine what actions or policies would be best 
for reducing casualty exposure to the natural elements; however, it is a factor that is not 
considered in this study.  
3.  Administrative Break in Exercise Realism 
 The press and public alike observed administrative breaks, such as the 
early preparedness of public hospitals before the incidents occurred and the cessation of 
public use 15 minutes before the exercise.  This research scenario will assume no 
preparation other than that expected for daily staffing of standby activities.  In addition, 
the civilians in the scenario are implemented in a way to demonstrate continuous use of 
public areas, and have actions and behaviors shaped by the environment, such as the 
service capacity of walkways, roads, road curbs, and pedestrian crossings.  
 
C. DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT RESPONSE IN SINGAPORE  
Based on this author’s personal experience, correspondence with senior staff in 
the CBRE Defence Group and open-source literature, the study focuses on a multi-agency 
incident response.  In the event of a civil emergency due to a chemical agent release or 
IED explosion in a public area, the SCDF becomes the central coordinating agency for 
the consequence management (Singapore Civil Defence Force, 2006).  This obligates 
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command authority of SCDF and police assets to an SCDF officer acting as the incident 
manager, usually the senior Commander of the Division where the incident occurred.  
Figure 4 illustrates a possible arrangement of forces at the incident site. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Arrangement of emergency responders at the incident site (From: The 
New Paper, 2006). 
 
Depending on whether chemical agents are involved in the incident, medical 
support is provided by emergency medical technicians (EMTs) using an on-site triage, 
after which further care is provided at the nearest public hospital (The New Paper, 2006).  
When chemical agents are suspected or confirmed, mass casualty decontamination will 
occur onsite, prior to evacuation to hospitals (CBRNe World, 2007).  In the event of a 
bomb blast or a multiple-bomb blast situation, a joint emergency response in Singapore 
will consist of the following elements:  
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1.  Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF) 
    Depending on where the incident occurs, divisional fire companies 
respond to a reported incident by sending an initial first response consisting of an 
emergency medical service ambulance and a fire pump engine.  Each pump engine is now 
equipped to conduct the quick wash-down of contaminated individuals (termed “hasty 
mitigation”), to reduce the dwell time of chemical agents on civilian casualties.  The 
pump-engine team members are each equipped with fireproof “bunker” gear and a non-
circulating self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) set that provides a degree of 
protection against inhalation hazards.  Where necessary, the pump team may use butyl-
rubber suits in place of their bunker gear flame-retardant vests.  The leader of the pump 
team takes on the role of the breathing apparatus chart officer (BACO) and becomes the 
first coordinating commander until the SCDF incident manager (IM) arrives on scene.  
In the event of reported chemical agent attack, the SCDF sends a hazmat 
detachment, which is equipped to conduct emergency snatch rescues in a chemically 
contaminated environment, as well as the sampling and containment of a suspect 
contaminant.  Compared to the first-response rescuers staffing the pump-engines, the 
hazmat detachments are equipped with a greater assortment of individual protective 
equipment (IPE) suits, detectors, and chemical agent mitigation apparatus to control 
residual hazardous material, once casualties are rescued. 
 Emergency medical service teams arrive in two phases.  One team arrives with 
the initial fire pump engine as a first response vehicle.  The second team arrives to 
provide additional support with the follow-on SCDF force and to augment the first team 
in the set up of a triage area for chemical and bomb casualties.  The arrival of the second 
ambulance also allows the first to conduct any necessary evacuation to the hospital. The 
SCDF incident command post arrives to support the entire operation and serves as a 
nucleus for the distribution of information to all SCDF assets and adjacent agencies.  
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2.  Singapore Police Force (SPF) 
The SPF facilitates and helps in the rescue of casualties, secures and preserves the 
scene of the incident to facilitate evidence gathering, and conduct crime and post-blast 
investigation to apprehend the perpetrators (Singapore Police Force, 2006).  Other actions 
would include protecting the public and key installations from further attacks, providing 
information and assistance to the affected public, and public reassurance to facilitate a 
speedy return to normalcy. 
 Like the SCDF, the SPF is organized into separate ground divisions that preside 
over the policing of different parts of Singapore, with fast response cars arriving on-scene 
within seven to ten minutes.  Divisional patrol officers responding to the scene of a 
terrorist attack would immediately proceed to secure the incident site and roads to 
facilitate the ingress and egress for emergency response teams and vehicles to the site.  
Patrol officers facilitate evacuation management, preserve the incident scene and look for 
eyewitnesses, while the SCDF conducts rescue operations and provides first aid to 
victims.  Roadblocks and increased checks would be carried out by police at the vicinity 
and other locations to look for suspects connected with the incident.  A team of criminal 
investigators, trained in post-blast investigation, would descend on the scene soon after 
and process the crime scene to identify the type of explosive, device, or method used.  
Witnesses identified by patrol officers prior to their arrival would be interviewed, and 
CCTV footage from MRT stations, transport operators, and other possible sources would 
be retained and reviewed.  Subsequent investigation may lead to the contact of regional 
and international foreign counterparts. 
3.  Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) 
The SAF provides CBRE standby teams maintaining explosive ordnance disposal 
(EOD), chemical, biological, and radiological defense (CBRD), detection and 
identification, and post-blast investigation elements.  An additional CBRE officer serves 
as an alternate subject matter expert (SME) to support the team leader’s analysis and 
command decisions.  The CBRE officer acts as a liaison between the Incident 
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Management Group and IM to the CBRE standby team.  The standby team is equipped 
with assets for the overt search and identification of IEDs and chemical agents (CAs).  It 
has its own vehicular platform and an EOD bomb containment vessel that can allow the 
movement and disposal of a small explosive payload.  The CBRE standby team ensures 
survivability and provides defense against secondary payloads that may be placed on-site 
to target first responders.  
4.  Other Elements   
The Singapore Ministry of Health (MOH) and Ministry of the Environment play a 
role in post-response mitigation.  The MOH assigns specific hospitals to deal with 
chemical and biological threats, where on-site facilities are available to cater for casualty 
care.  The Ministry of the Environment is responsible for post-incident co-ordination with 
the SCDF or SAF to facilitate the decontamination and disposal of contaminated material, 
to return the affected area to normalcy.   
D. DELIBERATE VERSUS STANDBY RESPONSE  
A deliberate response effort varies from a standby response effort in the sense that 
the deliberate response is a one-off, pre-conceived plan in support of a larger, high-profile 
event, whereas a standby response is a continuous obligation required to maintain a 
degree of high readiness in anticipation of a sudden, unexpected civil emergency.  Based 
on these definitions, an example of a deliberate response was demonstrated for the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Conference in Singapore in 2006 (Boey, 2006) and 
the IOC meetings of the same year.  An example of a deliberate response effort in 
simulation is demonstrated by Roginski’s Baltimore model (2006), where police and 
EMT units are available on site in a public carnival celebration.  The research scenario 
implemented in this study will instead demonstrate a standby response, where the 
affected area is devoid of emergency responders and civilians must manage in the 
presence of the hazard for a brief period, before responders arrive on scene. 
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E. CRITICAL OPERATIONAL ISSUES (COI), MEASURES OF 
EFFECTIVENESS (MOE), AND PERFORMANCE (MOP) 
 Central to the emergency response are COIs and accompanying MOEs central to 
the standby response to a CIED incident.  Based on the author’s studies, a select number 
of COIs are summarized in Table 1.  MOPs refer to one or many quantifiable measures 
from which the MOE may be determined.  Some of the COIs and MOEs will be selected 
to guide the construction of the simulation.  Returning an incident site to normalcy occurs 
as part of consequence management for a CIED incident.  Limitations of the simulation 
prevent their analysis in this research.  As such, a degree of abstraction is required to 
relate the performance measures derived from the simulation to the real-life MOEs.  
 
NO. CRITICAL 
OPERATIONAL ISSUES 
MEASURES OF 
EFFECTIVENESS 
MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE 
1 Effectiveness of the 
Emergency Activation 
Improvement of Civilian 
Survivorship Over No 
Response 
Civilian Survivorship 
 
Arrival Time of Standby Forces 
 
2 Treatment of Civilian 
Casualties 
Change in Civilian  
Survivorship Over No 
Response 
Percent Alive, Injured and Dead 
civilians with/without Response 
 
Probability of Survivorship with 
Response is Better Than No Response 
 
3 Securing and Control of 
Incident Site and population 
Reduction in Civilian 
Panic 
Degree of Panic/Calm Experienced by 
Civilian 
4 Survivability of Emergency 
Responders 
Survivorship of 
Responders 
 
Reduction in Hazard 
Exposure 
 
Amount of CA Exposure to responders 
 
Number of Responders Sustaining  
Injuries 
 
5 Return to Normalcy Speed to which site is 
returned to normalcy. 
Numbers of days taken for site to 
return to public use. 
Table 1.  MOEs and MOPs for COIs considered in study.  COI 5 (Return to 
Normalcy), in italics, will not be addressed in the study, although it is no 
less important an issue in the response, as early actions will affect how 
easy a return to normalcy can be achieved. 
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 Central to the emergency response is the need to reduce civilian casualties and 
implement site control.  The study elaborates on these two issues in the later chapters. 
F. SCENARIO FOR THE INCIDENT 
Taking into consideration the historical and current state, as well as certain COIs 
to the response, a theoretical scenario is crafted for the simulation.  The study describes a 
typical morning along Orchard Road (1° 30’45” N, 103° 83’26” E), an urban shopping 
belt within the central business district of Singapore.  The scenario takes into account a 
terrorist group with a considerably high degree of technical expertise, in that they are able 
to construct concealed devices and obtain hard -to-find components for chemical agents 
and vehicular bombs.   
1. Environment: Urban Shopping Belt 
a.  Basis for the Scenario 
  To replicate the operational pressures presented in the London bombings, 
multiple bomb attacks were scripted in NorthStar V.  This involved four underground 
transit train stations, and one bus station located in a major residential hub.  The train 
station attacks proved difficult to model in Pythagoras, which cannot model effects over 
multiple surface layers.  In addition, major bomb attacks on surface-level targets are more 
common.  Based on recent terrorist incidents in Asia, ground-level attacks, particularly 
using concealed vehicular bombs, are more prevalent.  The recent occurrence of the 
Marriott hotel bombing in Islamabad, Pakistan, is an example of a vehicular bomb attack 
at ground level that had been stopped by a primary barrier fence (Rupert & Sharif, 2008).  
As such, the scenario generated for this research is limited to incidents at ground level; 
however, floor elevation and ceiling height of terrain features such as buildings, trees and 
passages will also be represented.  
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b. Characteristics of the Environment 
  This study chooses to focus on a theoretical attack on a department store 
located within a major shopping belt in Singapore.  This would be a visible incident that 
would undermine both domestic and international confidence in Singapore’s security.  
The location has the following characteristics: 
• A low level of security prevails, in that there are few elements that screen and 
process the crowd and environment for any security threats.  Although routine 
patrols by the SOC have been put in place at this shopping belt since 2005, for 
the purpose of the study, the assumption is made that this measure serves as a 
patrol and reactionary force, but not a security screen.  
 
• A hybrid sector-nuclei type topographical layout, shaped by the pre- and post-
historical arrangement of roads in Singapore, that differs from typical grid-
type urban geographies in the United States.  
 
• A heterogeneous population of individuals with their own goals and 
directions.  Certain goals are shared while some are varied, but movement and 
behavior to achieve the objectives are consistently guided by major factors 
such as accessibility of entries and exits, public transportation, corridors for 
mobility and known-obstacles. 
 
• A transient density of people per unit area of land, in that the density of people 
in a given area will change as long as the service levels of passages are 
adequate enough to limit the formation of lines and bottlenecks at any 
particular place.     
 
• A moderate flow rate of service areas, as several improvements over the 
lifespan of the shopping area has led to improved pedestrian service standards. 
 
• A standard building height, in that urban planning and fire safety regulations 
fix the maximum building heights of retail and office establishments, so they 
do not vary greatly over a map grid area. 
  
 These characteristic details are illustrated in Figure 5, which show an aerial view 
of the affected area in the scenario.  
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Figure 5.   Affected area of scenario and characteristic details.  (A) Marriott Hotel 
and Tangs Shopping Centre. (B) Wheelock Place. (C) Takashimaya and 
Ngee Ann City. (D) Plaza Singapura shopping center exterior. (E) 
Junction of Orchard and Scotts Roads. (F) Orchard Road MRT entrance. 
Satellite imagery from Google Earth. All inserts from Flickr 
(www.flickr.com). 
 
2. Terrorist Target 
The target store is situated near notable buildings and establishments that have 
been linked to Western influence, such as the Marriott Hotel.  This store shares its 
location with a busy street junction and acts as a viable thoroughfare from all directions 
of the junction.  Near the target is a public underpass that sees a high level of pedestrian 
service, as they link two opposite sides of Orchard Road.   
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3. Chemical and Explosive Device 
 Devices of varying payloads and quantities have seen use in many urban terrorist 
incidents, ranging from man-portable devices (Schmidt, 1993; Kaplan, 2000) to vehicle 
bombs (Rupert & Sharif, 2008).  The main characteristic to be modeled for the device is 
its area of influence, which would be translated from the payload and the blast kinetics 
related to it.  This study models both a device of the maximum size possible to remain 
concealable in a store, as well as a device that can be transported reasonably within a 
mini-van travelling along the major road through the shopping belt.  The scenario uses an 
equivalent chemical payload as that in the Tokyo subway attacks (10 to 600 grams of 
liquid sarin) in the agent-based scenario for the initiation of the emergency response. 
4. Civilian Behavior 
a. Basis for the Scenario 
  Common principles applying cognitive sciences to computer simulation 
(Kaminka & Fridman, 2007), civil engineering, and emergency planning (Sime, 1995) 
allow for the intelligent design of urban areas and consequence management.  The human 
intangibles involved, however, are still theoretically subjective and simulation-specific 
limitations restrict the complexity of how definitive such behaviors can be described.  To 
characterize civilian behavior in the scenario, an appreciation of crowd psychology is 
needed.  This research will therefore suffice with a low-resolution model of crowd 
psychology, focused on its impact on the motor behavior of the individual.  
 One prominent idea used to describe civilian behavior in crowds, termed 
the Social Comparison Theory, is that when a group is presented with the same stimulus, 
individuals begin to compare and associate themselves to others that are in the same 
situation, and thereby imitate common behavior (Festinger, 1954).  This may lead to 
social attachment to leader figures and risk collective peril (Mawson, 2005).  This 
concept, however, has often been disproved by historical examples.  An elaboration of 
the idea is that members in a crowd can behave consistently with individual identities and 
be governed by the social norms of the situation. This proposition explains why mass 
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panic manifests rarely and the public behaviors resulting out of this panic can often be 
varied, ranging from self-centeredness to pure altruism.  This study attempts to model this 
range in the context of panic and compliancy; the intrinsic compliancy of civilians 
changes under stress, as does the degree of public hysteria that the civilian is able to 
withstand, before he/she ultimately succumbs to panic.   
  This study focuses on the initial phases of the emergency response and 
will therefore concentrate on the typical behaviors demonstrated in response to the 
physical hazards.  The simulation implements a simple model for two aspects of stress: 
the physical stress that comes with bodily harm, resulting from both the physical injury 
that may come from the IED and gas effects, and the psychological stress that may affect 
the civilians’ response to others.  The personalities of each individual civilian will first be 
characterized in general by their tendency to comply with instruction, their propensity to 
panic, and their desires for movement.  The stress incurred by each civilian will influence 
his or her movement in the simulation.  A stressor will influence the motor behavior of 
the civilian in that he may physically respond in a rational manner (i.e., extricate himself 
from a threat) or an irrational manner (i.e., move randomly or freeze in place).  The 
behavior will therefore demonstrate the civilians’ exposure, and hence their response, to 
the stressors in the simulation.   
b.  Civilian Interaction with Government Agents 
  In the event of an emergency response, civilian interaction with 
emergency responders is expected.  Civilians will behave differently to what they 
perceive to be sources of authority.  There are social, cultural and intrinsic behaviors that 
may influence a civilian’s response to a person of authority, such as a police officer or 
SCDF specialist.  This research will not discuss the factors governing this and will 
instead classify them as noise factors in the environment with which the emergency 
responders must manage.  First responders will therefore have to work with crowds of 
varied disposition—either compliant, neutral (ambivalent) or non-compliant (more “self-
serving” in this context). 
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c.  Civilians in the Scenario 
  In the context of the scenario, the civilians in the simulation represent the 
early morning shopping crowds that throng the shopping district.  Major department 
stores are easily populated with sparse, but directed, crowds that move along major 
thoroughfares linking the inside of the shops to the outside environment.  
5. Description of the Response 
 The following descriptions will explain the emergency response procedures 
generalized from multiple open-source references and used here to create our scenario.  
Several aspects of these procedures are made transparent and known to the public to 
facilitate the emergency response.  Figure 6 shows illustrations from one such effort, a 
civil defense handbook distributed to all households for public education for emergency 
preparedness given a terrorist attack.  It demonstrates the flow of the response activity 
from the civilian’s point of view.  
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Figure 6.   Initial response to CIED incident.  A device is hidden in a public location 
(A) and activated, leading to casualties (B) and the reaction by the public 
(C). Emergency calls to the police central radio dispatch (D) activate both 
initial response units to the site, and subsequently follow-on SCDF 
presence to treat civilians, who must register for decontamination or 
contact tracing purposes (F).  From SCDF Emergency Handbook 2007.  
 
a. Incident Management Cascade 
The response time for the activation of each individual force to a CIED 
incident is shown in Table 2.  Timings are based on open source information and some 
approximation is accommodated.  For the purposes of this study, only the acute phase of 
the response is described in the following table. 
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No. Event Action 
Authorities 
Forces and Means to Arrive On Site Time 
(Minutes) 
1 Reporting of 
Incident  
Divisional Police  NA T + 0 
2 Initial Assessment Divisional Police Police Fast Response Car 
Patrol Officers (acts as IM) 
T + 7 
3 Activation of 
Initial Response 
Force 
Divisional Police  
Divisional Fire Company  
SCDF Pump Engine  
SCDF Rescue Crew 
SCDF Duty Pump officer (new acting IM) 
SCDF Emergency Medical Team (1) 
T + 15 
4 Activation of 
Follow-on forces 
and   
Incident 
Management  
Divisional Police 
Traffic Police (TP) 
Divisional Fire Company 
Divisional hazmat 
Detachment 
SAF CBRE DG 
Civil Medical 
Authorities(MOH) 
Infrastructure 
Authorities (Public 
Utilities, Environment, 
media and Info-
communications, Gas and 
Power, Land and Building) 
Incident Command Post 
SCDF Leader (new acting IM) 
Divisional Police Leader 
TP Motorbike Officers 
TP Leader  
Hazmat Team 
Hazmat Control Vehicle 
SCDF Decontamination Pod 
SCDF Emergency Medical Team (2) 
SAF CBRE Standby Team 
SAF Leader 
Bomb Containment Vessel 
SAF CBRE Response Vehicle 
T + 30  
5 Security and 
Cordon  
Divisional Police  
SOC 
Police Tactical Units 
SOC Leader 
Divisional Police Patrol Officers 
Criminal Investigation Department Team  
T + 45 
6 Initial 
Investigation 
SPF (Criminal 
Investigation Department), 
SAF  
SAF Post-Blast Investigators T + 60 
7 Decontamination SCDF 
SAF 
Civil Authorities (health, 
environment and public 
utilities) 
As Above As required 
8 Verification, 
Monitoring, and 
Disposal  
SAF 
SCDF 
Civil Authorities 
(environment and public 
utilities) 
As Above As required 
9 Return to 
Normalcy 
SCDF 
 Divisional Police  
Traffic Police 
Infrastructure Authorities 
 As required 
Table 2.  Incident management (IM) cascade for standby response to CIED incident.  
Events in italics are considered outside of the acute phase.  
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b. Initial Response Forces 
  The scenario takes place in the central business district, so the responding 
police division is the central police division. On the confirmation of an emergency police 
calls reporting a possible CIED incident, one or two first response cars (FRC) arrive on 
the scene within five to fifteen minutes.  Patrol officers with the FRC will provide initial 
assessment of the incident, to be relayed by radio back to the divisional headquarters.  
Patrol officers with the FRC would attempt to proceed to secure the incident site and 
roads to facilitate the ingress and egress for emergency response teams and vehicles to 
the site.  The patrol officers continue to treat the site as having possible criminal activity.  
One fire pump engine and an emergency medical team on a SCDF ambulance will also 
arrive on activation.  These assets are expected to arrive slightly later than the FRCs, as 
they are larger and slower vehicles.  The duty pump officer will decide on the initial 
isolation zone and protective action zone, based on the information that the patrol officers 
can provide.  The duty pump specialist and firefighters will proceed to adopt a protective 
posture to attempt a snatch rescue of any non-ambulatory casualties.  If a chemical agent 
is detected, a hasty decontamination procedure will be attempted using the fire pump 
engine and fire hose spray on ambulatory and non-ambulatory civilians affected by the 
chemical agent. 
c. Follow-On Forces 
  When a central dispatch authority activates emergency procedures for a 
CIED incident, SCDF hazmat, SAF CBRE standby teams, traffic police (TP) and the 
Police Tactical Unit (PTU) from the SOC will be activated to send a detachment to the 
incident site.  Each detachment will originate from different headquarters and their 
approaches to the incident site are expected to be different.  Depending on the scale of the 
incident and assets on site, vehicular incident command posts may be activated and called 
on site. An SCDF senior commander will be installed as the principal IM.  
  Divisional police will send more patrol cars to create a buffer zone around 
the Incident Command Post (ICP).  These patrol officers will have orders to stop civilians 
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fleeing the site and, if they are believed to have been casualties or are chemically 
contaminated, order them to proceed to the casualty decontamination point and triage site 
set up by the follow-on SCDF elements.  This is to facilitate mass-casualty 
decontamination, as well as to prevent the contamination of other health-care facilities on 
the island (CBRNe World, 2007).  The PTU will conduct a roving patrol within the 
security area and perimeter of the warm zone. The PTU is equipped with tactical combat 
gear and is meant to specifically target human threats, such as terrorist instigators.  At the 
same time, they direct civilians and ambulatory casualties to the SCDF treatment sites.  
  TP motorbike officers will arrive with a leader, who will coordinate with 
the IM on the establishment of the road cordon. TP motorbikes will secure and block off 
road routes in accordance with the implemented zoning template.  They will facilitate the 
evacuation of road-vehicles out of the incident site and ensure the fast entry and exit of 
the responders.  They also keep non-essential personnel out of the affected area in order 
to minimize congestion that may hamper follow-on forces.  
 The SCDF hazmat team conducts a more definitive sweep of the 
chemically contaminated area to look for more casualties and conduct chemical agent 
identification.  The decontamination pod and teams set up an additional two lines for the 
decontamination of civilians by gender.  The follow-on ambulance sets up a triage site to 
process casualties after decontamination and evacuate civilians, if necessary, to a hospital 
equipped for chemical casualties.   
 The SAF CBRE standby team will arrive on-site to conduct secondary 
device searches for the work area.  They will also confirm, independently from the 
SCDF, the chemical verification results to facilitate criminal investigation.  If a secondary 
device is discovered, they will proceed with render safe and disposal procedures.  The 
CBRE leader, in conjunction with the IM, will implement re-zoning for a chemical 
hazard, if necessary.  
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Leaders from the different response elements co-locate with the SCDF ICP, which 
will be located on the perimeter of the warm zone.  Liaisons from various civil authorities 
plan at the SCDF tactical headquarters (HQ) to work on the appropriate consequence 
management actions.   
d. Command, Control, and Communications 
  The emergency response may be executed with multiple tactical HQs for 
each component force on-site.  Alternately, a common ICP may be arranged for the 
collective coordination of efforts for consequence management.  Each individual 
response organization maintains its own chain of command, but efforts are coordinated 
through each organization’s leader for on-site activities, to the IM from the SCDF.  
Ideally, these leaders share and update information on the locations and activities of the 
emergency responders: data that is monitored centrally at the ICP. 
 Communications employed in the emergency response exist mostly in the 
form of independent radio networks that are set up on-site.  These “radio-nets” may be 
encrypted or open-channel and it is the responsibility of each component response force 
to provide a link to the ICP.  The ranges and effectiveness of the communications are not 
available for publication in this research.   
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III. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter describes the modeling methodology used to create the scenario, 
inclusive of the how various features and elements central to the scenario are captured in 
the modeling of agents and the environment.  This chapter also draws attention to certain 
qualitative factors of importance.  Additionally, it explains how this study departs from 
the works of Kent (2007) and Roginski (2006), which this study builds on. 
A. GOALS 
The simulation models the acute phase of the emergency response in the scenario 
described in Chapter II. This phase is characterized by time-sensitive elements like 
casualty evacuation, site security and secondary device search.  The goal is to measure 
the impact of various tactical factors on the effectiveness of emergency response.  The 
research questions are kept in mind to facilitate our design of the simulation: 
 How feasible are existing operational templates, TTPs, and information 
making processes? 
 
 How robust are current procedures in containing civilians exposed to chemical 
agents? 
 
 What factors influence the efficiency of emergency response procedures? 
 
 To what degree does civilian compliancy affect the performance of casualty 
treatment? 
B. PYTHAGORAS AGENT-BASED MODELING (ABM) 
1. Background 
An emergency response to a crisis can be described as a multi-sided event that 
sees various interactions between the affected environment, the populations involved and 
the leadership available in these conditions.  Given these considerations, several features 
in Pythagoras lend themselves to the simulation of a crisis response (Northrop Grumman 
2008).  See Figure 7 for a diagram illustrating the relationships of different factors 
considered in Pythagoras.  In brief: 
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 It incorporates soft rules to distinguish unique agents. 
 
 It uses desires to motivate agents into moving and shooting. 
 
 It includes the concept of affiliation (established by sidedness or color 
value) to differentiate agents into members of a unit, friendly agents, 
neutrals, or enemies. 
 
 It allows for behavior-changing events and actions (called triggers) 
that may be invoked in response to simulation activities. 
 
 It retains traditional weapons, sensors, and terrain. 
 
 
Figure 7.   Venn diagram demonstrating the tightly coupled nature of leadership, 
physical elements and human factors (From:  Northrop Grumman, 2008). 
  
The current release of Pythagoras, version 2.0.3, has improved features over 
version 1.10—mainly an increase in available terrain map size and an increase in attribute 
slots assignable to agents. 
Use of the program requires little technical experience or prior knowledge.  A 
major strength is the capability to translate these features into a visual representation on 
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the computer.  A simulation playback screen allows for the observation of emergent 
behaviors based on the soft rules defined by the user.  These observations may be 
supported by historical references or be completely counter-intuitive. 
The study chooses Pythagoras because several key methods and components had 
already seen configuration in the form of a Pythagoras scenario, the feasibility of which 
has been demonstrated in the previous thesis works of Kent (2007) and Roginski (2006).  
Given the time limitations to learn the program from scratch, the study advantages on this 
existing knowledge base to reduce the time required to learn the simulation-modeling 
tool.  
2.  Complexity of Use 
The complexity of the Pythagoras model depends on the complexity of the 
process being simulated.  Ideally, the problem should be abstracted to a reasonable level 
that facilitates both easy configuration and logical output of data during simulation.  This 
does not mean that Pythagoras is only limited to solving simple, tactical problems. The 
advantage of Pythagoras is the flexibility of design, in that no combat or operational 
states are defined in the program—the user conditions such behaviors.  Multiple options 
can be configured by employing novel design techniques. 
Unfortunately, a major weakness is precisely this; a tolerance for complexity 
results in the inclusion of excessive detail.  If a process is not abstracted to a reasonable 
degree, the concept of using Pythagoras as a low-resolution model is lost, as designs 
become increasingly intricate. 
Nonetheless, it is the opinion of this researcher that the only limitations to the 
employment of Pythagoras for the design of any scenario are time and computer 
processor speed.  Time limits the number of behaviors configured in the scenario, while 
processor speed limits the reasonable return on investment (ROI) in terms of raw data 
obtained for the time.     
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C. VARIATIONS FROM PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 Several notable references and comparisons are made to the works of Kent (2007) 
and Roginski (2006), although major differences do exist.  In some areas of reference, 
aspects of their design were tested and altered.   
1.   Variations from Kent 
MAJ Walter Kent’s Pythagoras model, “Effects of Situational Awareness on 
Infantry in an Urban, Chemical Environment,” studied the implications of a future-force 
warrior platoon having to employ nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) protective 
posture.  Details obtained from MAJ Kent’s analysis dealt only with modeling techniques 
pertaining to Pythagoras.  No classified material was used.  
Kent implemented a scheme of troop behaviors to a chemical agent, focusing 
primarily on lethal and symptomatic effects.  This present study requires a scheme to 
model approximate nerve agent behavior on both civilians and emergency responders.  
As such, this study adopts Kent’s scheme for emergency responder behavior in response 
to the CA, and uses the same characteristics to generate a similar scheme for civilians, 
who are bereft of protective equipment or detectors.  
Kent also demonstrated a Chemical Vapor Model for Pythagoras, modeled for an 
outdoor release over a semi-built-up area.  Principal considerations for the design and 
configuration of the Pythagoras representation dealt mainly with modeling plume effects 
over such areas.  The scheme of behaviors for the chemical agent pertains to a non-
explosive open-air release.  This present study calibrates the behavior of the agent and the 
model using a test scheme to tune the settings of the simulation “agent” representing sarin 
and reconfigures their behavior to include explosive dispersal for an outdoor and indoor 
release in urban terrain.  Factors such as large plumes, wind tunnels, encapsulation, and 
volatility (as a function of time) are also added to the scheme prescribed by Kent.  
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2.  Variations from Roginski 
MAJ Jonathan Roginski’s work on “Emergency First Response to a Crisis Event: 
A Multi-Agent Approach” forms the second major work that this study builds on.  
Roginski’s work proposed an approach to exploring disaster and terrorist responses in an 
urban event by simulating theoretical scenarios for testing, evaluating and complementing 
national terrorism-preparedness exercises in the United States, such as Exercise 
TOPOFF.  This work centered on a deliberately planned emergency response, whereas 
this study focuses on the response to a sudden event with standby SOPs.  In addition, the 
scenario excludes the physical presence of terrorists, preferring to concentrate on 
interactions between the CIED, civilians and emergency responders. 
Roginski’s simulations employed both a “Man, woman, child” (gender/age) 
design, as well as a “Good-Bad-Neutral” (alignment) design to functionally characterize 
the behavior of civilians.  This study will not take into account the gender or age of the 
public affected; rather, for this research, it is more apt to concentrate on modeling the 
compliancy of the civilians.  In this respect, the simulation configured in this study 
modifies Roginski’s “alignment” design, altered with considerations from Festinger’s 
social comparison theory (1954) and the findings of Mawson (2005).   
Roginski’s implementation in Pythagoras also demonstrated a novel 
representation for an IED, the size and impact of which was based on the Oklahoma City 
bombings of April 1995.  This study analyzed the incident and reconfigured the design 
for the purposes of simulating a concealable payload for stationary indoor and outdoor 
activation, as well as a modification of the design to simulate a moving vehicle bomb.   
A major difference from Roginski’s implementation of civilian distribution is that 
in the current study, civilian movements are dictated by the terrain, their objectives 
relative to their roles (shopper or pedestrian), their desires (moving to next waypoint 
versus staying still), and their location (sidewalk or shop).  This replaces the random 
distribution employed by Roginski, as it is the author’s opinion that civilians in the 
scenarios either fulfill a purpose or are in transit to fulfilling their individual objectives, 
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and hence cannot be assumed to be randomly distributed.   Nonetheless, the design 
framework proposed by Roginski serves as a good basis for this research to elaborate.  
D. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SIMULATION MODEL 
1.  Time and Scale 
Time in Pythagoras is represented as discrete time steps.  As such, it is important 
to select an appropriate scale for real-time to simulation time step, so as to avoid agent 
“hopping;” an artifact behavior that results in agents “teleporting” from destination to 
destination, without ever interacting with the environment or other agents.  Other 
administrative factors limiting the size of representation include the availability and speed 
the scenario runs under high-performance computing.  For this study, one time step is 
selected to represent four seconds in real time.   
Map scale in this study is aided by the fact that Pythagoras 2.0.3 has an increased 
capacity for scenario map size, up to 4000 by 4000 pixels.  For this purpose, the 
simulation is set to the scale of one pixel to represent one square meter of real space.  A 
terrain map of 2700 by 1800 was specified to contain the simulation.  This corresponds to 
a 2.7 km by 1.8 km square area of operations.  
Height and altitude are similarly expressed in terms of pixels.  Where it is 
appropriate to represent elevated objects, the floor height of a terrain feature is increased.  
Ceiling height of a terrain feature represents its maximum height in the scenario.   
2. Terrain Features 
 To characterize major terrain elements, a total of 12 different “features” were 
generated in Pythagoras simulation model.  Each terrain feature has a set of attributes that 
can be configured to reflect the characteristics of the terrain element, such as predefined 
height, altitude, visibility, trafficability (for human mobility), protective properties, and 
values for concealment, which may be defined by pixel values or an arbitrary value 
setting from 0.0 to 1.0.  Concealment settings were set to determine the capacity for a 
terrain feature to conceal agents from sensors set to Channels A (olfactory for human 
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agents, chemoreception for detectors), B (visual) or C (audio).   These will be elaborated 
on for sensor descriptions.  See Table 3 for the Pythagoras terms associated with terrain 
characteristics deemed important for the simulation.   
 
Characteristics Actual Term Pythagoras Scale 
Height Height (m) Ceiling Height (pixels) 0 – 140 
Concealment Concealment Concealment 0.0 – 1.0 
Movement Trafficability Mobility 0.0 – 1.0 
Protection Cover Protection 0.0 – 1.0 
Table 3.  Translation of terrain element characteristics to Pythagoras feature terms 
(From: Roginski, 2006). 
 
Pythagoras may use terrain type settings as multipliers to modify the probabilities 
of detection, rate of movement, or probability of being killed by a specific weapon.  As 
Pythagoras takes into account only the top most layers of terrain features “drawn,” the 
order of features is important.  Table 4 lists the settings for the 12 features created, in 
order of implementation.  With respect to the scenario location, buildings have a 
relatively consistent ceiling height of 100 meters for retail outlets and 152 meters for tall 
buildings such as hotels and offices.  This is illustrated in the photograph shown in 
Figure 8.  
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Figure 8.   Above ground photo showing relatively uniform height of low-level and 
tall buildings.  Image from Flicker (www.flickr.com). 
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Concealment 
Color Name 
Height 
(pixels) A B C 
Mobility Protection 
Grey 50% Sidewalk 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.0 
Light Grey Pavement 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 
Black Road 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 
Magenta Building 100 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.2 
Dark Grey Expressway 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 
Sky Blue Water 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Dark Violet Tall Building 152 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 
Tan Inside Building 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.999 0.0 
Yellow Pedestrian Crossing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 
Green Vegetation 15 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 
Dark Green Unpassable Vegetation 20 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.2 
Maroon Building Facade 100 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.0 0.2 - 0.5 
Table 4.  Terrain types, colors and major settings used in the scenario. 
 
 An object that belongs to a specific type of terrain feature is “drawn” in the terrain 
map using the Pythagoras graphic user interface (GUI) and stored as a collection of 
waypoints closed by a loop.  Each terrain feature has a library of “objects” that can be 
accessed and copied in extensible markup language (XML) format via a text editor to 
another scenario file.  Figure 9 demonstrates this rendering, based on a satellite image of 
the scenario area.  To resolve certain technical limitations on agent movement, some 
curved passages in the map were altered to prevent agents from being “stuck” in the 
simulation.  
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Figure 9.   Segment of 2.7 by 1.8 sq. km. area of the central business district in 
Singapore (left), converted to Pythagoras Terrain Model (right).  Location 
in green box corresponds to that shown in Figure 5.  (Satellite imagery 
from Google Earth).  
 
3.  Weapons, Influence Tools and Restorative Capabilities 
a.  Description 
  Agents interact with their environment in Pythagoras via the use of 
weapons, which in turn may be re-termed “influence tools” if they represent effects other 
than a kinetic effect (KE).  Weapons may alter the target’s health, sidedness, or another 
user-selected attribute.  Their effectiveness is influenced by: 
 Probability of a hit associated with the weapon, as a function of range 
 
 The marksmanship of the agent shooting 
 
 The probability of kill or influence of the weapon, given a successful hit 
 
 The effectiveness of a weapon (i.e., lethality) 
 
 Vulnerability of the agent being shot 
 
 Protection factor offered by the terrain 
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  Table 5 summarizes the different weapons, influence tools, and restorative 
capabilities used in the simulation.  Appendix B describes the capabilities and settings of 
weapons, influence tools (ITs) and restorative capabilities (RCs) used in the scenario. 
 
Name Type User Target General Effect 
9 mm Pistol (Glock 19) KE Police E Reduce Health 
9 mm SMG (MP5) KE Police E Reduce Health 
M4 SMG KE SAF E Reduce Health 
IED  (lethal Zone) KE CIED F, E, N Reduce Health 
IED (Fragmentation) KE CIED F, E, N Reduce Health 
IED (Flash and sound) KE CIED F, E, N Create Panic 
Decontaminant RC SCDF decon crew F, N Reduce panic 
Detection Alert IT SAF, SCDF F Alert for Masking 
LethalChem KE CIED F, E, N Reduce Health, create panic 
MiosisChem KE CIED F, E, N Alter attributes,  create panic 
Medical Kit RC SCDF Medical F, N Increase health, create compliance 
OrdersFromCivilain IT Compliant civilians F, N Alter attributes, create compliance 
Orders_to_Civilians IT All Responders N Alter attributes,  Create compliance 
Panic_Shouting IT Panicking Civilians F, N Alter attributes, create panic 
Table 5.  Summary of Kinetic Effects (KE), Influence Tools (IT), and Restorative 
Capabilities (RC).  E = enemy; F = friendly; N = neutral.  
 
b.  Kinetic Effects (KEs) 
  KE refers to direct and indirect fire weapons, inclusive of the IED and 
chemical effects of sarin.  Weaponry configured for the scenario reflects those carried by 
the SPF and SAF, typically small caliber arms of 9mm.  Examples include 9 mm 
automatic pistols and MP5 submachine gun variants.  United States Army Materiel 
Systems Analysis Activity (USMSAA) data compiled by Roginski (2006) was used to 
represent these weapons in Pythagoras.  The effects of the IED are modeled as indirect 
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fire weapons with a probability of kill derived either as a cookie-cutter or Carleton 
damage function (see Chapter III, section 9 for more details).  LethalChem and 
MiosisChem demonstrate contaminating effects on target civilians by changing their 
color sidedness, in order to invoke an appropriate behavior from the emergency 
responders (see section 10 for more details).       
c.  Influence Tools (ITs) 
  ITs are used by one population of human agents in the scenario to exert an 
effect on another by increasing or decreasing the attribute levels of the intended targets.  
These are configured to represent instructive actions on the part of the responders’ social 
influence of the civilians.  The influence tools are configured to not cause damage, but to 
alter the agent attributes or color sidedness.  
d.  Restorative Capabilities (RCs) 
  Medical aid and chemical decontamination are modeled as weapons with 
RCs.  The medical capability increases the “health” of injured civilians or friendly agents 
and reduces the psychological attributes responsible for inducing a panic state.  This 
allows the injured civilian to enter a compliant state that allows him to seek further 
treatment or escape.  The decontaminant capability reduces the color change associated 
by the contamination inflicted by the LethalChem and MiosisChem weapons.  
4.  Unit Affiliation 
a.  Description 
  Unit affiliations are represented in Pythagoras as Agent Side properties, 
calculated from the color “sidedness” of a particular side, a feature unique to Pythagoras 
(Bitinas, Henscheid & Truong, 2003).  Each agent or affiliation is assigned a value for 
each color property—red, green, and blue.  This in turn establishes their relationship 
relative to other agents.  The calculation of color sidedness in this simulation is based on 
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the Manhattan distance of one agent’s color values to the other, when interpreted in the 
form of a two-dimensional plot.  That is: 
  d = |Blue2 – Blue1| + |Green2 – Green1| + |Red2 – Red1| 
This calculation was derived using a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet supplied by the 
distributors of Pythagoras.  The relationships of the human agents and the CIED, relative 
to other agents, were determined this way.  
b.  Concept 
  Each functional group is assigned a distinct side, to enable the 
implementation of a single leader to be in command of the agents under the same side.  
Using the pair-wise color comparison spreadsheet bundled with Pythagoras 2.0.3, eight 
different agent sides were configured in this way to represent these affiliations.  As 
Pythagoras will not function unless all agents have a side, the CIED is also assigned its 
own agent side.  Given the highly integrated nature of the SCDF and SPF, as well as the 
visible nature of the SAF-CBRE responders, agent sidedness for all the emergency 
responders was assigned the color blue.  The CIED side pertains to both the IED and 
chemical payload.  The CIED was configured to take the color red.  Friendly and neutral 
agents will, therefore, respond to the CIED (IED and sarin cloud) as the enemy only upon 
detection (i.e., by sight, smell, or chemical sensor).  
  A minor deviation from representing affiliation by sidedness is in 
representing chemical contamination. Only the civilians may change in color sidedness 
due to the influence of sarin.  All the civilians begin the simulation affiliated with the 
color green.  Each civilian may be chemically contaminated—this is modeled by an 
increase in red sidedness after being hit by the LethalChem and MiosisChem weapons.  
This combination of red and green allows emergency responders responsible for securing 
the site to respond appropriately to contaminated individuals and direct them to the 
decontamination points and triage areas.  A limitation of this is that responders direct 
both injured and contaminated civilians to the same site for medical assistance.  Table 6 
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summarizes the relationships of each side in the simulation.  Appendix C contains more 
details on the implemented sidedness settings.   
 
No. NAME UNIT (OWN) FRIEND ENEMY 
1  CIED 1 None 2-6 
2 Civilian 2 3-8 1 
3 Division Police (Includes SOC) 3, 4 5-8 1 
4 Fast Response Team Police Only 3,4 5-8 1 
5 SAF-CBRE 5 2,4, 6-8 1 
6 SCDF-Hazmat 6 2-5, 7, 8 1 
7 SCDF-Medical 7 2-6, 8 1 
8 Traffic Police 8 2-7 1 
Table 6.  Table of relationships among affiliations in simulation. Numbers 
correspond to the row numbers in table.   
 
5.  Sensors 
a.  Description 
  Sensors are configured in Pythagoras to detect a particular agent, based on 
three factors, the performance of the sensor in detecting an agent, the concealment factor 
of the terrain, and how detectable an agent is.  The nature of the detection is assigned one 
of three different signatures, labeled A, B, and C, allowing the representation of smell 
(chemoreception), sight, and sound, respectively, or any other appropriate factor that the 
detector uses to sense the agents.  The concealment of these signatures therefore, varies 
with the terrain, which may delay detection capacities by a factor set from 0 to 1.  For a 
specific sensor, this can be summarized by the equation: 
 
where;  
    “c” = the concealment factor for a given terrain feature  
    “s” = signature, either smell, sight, or sound.  
  A profile for a specific sensor’s detection probabilities is typified by that 
for the sensor representing human sight. 
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b. Concept 
   In total, six sensors were configured to correspond to actual features in 
real life, while one (ChemEyes) is assigned to facilitate the better simulation of the sarin 
gas plume.  These are summarized in Table 7.     
 
No. NAME REPRESENTS SIG USED BY 
1 “ChemEyes” Sarin Plume Behavior B All Chemical 
“Agents” 
2 Eyes (in 
MOPP) 
Vision through Gas Mask B All Emergency 
Responders 
3 Eyes only Unaided Vision B All Humans 
4 Eyes in MOPP 
and Visor 
Sight through Gas Mask and Perspex 
Visor 
B SAF, SCDF 
Hazmat 
5 CAD “Point” Chemical Agent Detection; i.e., 
by CAM, JCAD, Dräger Multiwarn 
A SAF, SCDF 
6 Smell Olfactory Function (i.e., smelling) A All Humans 
7 Sound Auditory Function (i.e., hearing) C All Humans 
SIG = signature 
Table 7.  Summary of sensors implemented in simulation.    
 
   
All human agents in the simulation are assigned detectors representing a 
sense of sight and smell, allowing them to sense their environment as per the settings 
defined for the terrain features and the agents. The exception is the CIED, which is meant 
to be hidden and is not visible, and the chemical “agents” that are released (signature A 
settings of zero).  The chemical agent remains detectable by smell, and therefore can be 
detected by human agents that are not in a protective posture, i.e., in a state representing 
the use of a gas mask.   
  Emergency responders capable of adopting a protective posture possess 
additional sensors to demonstrate this, depending on their roles and functions.  Since 
2004, all SPF patrol officers are issued IPEs consisting of a gas mask and CA-resistant 
suit as part of their patrol car’s trunk gear (Singapore Police Force, 2005c).  In addition, 
follow-on forces are issued gas masks as part of a mobile supply vehicle that arrives on-
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site (Joihani, 2005).  The simulation assumes that all follow-on forces are activated 
strictly in response to a chemical agent threat, and are therefore equipped to proceed to 
“mask up” in a protective posture.  Thus, the transition of issuance of protective gear and 
response is omitted.  SAF-CBRE and SCDF responders are assigned chemical agent 
detectors for their roles to detect the presence of sarin and respond accordingly. 
6.  Communication  
a.  Description 
  Communication is implemented in the scenario by either voice or radio 
devices.  “Talking” is implemented as short-range line-of-sight (LOS) communication 
devices.  Different response elements are assigned a dedicated radio “net” that may either 
be closed-communication (one channel) or networked to a larger system (many 
channels).  The SPF, SCDF and TP have island-wide Terrestrial Trunked Radio 
(TETRA) networks.  The SAF-CBRE network on site will consist of two-way radio 
communications, which have a shorter range compared to the digital communications of 
the police and fire service.  Various other transmitting devices such as frequency jammers 
and telemetry for robotics are not modeled here, although it may be done in further 
research.  As the scenario map does not exceed the maximum range of a typical TETRA 
network, all networks have a broadcast capability that spans the whole map.  Centralized 
command, control and communications (C3) is established once the ICP is set up and all 
communication links reach the ICP site.  
b. Concept 
  Three features in Pythagoras can be used to demonstrate communication—
sensors, communication devices and sidedness settings.  Sensors were used as a surrogate 
in earlier versions of Pythagoras and can represent omni-directional or LOS devices.  
Communication devices allow the designer to implement bandwidth as a factor in terms 
of the multiple channels assigned to a specific device.  Sidedness settings can create 
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“perfect” intelligence, where an agent can receive and transmit information about its unit 
members, friends or both.  Information transmitted and received consists of: 
 Agent location 
 
 Agent affiliation 
 
 Agent condition, in the form of generic attributes 
 
 Agent leadership  
 
 Resource reorder status for friendly and neutral agents  
 
 The updating feature will be explained later in the chapter.   
7.  Agent Behaviors 
a.  Description 
   Each agent is assigned a scheme of alternate behaviors that allow it to 
switch from its initial behavior when a trigger is met.  This routine of behaviors can be 
seen as a representation of responder SOPs civilian psychology to threats or the physical 
behavior of non-living elements.  These behaviors can be summarized as event-state-
diagrams, such as that shown for leader behaviors in Figure 10.  
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Figure 10.   Event state diagram for leader behavior on activation.  
 
  A trigger is thus the “event” and the new alternate behavior is the “state.”  
These alternate behaviors are characterized by distinct combinations of agent settings 
different from the initial setting.  Diagrammatic descriptions of these behaviors are shown 
in Appendix D.  In summary, the features that are variable are: 
 Movement desires 
 
 Engagement desires 
 
 Agent attributes 
 
 Alternate behaviors 
 
 Leadership and obedience 
b.  Concept 
  The behavior of the chemical agent and civilian population is relatively 
homogenous in nature and will be described later in Sections D, part 9, and part 10, 
respectively.  In contrast, the emergency standby response is a heterogeneous 
combination of behaviors that is either time- or event-dependent for triggering, and 
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mostly specific to each emergency response force.  The roles and function of each force 
are described as a combination of these behaviors. The assigned leaders of each force act 
independently to arrive at the incident site, and proceed to collect “information” 
configured as a resource.  When the information gathered reaches a specific level, the 
leaders order specific behaviors in the subordinate agents.  These agents proceed to the 
incident site and execute the next alternate behavior if the trigger condition is met, like 
arrival at a waypoint.  To preserve the continuity of the agent’s role, common behaviors 
such as the neutralization of an enemy threat or the execution of masking drills, cannot be 
shared among agents.  These common characteristics are thus configured specifically for 
the agent.  In summary, 142 different alternate behaviors describe the first hour of the 
emergency response, 124 of which describe emergency responder behavior.  Behaviors of 
critical importance are described later in Section D, part 11.   
8. Red: Improvised Explosive Device (IED) 
a. Description and Concept 
  The IED is represented in the simulation as a combination of three 
separate elements.  The first represents the primary blast wave generated from a 
detonation of a high explosive.  The second represents the fragmentation effects 
generated by the blast.  Each of these elements is designed as an agent assigned a specific 
“weapon” type that produces the bomb effects as overlapping areas of effect.  Figure 11 
shows the schematic representation and the visualization of the IED explosion in 
Pythagoras.   
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Figure 11.   IED in simulation. A) Names of agents representing IED in both cases. B) 
Event state diagram summarizing behavior of IED. C) Screen shot of IED 
exploding, showing lethal (inner circle) and fragmentation (outer circle) 
zones. Red agents represent the sarin cloud released.  
 
  Box A in Figure 11 shows the agents that represent the IED.  To separate 
the physical and psychological elements of the bomb for better flexibility in 
configuration, psychological effects from sight and sound generated by the detonation of 
the device are represented in “Eyes_and_Ears.”  This study “calibrates” the device for 
two cases. 
    (1) Man-Portable Device.  A 7-8.5 kg device, with a primary 
payload made of TNT/RDX or tri-acetone-tri-peroxide (TATP) is selected for this device.  
TATP can be homemade, has a high detonation velocity, and has a 0.83 relative 
effectiveness factor, compared to TNT; i.e., 0.83 grams of TATP is equivalent to 1 gram 
of TNT.  TNT/RDX is selected as it is the next most likely explosive that can be 
concealed in a small container and remain powerful enough to cause serious damage.  
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TNT is a constituent that was sought after by the JI cell in Singapore prior to the 
detainment of their members by Singaporean internal security (2003), while RDX is a 
common blasting explosive.  
    (2) Vehicular Bomb.  The study employed a vehicle bomb 
equivalent to that used in the Oklahoma City bombing incident of 1995—a vehicular IED 
with an approximate 3.3-ton homemade Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil (ANFO) payload 
(Mlakar Sr., Corley, Sozen, & Throton, 1997).  Owing to the large payload, the vehicular 
bomb is configured to have a slow ground speed (below 40 km/h), but will otherwise 
detonate on reaching its designated waypoint.  Detailed calculations on the effective blast 
radius of the vehicle bomb are shown in Appendix A.   
b.  Calibration 
  Explosive blast and fragmentation effects are inherently hard to model.  
As such, the study concentrates on modeling and calibrating for the primary blast wave 
only, and disregard refraction and reflection of the energy generated from the blast.  
Factors such as reflection and absorption of the shock waves generated from an 
explosion, or the ejection of fragments from the device will be abstracted as part of two 
zones of effect—blast and fragmentation zones.  Blast effects in the simulation are related 
to the theoretical overpressure generated by a military explosive or the experimental 
equivalency of a homemade explosive to a 50% RDX/TNT mixture.  Explosive 
equivalency by mass is multiplied by the equivalent explosive factor calculated from the 
mass of the device casing and bare charge weight using the Proctor equation (Held, 
1983). This takes into account the blast energy lost due to the casing around the payload. 
 
where:  
C = the equivalent explosive factor;  
   M = Casing Weight (kg); 
   W = Explosive Weight, in terms of TNT (kg). 
 58 
 
 
  “C” is used to determine the effective mass of explosive that generates a 
blast effect.  The equivalent mass of derived explosive, which is less than the actual bare 
charge weight, is then used to calculate the effective radius of a lethal overpressure zone.  
This is done by using the scaled distance derived from the expected range and payload in 
the relationship (Held, 1983): 
 
where: 
S = the scaled Distance; 
   R = Effective Blast Radius (in meters); 
   Q = Weight of the explosive payload, in terms of TNT (kg). 
 
   Lethality in this case is based on achieving overpressure conditions that 
provide only a 90% probability of kill for a human being (White, Jones, Damon, Fletcher, 
& Richmond, 1971).  This is more stringent with the general meaning applied to lethal 
range, which is the range of the indirect weapon that achieves 50% probability of kill.  
This is derived from the chart shown in Figure 12.  Assuming a spherical effect, the 
maximum possible range to which this peak pressure may be maintained in the primary 
blast wave is set as the lethal zone (see Appendix A for the calculations and equations 
involved). 
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Figure 12.   Human tolerance predictions for a 70-kg man in a free-stream blast wave  
(From: Gibson, 1994 and White, et al., 1971).  
 
  Fragmentation effects from the IED will be abstracted for the purposes of 
the simulation.  Analysis on fragmentation effect is largely empirical in nature, so this 
study bases the damage caused by fragmentation on the probability of hit and the distance 
of the target from the epicenter of the blast.  
c.  Representation in Simulation 
      (1) Cookie-Cutter Damage Function.  In Pythagoras, the lethal 
zone is implemented using a cookie-cutter damage function.  In this case, there is no 
partial damage assessment.  Any “human” represented by an agent in the simulation who 
is within the lethal zone is either killed or not, depending on the probability of a kill 
associated with the IED.  The agent assigned to represent the fragmentation element of 
the IED will still affect human agents not killed by the cookie-cutter damage effects. 
        (2) Carleton Damage Function.  The probability that a human 
agent outside the lethal zone is hit and injured by a fragment from the IED is calculated 
by a larger area-effect weapon set to use the Carleton damage function, the default choice 
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for the area effect of indirect fire in Pythagoras 2.0.3.  The Carlton damage function 
describes the damage radiating out from a point of impact through the following 
equation.   
    
where: 
Pk   = probability of kill; 
distance  = distance of the target from Point of Impact; 
radius   = size of the blast radius at which there is a 
 50% probability of being killed.   
 
   Figure 13 shows the exponential relationship between the 
probability of kill and the distance of the target from the epicenter of the attack.  The 
probability of a kill resulting from this calculation is then modified by the effectiveness 
value of the IED “weapon” to provide the fixed amount of damage received by the agent.  
Other factors that modify the probability and damage incurred include the agent’s 
vulnerability to the attack, the protection rendered to it by the terrain features between the 
epicenter and the target agent, and the terrain the target is on.  
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Figure 13.   Probability of kill from fragmentation effect of IED, given a Carlton 
damage function relationship.   
 
  The psychological impact of the IED explosion is similarly 
modeled as an agent “armed” with an influence tool that “shoots” human agents based on 
a Carleton damage function (Roginski 2006).  This is done under the assumption that a 
civilian further from the incident site would be less likely to be affected enough to go into 
panic state.  The psychological effects of the bomb blast are thus inversely proportional to 
how far removed a civilian is from the epicenter of the blast.  
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9.  Red: Chemical Payload 
a.  Description and Concept 
 The representation of the chemical agent sarin is based on a similar model 
implemented by Kent (2007).  The chemical agent is represented by three different agent 
instances—“LethalChem,” “MiosisChem” and “MiosisChemPhase2.”  Figure 14 
summarizes the characteristics of the chemical payload in simulation.  Rather than 
implement an earlier suggestion from the United States Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) 
to represent agent effect as concentric area effect weapons, this study retains Kent’s 
model, dubbed here the “particle model,” as it allows better interaction with the simulated 
urban environment.  
 
 
Figure 14.   Chemical payload in simulation.  (A) Names of agents representing the 
chemical payload for indoor and outdoor releases.  (B) Diagram 
summarizing behavior of chemical agent release.  (C) Screen shot of 
chemical agent release, showing the sarin cloud spreading inside the 
targeted store and out of entrances. 
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b. Calibration of the Chemical Agent Model 
  To calibrate the model to reflect the quantity and quality of the payload 
used, a “gas chamber” simulation was conducted to determine a representation for the 
median lethal concentration (LCt50) of sarin to be simulated, which would be 
approximated as the number of the agent instances required to generate a kill in 50% of a 
test population per unit time.  The number of instances used was therefore benchmarked 
to the LCt50 values of a specific chemical warfare agent, so that a suitable number of 
instances would be entered into the simulation to reflect the amount of a chemical 
warfare agent used as a payload.  
  It is important to note that this is only an approximation to facilitate the 
suitable modeling of agent quantities in the simulation.  Replicate runs of the “gas 
chamber” simulation did not produce any variation even with the inclusion of a variable 
degree of randomness in agent movements.  The researcher deemed this sufficient for the 
purposes of the overall simulation.   
  The Pythagoras simulation for the gas chamber was set up to demonstrate 
both civilian agents and the chemical agent representations.  A visualization of this is 
shown in Figure 15.   
 
 
Figure 15.   “Gas chamber” simulation at time steps 0, 16, 18 and 30 (with and without 
red agents displayed). One time step is equivalent to four seconds of real 
time.  
 
  One hundred civilian agents are randomly distributed and allowed to move 
randomly for 15 time steps (real time 60 seconds) until the agent is released to dissipate 
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through the chamber for another 15 time steps.  Thirty time steps is equivalent to two 
minutes.  The total number of deaths was enumerated as an MOP for how effective the 
particle model is in representing a particular nerve agent, and was used to calibrate 
LethalChem, MiosisChem and MiosisChemPhase2 instances in accordance with the 
scenario payload quantity. 
  The instances (number of representations) for LethalChem agent were 
calibrated in accordance with the number of instances required to generate a death in 50% 
of the target population.  The ratio of LethalChem to MiosisChem and 
MiosisChemPhase2 was kept constant to enable the desired plume effects, as described 
by Kent (2007).  
10.  Green: Civilians 
a. Description 
  Civilians in the area of operations are either shoppers or in transit to some 
other location.  The study de-emphasizes the impact of the age and sex of each individual, 
choosing instead to concentrate on modeling their typical behavior in the shopping 
district, before the incident and after.  Pythagoras allows us to create civilians as a group 
of agents belonging to the same side, but with different initial settings.  
b. Concept 
  The simulation models the intrinsic compliance and resultant behaviors of 
civilians before and after the initiation of the terrorist device.  See Figure 16 for the event 
state diagram of civilian behavior.   
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Figure 16.   Event-state diagram summarizing civilian behavior.  
 
Prior to the incident, civilians are categorized into three groups based on 
their tendency to follow instructional authority; i.e., whether they are compliant, non-
compliant, or ambivalent (neutral).  These three groups form the sub-populations using 
the walkways and the inner areas of buildings.  Their representation may vary based on 
societal climate, like public sentiment to a government decision.  Technical limitations 
for scenario runtime led the research to limiting their representation to 90 individuals per 
location.  Walkway users move from point A to B and cycle back to represent two-way 
flow, whereas building users circulate through waypoints designated for each building.  
These two populations may inter-mingle along the façade meeting the walkways, but are 
otherwise orbital—they segregate to move to the next destination.  Before the incident, 
civilians demonstrate directed movement and a strong desire to move to the next 
waypoint, with some tendency to stay in place, move in a random direction or maintain 
their existing course.  Figure 17 illustrates the distribution areas for the civilians. 
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Figure 17.   Civilian agent distribution in the scenario.  Green boxes represent transit 
pedestrians.  Cyan boxes represent shoppers.  A dashed arrow represents 
an example of civilian movement to assigned waypoints.  
 
  In a crisis situation, civilians are influenced by both the effects of the 
incident and the behaviors of others.  Compliant civilians tend towards maintaining 
public order and provide “orders” to reduce panic in a crisis.  Non-compliant civilians 
tend toward alternate behaviors that detract from their tendency to follow orders, whereas 
neutral civilians begin to take on a compliant or non-compliant behavior once a crisis 
occurs, and respond accordingly.  The study does not control the behaviors that the 
neutral civilians choose—this is allowed to be a product of the interaction between the 
neutral agent, the incident, and the existing “people” by whom the neutral civilian is 
surrounded.  
  Regardless of their compliancy, all civilians may be injured in the course 
of the incident.  Ambulatory (i.e., walking) and non-ambulatory casualty behavior arises 
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out of this.  Ambulatory casualties seek to distance themselves as far as possible from the 
incident site, and may enter into a panic state whilst doing so.  Non-ambulatory casualties 
cannot move and must await evacuation by rescuers in order to displace themselves from 
the incident site. 
  All civilians may enter into a state of panic, irrespective of whether they 
are injured or not.  It is during this time that social comparison occurs.  Panicking 
civilians must decide to move away from the detectable threat, stay in place, or follow the 
nearest “friend.”  The simulation allows this “choice” to be determined by the civilian 
agent with respect to its highest priority desire of movement, with escape as the highest.  
Civilians continue to stay in panic until an emergency responder interacts with them.  
This interaction consists of three effects: (1) the orders given to the panicking civilian by 
the responder; (2) the “calming” effect that responders provide to panicked civilians, 
modeled here as a resource; and (3) the restorative effects that responders provide using 
the medical kit.  Sources of panic may come from being immediately affected by the 
explosion of the CIED, being influenced by the panic of other civilians or from the 
physiological impact of sarin poisoning in the human body.  The latter is caused by lethal 
(nausea, headaches, loss of nervous-muscular control) or miosis-related (dimming and 
blurring of vision, eye-pain) effects (Romano Jr. & King,  2001).  
11.  Blue: Emergency Responders 
a. Description 
  Emergency responders are introduced into the scenario in two parts: the 
initial response and the follow-on force. Force movement to the incident site is 
configured to represent vehicle speeds from 30 to 50 km/h, assuming average traffic 
volume at the time of the incident.  Once agents arrive on site, they proceed with their 
respective functions in accordance to their roles.   
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b. Starting Locations 
   The approaches of the responders reflect their origins.  These were 
determined by plotting the “shortest time” and “shortest distance” path possible from the 
parent base location to the incident site, using the “Google Maps” search engine.  Based 
on NorthStar V (The New Paper 2006) and the author’s experience, an approach was 
selected to best facilitate the likely arrangement with the initial response.  These are 
shown in Figure 18.  
 
 
Figure 18.   Starting locations and approaches for emergency responders. (A) Traffic 
Police; (B) SAF-CBRE; (C) Initial Response Division Police and Civil 
Defence; (D) Follow-on divisional police.  
 
c. Site Organization and Waypoints 
   The incident site is initially organized using a zoning template as a guide.  
Emergency isolation zones implemented for an indoor device differ from those of an 
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outdoor device, in terms of the range implemented.  Initial response force elements 
proceed up close to the incident site to conduct rescue and evacuation operations.  
Follow-on response elements and C3 assets are positioned outside the warm zone area 
bordered by a vapor contamination control line (VCCL).  The ICP and force leaders 
move to a central location to meet and, as necessary, collect information, to enable the 
follow-on tasks.  These elements may shift in position if the need arises, in which case 
the ICP relocates and force leaders head in the general direction of the information 
provider.  TP elements arrive to erect traffic control points (TCPs) to manipulate traffic 
flow and ensure a feasible ingress and egress for emergency responders.  The principal 
consideration for these roadblocks is the need to re-route traffic.  As such, they do not 
correspond to the VCCL line, but may be approximately at or further than the template 
warm zone perimeter.  Given the same location will be attacked with both an indoor and 
outdoor CIED activation; the roadblocks will be the same for both indoor and outdoor 
response scenarios.  See Figure 19 for the approximate site organization of an outdoor 
and indoor incident site.     
 
 
Figure 19.   Approximated site organization for (A) Indoor device and (B) Outdoor 
device.  In both cases, the blue circles with “X” denote the master 
waypoint for the initial response, and rescue elements.  The empty blue 
circles represent the master waypoint for C3 and security elements. White 
circles represent traffic control points (TCPs).  
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   A patrol route is implemented once divisional patrol officers and tactical 
units from the SOC arrive on site.  The main role of the patrol officers is to clear the 
warm zone of unaffected civilians, while subsequently securing the ICP and directing 
civilians that approach it to proceed to the triage point.  The tactical units proceed to each 
TCP to secure the perimeter of the incident site, to ensure public order, and to engage any 
left-behind terrorist threats.  See Figure 20 for the direction of the routes taken.  
 
 
Figure 20.   (A) Clearance route for division patrol officers and (B) Security patrol 
route for SOC tactical units.  
 
d. Command and Control (C2) 
  This study provides a scheme to simulate the C2 process that occurs 
between the sub-ordinate units, the leaders, and incident management.  Standby forces 
from each agency have a team leader and execute initial tasks independently of a central 
command structure, up until the follow-on forces arrive and the ICP is established.  C2 is 
subsequently established hierarchically, with the SCDF senior commander (aggregated as 
part of the ICP) as the principal IM and each response force leader working in support of 
him.  “Information” flows from the subordinate units to the ICP and the immediate 
leaders, who use the information to proceed with the imparting of orders, in the form of  
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alternate behavior changes in the subordinate agents.  When a leader begins to lose 
information due to consumption as a “resource,” he proceeds to seek it from the ICP, 
which is a provider.   
Communications representing blue force updates to the ICP are assigned an 
attribute changer that makes the ICP (as an agent) switch to an “updated” alternate 
behavior once the attribute is greater than a specified value.  Information is depleted once 
the force leaders “consume” it as a resource, up until the ICP’s updated attribute value 
fulfills the required update condition again.  Sub-ordinate units are not configured to 
update their leaders, so the IM at the ICP has a C2 relationship with the leaders. 
e. Protective Posture and Detection of Sarin 
 All emergency responders have the capacity to adopt a protective posture, 
i.e., execute a masking drill against a CA exposure.  This confirms the availability of a 
gas mask to every responder on site.  Detection will be by two methods: either the 
responder is not equipped with a chemical agent detector (CAD) and the responder will 
“mask-up” due to the smell, or the responder is equipped with a CAD and detects sarin 
early enough to adopt the protective posture.  At the same time, the audible alarm of the 
CAD will inform the immediate vicinity of the detection of the sarin, prompting 
surrounding forces to mask-up as well.  This broadcast range is short, but augmentation 
with transmitters could increase the range of the alarm.  
12.  Information and Decontamination  
a. Information 
   Information has a qualitative and quantitative nature.  The simulation 
defines the quality of the information in the emergency response to be time-sensitive 
during the acute phase of the process.  This is easily achieved by the assignment of a 
specific channel and associated attribute changer to all the radio-nets for the updating of 
the ICP.  The study thus assumes that the ICP has connectivity to all the communication  
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nets used by the stand-by forces.  The simulation describes the disseminative flow of 
information as a resource distributed from a supplier (the ICP) to a consumer (force 
leaders). 
  The timeliness and distribution of information at the incident site is 
represented by two mechanisms.  Timeliness is demonstrated by an attribute assigned 
only to the ICP agent.  Force leaders seek out the ICP in order to obtain information, up 
to the point at which an alternate behavior is triggered and the leader to its subordinates 
directs an order behavior.  Once this occurs, leaders continue into an information 
consumption “loop” of orders and information receipt.    
b. Decontamination 
The decontamination process is meant to increase casualty survival by 
reducing the dwell time of the CA on the affected civilian.  As this physical effect is hard 
to simulate in Pythagoras, the simulation models key aspects of CA contamination, 
relative to their importance in the response.  Decontaminants are modeled as non-lethal 
“weapons” that reduce the red color sidedness of the contaminated casualty, while the 
decontamination point is modeled as a two-lane crew assigned a hazmat decontamination 
pod that provides decontaminants to the agents, which consume it as a resource. The 
decontamination lane reduces the casualty’s red sidedness, supplies fuel to the casualty, 
and reduces its non-compliancy so that it may proceed to a triage point, indicated as a 
waypoint for a holding area.  
E.  PROOFING OF THE SIMULATION 
 Design details pertaining to the sarin and chemical defense model were discussed 
with Gerald M. Pearman, a contractor under TRAC-MTRY.  Additional opinions were 
also sought from Bob McIntyre from AFRL on the implementation of the CA plume. 
 Initial trials and implementations of the simulations were conducted in part by 
conference during the Simulation Experiments & Efficient Designs (SEED) Center 
forums.  Operational aspects scripted in the simulation were discussed with Ed 
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Lescnowicz, Research Associate with the Naval Postgraduate School, who has assisted in 
several thesis projects involving the use of Pythagoras. 
 Prototype simulation scenarios were run to generate a trial set of outputs for 
statistical analysis to determine the functionality of the scenario when run on a high-
performance cluster.  Assistance with this was provided by Steve Upton and Mary 
McDonald, Research Associates with the SEED Center. 
F.  MODEL ASSUMPTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND ARTIFICIALITIES 
The following points describe assumptions on the operation and scenarios, made 
because they are not of interest in this study, are valid assumptions, or they cannot be 
described in silico, given the technical limitations of Pythagoras 2.0.3.  
 No Targeting of Responders.  For the purposes of proof of concept, 
responders will not be attacked in the course of the simulation.  Historically, 
there have been no cases of attacks on emergency responders in Singapore.  It 
is possible, however, that aggressors will force activation in order to observe 
response procedures.  
 
 Equivalent Performance of Chemical Agent Detectors.  The SCDF and 
SAF employ different types of detectors that may or may not use the same 
technology.  It is assumed, however, that the detectors are equivalent in 
performance and have a good capability in screening false positive results.   
 
 No Augmentation of Response Forces.  The response forces demonstrated in 
the simulation represent a functional organization for a single incident site.  
This can be augmented with additional; forces.  However, to analyze the 
baseline response, the simulation does not allow for the augmentation of the 
response force. 
 
 High Volatility of Sarin in the Tropics.  Temperatures in Singapore range 
from 73 to 93 degrees Fahrenheit (National Environment Agency 2008).  This 
suggests that the volatility of sarin is between 16,091 to 29800 mg/m3 (United 
States Army 1990), and that the proposed 600g sarin plume may occupy a 
volume between 20 m3 to 37 m3.  The persistency of sarin is thus expected to 
be low in Singapore.  
 
 Roadside Traffic Gives Way to Emergency Vehicles.  A common malady in 
Singapore is the failure of road traffic to give way to emergency vehicles.  
This is largely ignored in the simulation and it is assumed that responders are 
able to keep a consistent speed while moving to the incident site.  The 
 74 
 
 
variation in speed over time step for vehicular movement is thus kept to a 
minimum.  
 
 One-Hour Acute Phase.  The acute phase is limited to a 1-hour period or 900 
time steps.  The acute phase could be longer in a real activation, but by 
technical limitations, the study chooses not to exceed this number of time 
steps.  
 
 Platform-User Aggregation.  Drivers and other operational crewmembers are 
aggregated with the vehicle if the vehicle is meant to generate a particular 
function.  A good example is the IM/ICP aggregation, which may include 
other real operators such as a telecommunication specialist.  Another example 
is the SCDF hazmat decon pod and fire pump engine, both of which have 
drivers and operators.  
 
 No Morgue.  A morgue is not set up because of difficulties in modeling the 
movement of dead civilians by the SCDF rescue team.  Otherwise, the 
requirement for a morgue influences the triage location and medical logistics 
support.  
 
 No Evacuation to the Hospital.  Following doctrine, all chemical casualties 
are decontaminated and triaged at the incident site.  Uncontaminated physical 
casualties are treated in the same way, although this clearly may not be the 
case in a real incident.  
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IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
For experiments, this study uses the technique of “data farming,” a term coined by 
Brandstein and Horne (1998) to describe the running of a simulation model multiple 
times while simultaneously altering many input parameters.  The resultant data sets 
generated allow the analyst to explore the “landscape” of potential outcomes given the 
parameter changes, to get better insight into the problem.  Figure 21 summarizes the 
process. 
 
 
Figure 21.   Diagrammatic Representation of the DOE process used in this study.  
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This chapter describes the experimental process of this study.  In brief, specific 
design parameters were chosen from the Pythagoras scenario file as variables for analysis.  
Data were generated for statistical analysis, using highly DOE techniques and HPC.  To test 
the feasibility of the scenario file on the HPC cluster, prototype runs were used to generate an 
initial set of experimental data.  Data obtained from the prototyping were used to correct the 
scenario file, which was again run to form the basis of the base case scenario.  Where 
necessary, some analysis on simulation-specific factors was conducted to determine the cause 
of technical problems in a data generation process.   
This study also describes and explores, using the same DOE techniques, three 
different incident conditions. This chapter describes how the data were processed using 
commercial statistical analysis software. 
B.  MOE OUTPUTS 
The primary MOE of interest is the survivorship of the civilian population, the 
improvement of which is the primary focus of the emergency response.  Civilian survivorship 
was recorded for all scenarios used, by activating the pre-set MOEs recordable for agents in 
the Pythagoras scenario files.      
C. VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
The study classifies variables of interest as controllable factors (i.e., decision factors) 
and uncontrollable factors (i.e., noise or environmental factors) (Taguchi, 1987; Sanchez, 
2000).  Controllable factors are variables that are expected to be within the influence of the 
blue force, and determine the quality and quantity of the response.  Uncontrollable factors are 
variables that are not within the influence of the blue force and therefore represent the 
environmental factors that the emergency responders must work with to mitigate the incident.  
The inclusion and analysis of uncontrollable factors is necessary to derive a degree of 
robustness in the simulation result, and thereby improve the researcher’s understanding of the 
data (Sanchez, 2006).  The variables of interest have integer or continuous values, and are 
indicated in Tables 8 and 9.  The possibility of autocorrelation was analyzed for each factor 
once data could be generated.  This is explained in Section C.  
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No. Factor Range Units Remarks 
1 No. of Fast Response Car Patrol Officers 1… 4 Persons 
2 No. of Fast Response Medical Teams 1… 4 Persons 
3 No. of Follow-On Medical Teams 1… 4 Persons 
4 No. of Pump Engine Rescuers 1… 4 Persons 
5 No. of Hazmat Rescuers 1… 4 Persons 
6 No. of Follow-On Patrol Officers 2… 6 Persons 
7 No. of Decon Pods and Teams 1… 4 Units 
Number of 
personnel sent 
for standby 
response; i.e., 
force 
composition 
8 Broadcast Range Orders to Civilians 20… 50 Meters 
9 Max Influence FRC Patrol Officers 1… 10 Persons 
10 Max Influence Div Follow-On Police 1… 10 Persons 
11 Max Influence Hazmat Rescuers 1… 10 Persons 
12 Max Influence Pump Engine Rescuers 1… 10 Persons 
13 Max Influence SOC tactical Officer 1… 10 Persons 
14 Max Influence Traffic Police Officer 1… 10 Persons 
Represents 
control over 
the civilian 
population 
15 Entry Time First Responders (SPF, SCDF) 7… 30 Minutes 
16 Entry Time SCDF Leader 7… 30 Minutes 
17 Entry Time TP Leader 7… 30 Minutes 
18 Entry Time Div Police Leader/SOC  7… 60 Minutes 
19 Entry Time Follow-on Patrol Officers 7… 60 Minutes 
For response 
times of initial 
and follow-on 
response 
20 CAD Detection Range 30… 80 Meters 
21 CAD Broadcast Range 2… 10 Meters 
Ability to 
respond to 
chemical 
threat 
Italics indicate integer values. 
  
Table 8.  Table of Controllable Factors used in the course of research.   
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No. Factor Range Units Remarks 
1 No. of Compliant Civilians 0… 30 Person
2 No. of Neutral Civilians at Start  0… 30 Person
3 No. of Non-compliant Civilians at Start 0… 30 Person
4 Non-compliance, Compliant Civilians 0… 90 Units 
5 Non-compliance, Neutral Civilians 0… 90 Units 
6 Non-compliance, Non-compliant Civilians 0… 90 Units 
7 P(Influence) by Compliant Civilians 0…1.00 NA 
8 P(Influence) Panicking Civilians 0…1.00 NA 
Used in 
debugging, 
prototyping and 
scenario 
experiments 
9 Smell Range 0… 100 Meters
10 Range of Panic Shouting 1… 50 Meters
11 Orders Range, Compliant Civilian 1… 50 Meters
12 Confusion in Panic 0… 100 NA 
13 Confusion in Panic for Compliants 0… 100 NA 
14 Panic induced from lethal symptoms 0… 20 Units 
15 Panic induced from Miosis 0… 20 Units 
16 ‘LethalChem’ Instance 9…40 - 
17 ‘MiosisChem’ Instance 17…75 - 
18 ‘MiosisChemphase2’ Instance 17…75 - 
19 Detectability of Chemical Agent 0…1.00 - 
Used in 
debugging and 
prototyping only. 
Green represents factors with respect to the civilian population.  
Red represents factors with respect to the CIED.   
Italics indicate integer values. 
  
Table 9.  Table of Uncontrollable Factors used in the course of research.   
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1. Controllable Factors 
 Number of FRC Patrol Officers.  This is defined as the number of FRC 
patrol officers that arrive on the scene at the start of the initial response. 
 
 Number of First Response Medical Teams.  This is defined as the number 
of medical teams that arrive on the scene at the start of the initial response.  
 
 Number of Follow-On Medical Teams.  This is defined as the number of 
medical teams that arrive as part of the follow-on response. 
 
 Number of Pump Engine Rescuers.  This is defined as the number of 
rescuers that will conduct snatch and grab rescue from the incident site in the 
initial response.  
 
 Number of Hazmat Rescuers.  This is defined as the number of rescuers that 
arrive as part of the follow-on response to conduct a rescue within the incident 
site and other contaminated areas. 
 
 Number of Follow-On Patrol Officers.  This is defined as the number of 
division patrol officers that arrive as part of the follow-on response. 
 
 Number of Decontamination Pods and Teams.  This is defined as the 
number of decontamination pods and crews that arrive as part of the follow-on 
response.  Two teams are allocated to a decontamination pod, the allocation of 
which is “lock-stepped” to a single design point variable that changes the 
number of teams in proportion to the number of decontamination pods sent.   
 
 Broadcast Range of Orders To Civilians.  This is defined as the range of 
influence that an emergency responder’s “orders” may affect a civilian of any 
condition. 
 
 Maximum Influence of FRC Patrol Officers.  This is defined as the 
maximum number of people a patrol officer can influence with one order.  
 
 Maximum Influence of Division Follow-On Police.  This is defined as the 
maximum number of people that division follow-on patrol officers can 
influence with one order. 
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 Maximum Influence of Hazmat Rescuers.  This is defined as the maximum 
number of people that hazmat rescuers can influence at one order. 
 
 Maximum Influence of Pump Engine Rescuers.  This is defined as the 
maximum number of people that SCDF rescuers with the initial pump engine 
can influence with one order. 
 
 Maximum Influence of SOC Tactical Officers.  This is defined as the 
maximum number of people that SOC tactical officers can influence with one 
order. 
 
 Maximum Influence of Traffic Police Officer.  This is defined as the 
maximum number of people that TP officers can influence with one order. 
 
 Entry Time of First Responders.  This is defined as the time (in time steps) 
at which the First Responders enter the AO to proceed to the incident site.  
The entry times for the FRC patrol officers, SCDF pump engine, pump 
personnel and medical ambulance are “lock-stepped” to change as a single 
group. 
 
 Entry Time of SCDF Leader.  This is defined as the response time of the 
SCDF leader in arriving at the incident site.  
 
 Entry Time of TP Leader.  This is defined as the response time of the TP 
leader in arriving at the incident site. 
 
 Entry Time of Division Police Leader and SOC Tactical Units.  This is 
defined as the arrival time of the Division Police Leader and the SOC tactical 
units at the incident site.  The entry times for the police leader and each SOC 
tactical officer is “lock-stepped” to change as a single group.  
 
 Entry Time of Follow-On Divisional Police Patrol Officers.  This is defined 
as the arrival time of the FRC in arriving at the incident site. 
 
 CA Detector Range.  This is defined as the maximum range at which the 
chemical agent detector may detect the CA. 
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 CAD Broadcast Range.  This is defined as the maximum broadcast range at 
which an activated CAD is able to transmit a signal to another friendly agent.  
2. Uncontrollable Factors 
  Uncontrollable factors represent environmental variables that cannot be 
influenced at the initial onset by the emergency responders.  The uncontrollable factors 
used for analysis serve to better characterize the model, the scenario and the robustness of 
the results obtained from the simulation runs.  The study will focus on two areas—the 
heterogeneous nature of the civilian population, and the nature of the CIED and gas 
hazard.  Listed below are the uncontrollable factors examined in the experiments. 
 Number of Compliant Civilians.  This is defined as the number of civilians 
in the scenario at each location box that are initially compliant towards 
authority. 
 
 Number of Neutral Civilians at Start.  This is defined as the number of 
civilians in the scenario at each location box that are initially neutral towards 
compliance to authority.  
 
 Number of Non-compliant Civilians at Start.  This is defined as the number 
of civilians in the scenario at each location box that are initially non-compliant 
to authority.  
 
 Intrinsic Non-compliance of Compliant Civilians.  This is defined as the 
level of intrinsic non-compliance that the compliant civilian has at the start of 
the scenario.  
 
 Intrinsic Non-compliance of Neutral Civilians.  This is defined as the level 
of intrinsic non-compliance that the neutral civilian has at the start of the 
scenario. 
 
 Intrinsic Non-compliance of Non-Compliant Civilians.  This is defined as 
the level of intrinsic non-compliance that the non-compliant civilian has at the 
start of the scenario.  
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 Probability of Influence by Compliant Civilians (Using Orders).  This is 
defined as the probability that a compliant civilian is able to reduce the non-
compliancy of any targeted civilian.  
 
 Probability of Influence by Panicking Civilians (Using Panic).  This is 
defined as the probability that a panicking civilian is able to increase the panic 
attribute (and thus contribute to the panic) of any targeted civilian.  
 
 LethalChem Instance.  This is defined as the number of agents that 
correspond to the lethal effects of the sarin plume.  This corresponds to how 
well sarin is able to cause lethal effects in civilians that come into close 
proximity with the plume formed.  
 
 MiosisChem Instance.  This is defined as the number of agents that 
correspond to the miosis-inducing effects of the sarin plume.  This 
corresponds to how well the sarin is able to induce miosis in civilians who 
come into close proximity of the sarin plume. 
 
 MiosisChemPhase2 Instance.  Similar to Miosischem Instance, this 
influences the direction and expansion of the sarin plume that forms out of the 
release, and therefore directly impacts on the civilians surrounding the 
incident site.   
 
 Detectability of Chemical Agent.  This is defined as the delectability of the 
sarin characteristics, i.e., smell and miosis effects.  
 
 Smell Range.  This is defined as the maximum range of the human sense of 
smell at the given time of the day in the scenario.  
 
 Range of Panic Shouting.  This is defined as the maximum range in which a 
civilian under panic can communicate, and thus, potentially spread panic.   
 
 Range of Orders from a Compliant Civilian.  This is defined as the 
maximum range of the influence a compliant civilian is able to exert with an 
order.   
 
 Panic from Symptoms of Lethal Exposure.  This is defined as the impact 
that the lethal effect of the sarin plume has on inducing civilian panic.  This 
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translates the physiological effects of the sarin gas into a Pythagoras agent 
attribute changer that alters the agent attribute alpha.  
 
 Panic from Miosis Symptoms.  This is defined as the panic incurred by the 
impact of the miosis induced by the sarin plume. 
 
 Confusion in Panic.  This is defined as the desire of a civilian under panic to 
move in a random direction, and represents the clarity in the panicking 
civilian’s decision-making response. 
 
 Confusion in Panic for Compliant Civilian.  This is defined as the desire of 
a compliant civilian under panic to move in a random direction, and represents 
the clarity in the panicking, but compliant, civilian’s decision-making 
response.   
3. Scenarios 
  The conditions described in Chapter III outline the “baseline” case 
scenario to which comparisons may be made.  The following variations will be explored 
and analyzed using our DOE scheme.  
a.  Base Case: No Response 
  A simulation without responders will be used to analyze the interaction of 
an indoor CIED with the target population when no emergency response occurs.  This 
will act as the control run for the analysis of all other scenarios and variations. 
b.  Scenario 1: Response to Indoor CIED Activation 
  Similar to that above, except this variation simulates a theoretical indoor 
release with an emergency response to the incident site.  Emergency responder behaviors 
are configured to reflect the protocols meant for managing an indoor-exploded CIED.  
c.  Scenario 2: Response to Outdoor CIED Activation 
  The same device implemented in the above scenario is shifted to become a 
device employed in an outdoor setting.  An outdoor setting allows for a larger gas plume, 
and requires a larger zoning protocol on the part of the emergency responders.  
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d.  Scenario 3: Response to Vehicle-Borne IED (VBIED) 
 Using the same design concept for experimental design, an adaptation of 
the simulation employed by Roginski (2006), which itself is based on the Oklahoma City 
building bombing of 1995.  This variation of the outdoor scenario is attempted to show 
proof-of-concept in the application of the simulation to large payload vehicle IED 
attacks.  Comparisons will also be made to determine if the controllable factors that are 
influential on mitigating the outdoor incident are pertinent to the VBIED incident.  
D. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENT (DOE) 
1. Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) 
To improve the efficiency of the experiment, the study used a combined NOLH 
design (Cioppa, 2002; Cioppa and Lucas, 2007).  Implementing the NOLH design has 
distinct advantages over a standard gridded design.  A major advantage is that it gives a 
higher fidelity to the researcher, allowing better insight into the response from an entire 
range for each factor, while using fewer design points than a full factorial design of high 
and low settings.  This is because of the higher efficiency and better space-filling 
property of an NOLH design format.  This is illustrated in Figure 22, which represents 
the design space as a two-dimensional square plot.   
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Figure 22.   Scatter-plot matrix for an experimental design space of a NOLH Design.  
The plot represents 257 design points derived from 21 controllable factors 
and eight uncontrollable factors.  
 
The NOLH was designed using a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet created by 
Professor Susan M. Sanchez of the Naval Postgraduate School (Sanchez, 2005).  For 
technical purposes, NOLH size was limited to 29 factors.   
 
 86 
 
 
2.  Proofing and Debugging of Simulation and DOE 
To ensure that the simulation could run on the HPC, 19 uncontrollable factors 
were used in a 29-factor NOLH design as an initial surrogate for the analysis runs.  This 
generated a Cartesian product of 257 design points, each replicated 10 times, resulting in 
2570 runs.  The prototype was rerun with the 29-factor NOLH design to analyze the 
impact of the uncontrollable factors on the response (e.g., survivorship of civilians).  To 
determine if factors were confounded, this study analyzed the correlation of their effects 
using the data outputs generated from each scenario run.  Numerically, the maximum 
correlation coefficient between any two factors is 0.0786.  None of the factors was highly 
correlated.  See Appendix E for a diagrammatic representation.  
  The most influential uncontrollable factors were determined and used for a 
combined NOLH design (Sanchez 2006) with 21 controllable factors.  The same NOLH 
design was applied to different scenarios and compared against the base case.  A crossed 
design was considered to ensure better certainty on the results generated, but this option 
was not performed, given the possible simulation run-time overhead that would be 
generated—potentially 212  82 = 28224 design points, in 10 replicates = 282240 
replicates, instead of 2,570 for a combined NOLH.  Nonetheless, both designs 
implementing the NOLH design would still outperform the efficiency of a full-2k multi-
factorial design, with k being the total number of variables assessed (Sanchez, 2006).  In 
contrast, implementing a gridded DOE would have resulted in 229-factorial design, 
generating  536,870,912 design points, with only two factorial settings for each factor, 
typically the boundary values, and assuming a linear response.  Clearly, the 
implementation of an NOLH design outperforms the classical gridded design.  
3.  Scenario Runs on HPC Clusters 
 Using the factors identified and described above, the base case, indoor, outdoor 
and VBIED scenarios were run on the AFRL HPC cluster.  Pythagoras scenario files (in 
XML format) and NOLH design spreadsheets (in comma separated value, [CSV] format) 
were input into XStudy. This is an application that presents a graphic user interface to 
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allow a researcher to configure his simulation experiments and compile accompanying 
files into a submission for pre-processing and execution on the HPCs available (Upton, 
2008).  Steve Upton of the SEED Center did the processing required to facilitate the 
submission.  Excursions representing the specific parameter configurations of each 
design point were generated for each of the scenarios.  Custom Linux scripts were written 
to generate the job submission files for the Falcon HPC cluster, at the AFRL, Wright-
Patterson AFB in Dayton, OH.  Time allocation on that machine was part of the 
Department of Defense HPC Modernization Program (MP) User Productivity 
Enhancement and Technology Transfer (PET) initiative (http://www.hpcmo.hpc.mil/). 
 The use of an HPC cluster for running the simulation greatly improves the speed 
at which the data can be obtained.  Supporting this is the fact that it takes seven days to 
edit and run the VBIED scenario submission, consisting of 2570 replications run with a 
mean time of 34 minutes.  If run on a normal computer it would take up to 60 days (2,570 
 34 = 87,380 minutes = 1,456 hours) to run the vehicle bomb scenario to completion!  
By this approximation, five submissions to the cluster would take over a year to complete 
if run sequentially on the laptop computer used to design the initial simulation.  Instead, 
scenario files were submitted for runs on October 4, 2008, and final submissions were 
returned by November 5, 2008.  Completion of all experimental runs, including 
administrative time, error correction and re-submission, took only 32 days.  Again, 
consider the far less astute use of the same cluster using a 229-factorial design.  It would 
take 5.3 billion  34 minutes = 247 millenia! 
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V. DATA ANALYSIS 
We have the duty of formulating, of summarizing, and of 
communicating our conclusions, in intelligible form, in recognition of 
the right of other free minds to utilize them in making their own 
decisions. 
R. A. Fisher  
Statistician and Evolutionary Biologist 
1955 
A. DATA COLLECTION AND POST-PROCESSING 
Data collected from the simulation runs were processed and analyzed in JMP 7.0, 
and S-plus 8.0, two commercial statistical software packages.  There are two types of 
data obtained from the runs: the simulation-specific data that details the run times and 
completion of each replicate, and the scenario-specific data, detailing the response 
variables of survivorship for the civilian population and emergency responders.  Both 
types of data are saved as CSV files that contain the input conditions in terms of the 
simulation parameters and the output data in terms of the settings configured in 
Pythagoras.  The post-processing of data involves the calculation of the MOPs, from 
which the MOEs may be determined.  The values from each set of replicates for every 
design point are then used to generate statistical data to characterize the distribution of 
the results.  This process generates mean response values for each design point condition.    
1.  Cluster (Segmentation) Analysis 
  Where appropriate, cluster analysis was applied to identify outliers in the data set 
that demonstrate peculiar responses worth investigating.  Cluster analysis, also called 
segmentation analysis or taxonomy analysis, is a way to create groups of objects, or 
clusters, in such a way that the profiles of objects in the same cluster are very similar and 
the profiles of objects in different clusters are quite distinct (Jain, Murty & Flynn 1999).  
This helps us identify specific objects that stand contrary to the general identity of the  
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cluster.  The study utilized COADM — “Cluster and Outlier Analysis for Data-
Mining,”—a stand-alone statistical tool implemented by DSO, National Laboratories, for 
the purpose of cluster analysis.   
2.  Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) 
This research focuses on the following MOEs to answer the research questions. 
a. MOE 1: Change in Civilian Survivorship with Responder Arrival 
Time 
   A general assumption for this MOE is that earlier arrival of emergency 
responders allows for the earlier activation for the response cascade. It may seem 
reasonable to expect civilian survivorship to improve with the earlier arrival of force 
elements in accordance with the emergency cascade.  No historical evidence, however, 
exists to support the idea that an emergency response improves this, outside the efforts of 
the civilian population.  This assumption will, therefore, be tested using data obtained in 
this study and will be discussed in Section B.  
b. MOE 2: Change in Civilian Survivorship Versus No Response 
  Another generalized assumption is that the emergency response improves 
civilian survivorship, over no response at all.  This assumes that civilian survival depends 
solely on responder actions and not on the survival behavior of the civilians affected.  
The focus is only on the quantitative change in civilian survivorship, as this study does 
not take into account the nature of the injury sustained by civilians.  A statistical 
comparison of the percentage of civilians injured and dead out of the affected locations 
for both the base case scenario and the emergency response scenario will be performed. 
c.  MOE 3: Reduction in Civilian Panic   
  Security and control of the incident site requires on-site security elements 
to manage the affected people that are reacting negatively to the incident.  Using the 
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outdoor CIED scenario, the study analyzes this by determining the factors significant in 
controlling civilian panic and observing the reduction in the surrogate attribute used to 
signify human panic.     
3.  Calculation of Measures of Performance (MOPs)  
To address the MOEs, a quantifiable measure is necessary.  The study also 
analyzed the impact of increasing or decreasing the controllable factors on the MOPs, 
which in turn were used to determine the effectiveness of the emergency response 
procedures and the impact of varying the controllable factors.  Data were derived from 
the simulations through configuring “MOE” settings in Pythagoras and were either 
treated as quantified MOPs for this study, or used as raw data to derive the MOPs.  The 
data of primary interest is civilian survivorship because the main purpose of the 
emergency response is to limit the damage caused by the attack and protect the affected 
civilian population.  This is evident given the COIs in Chapter II.  With this in mind, this 
research defines the MOPs for civilian survivorship.  
a.  MOP 1: Percentage of Civilians Injured or Dead Out of the 
Affected Population 
 To relate the injuries and deaths inflicted on affected populations, the 
percentage values of each survivorship category were determined as the proportion of 
civilians in each state of survivorship out of the initial size of the affected population 
prior to device activation.  Affected areas were qualified as the specific areas in the 
scenario map occupied by civilians that were covered by the maximum areas of effect for 
each device.  As the civilian populations at a given site or area are composed of 
compliant, non-compliant or neutral populations, Pythagoras records the end point 
number of alive, injured and dead civilians based on these compliancy categories and for 
different areas.  Since these population numbers vary with each NOLH design point, the 
target population size varies.  The calculation for percentage survivorship at the affected 
area in the first hour of the standby response is therefore defined as:  
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where:  
   “group”  {compliant, neutral, non-compliant}; 
“status”  {alive, injured, dead}; 
“area”    {T, SHW, LP,…}. 
 
   Survivorship values were calculated in JMP 7.0 and input as a new data 
column for each design point replicate.  The expected counts for alive, injured or dead 
civilians were calculated as a mean value across multiple replicates for each design point 
run.  This was typically ten replicates, with the exception of design points replicates that 
encountered “time-out” complications on the HPC cluster and therefore did not run to the 
end-point time step.  The mean and standard deviation values for each set of replicates 
were then compared against their respective design parameters. 
b.  MOP 2: Percent Injured/Dead Civilians < Target Injured/Dead 
Civilians 
    MOE 2 requires the assessment of the improvement or decline in civilian 
survivorship that comes with emergency response, vis-à-vis no response.  As there are no 
historical performance references for reducing casualties in the scenarios implemented, 
the analysis compares each design point response to the mean percentage injury or deaths 
for the entire scenario.  This serves to benchmark the conditions associated with whether 
the performance of each design point resulted in a response below the reference value.  
An exception is taken for scenario #1, which can use the base case as the reference.  The 
analysis implements the following logic to qualify MOP 2 for all conditions set by the 
design points of the NOLH:  
 
    The continuous response values now become a binary response variable 
that can be analyzed using either a logistic regression or a categorical regression tree.   
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c.  MOP 3: Mean Panic Associated with Compliant, Neutral and 
Non-compliant Civilian Populations  
As the composition of civilians at the incident site is made up of 
compliant, non-compliant, and neutral civilians, their reaction to both the incident and the 
emergency response will differ.  The representation of each civilian demographic is by a 
singular agent class, of which multiple “instances” represent multiple people in the 
scenario.  As such, Pythagoras will record the panic attribute for each class as an average 
value based on all “instances” (people) under the same class.  The final “mean” value of 
the panic attribute for each design point replicate will be recorded at the end of the 
scenario.  These replicates will therefore contribute to a master mean for that design 
point.  Regression analysis will then be attempted on these values to determine what 
conditions can be associated with a lower degree of panic, and what commonalities exist 
in stemming panic across the three levels of compliancy.  In notational form: 
 
where:  
   “group”   {compliant, neutral, non-compliant}; 
“area”     {T, SHW, LP,…}; 
“n”  = number of civilians of a specific group and area. 
To avoid losing resolution, the study investigates this in a location-specific 
manner.  To maximize returns on the analysis for MOP 3, the study focuses on scenario 
#2, as the scenario demonstrates the capacity for the panic CIED to propagate over a 
large area, whereas for scenario #1, the incident is confined to the interior of the targeted 
shopping mall.  
4.  Initial Comparison of MOPs 
 An initial comparison of the mean percentage of injured and dead civilians gives 
us some initial insights.  With respect to Figure 23, a comparison of the histograms 
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generated for mean percentage injuries and deaths suggests that there is a slight 
difference in mean deaths and injuries for the base case and the indoor response scenario, 
with a slight increase in percentage injured for the latter.  The outdoor scenario 
demonstrates a lower percentage of the target population being injured and killed.  The 
VBIED scenario demonstrates a markedly higher percentage of injuries and deaths, 
although a larger spread of outlier values are noted as indicated by the outlier box plot in 
the right of the diagram.  Outlier values also exist for the other two response scenarios 
and are indicated by the red circles.  The mean percentage deaths also appear to have 
more variability in the data compared to the mean percentage injured and could be an 
indication of a poor association of response to the varied factors.  
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Figure 23.   Histograms for all scenarios comparing percentage of injuries and deaths 
out of the affected population.  
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B. BASE CASE SCENARIO 
Recall that the base case scenario allows us to compare the simulated impact of an 
incident in the absence of a response to a simulation inclusive of an activated emergency 
response.  The analysis achieves this by analyzing the data set for both cases and then 
subsequently conducting a paired t-test to determine any significant difference between 
the responses obtained from both cases.   
Partition (or regression) tree analysis partitions data recursively according to a 
relationship between the response and factors, creating a tree of partitions.  Like a 
parametric regression, it finds a set of cuts or groupings of controllable factors that best 
predict the response.  It does this by exhaustively searching all possible cuts or groupings. 
These splits (or partitions) of the data are done recursively forming a tree of decision 
rules until the desired fit is reached.   
Regression tree analysis for the base case scenario revealed that the initial size of 
the population at the incident site influenced percentage survivorship the most.  This 
corresponded with a parametric analysis of civilian survivorship versus the uncontrollable 
factors using Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and a subsequent linear regression, 
shown in Figure 24.   
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Figure 24.   Regression Analysis results of mean percentage injured in base case scenario.  Bar graph shows the t ratio, with blue 
line showing the 0.05 significance level. 
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Percentage combinations of neutral and non-compliant civilian numbers at the 
incident site explained the most variability in civilian survivorship and were the most 
statistically significant.  Intuitively, more civilians in the target area would naturally 
mean more casualties and a higher possibility of injured and dead civilians.  
  To enable a robust assessment of the effect of the 21 selected controllable factors, 
civilian numbers would, based on our initial finding, be sufficient to complement them 
for the combined NOLH.  The DOE continued to include eight uncontrollable factors into 
the design.  The eight factors are, therefore, a combination of statistically-significant and 
interesting environmental factors in this study.  As this study is more interested in 
understanding “civilian-responder” interactions, rather than “civilian-hazard” 
interactions, subsequent DOEs implementing the controllable factors excluded the factors  
“detectability of the chemical agent” and “sensitivity of human smell,” and incorporated 
the factors corresponding to the intrinsic non-compliance of civilians, the influence of 
panicking individuals, and the influence of compliant individuals.  The last two are of 
particular interest because they present the emergency responders and civil emergency 
planners with two options, both pertinent to the adequacy of emergency response 
procedures.  
 Is it beneficial to incorporate into existing SOPs the task to apprehend and 
detain overly panicked individuals to stem the spread of panic? 
 Is it beneficial to have compliant people that assist emergency-response 
efforts in the population?   
Singapore’s existing public education system for civil defense and emergency 
preparedness has the central objective of preparing the public to respond appropriately to 
an emergency incident.  Civilian volunteers could be called upon to assist in emergencies 
affecting their communities, or simply support responders by behaving in a compliant 
manner and follow evacuation instructions. 
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C. SCENARIO #1: EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO INDOOR DEVICE 
1. MOP 1: Comparison with Base Case Scenario 
  A paired t-test was conducted between the base case scenario and scenario #1 to 
determine if there was any significant difference, at 95% confidence, for the mean 
percentage of civilian injuries and deaths.  Two hundred and forty-seven design points 
were compared.  Five design points were lost in scenario #1 and five were removed from 
both sets as they lacked an operational basis.  Results are shown in Figure 25.  These 
suggest a statistically significant difference in the mean percentage of injuries sustained 
by the affected civilian population. Paired t-test results for mean percentage of deaths 
between base case and scenario #1 prove inconclusive; given only a 64.5% confidence 
achieved in disproving a difference.  
 
t-test statistics 
Mean 
Percent 
Injured 
(Scenario 1) 
Mean 
Percent 
Injured 
(Base Case) 
Mean 
Percent 
Dead 
(Scenario 1) 
Mean 
Percent 
Dead  
(Base Case) 
Mean 21.6 20.0  2.39 2.41 
Variance 6.99  10-4 6.69  10-4  8.93  10-5 3.82  10-5 
Observations 247 247  247 247 
Pearson Correlation 0.302  0.0876 
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  0 
Degrees of Freedom 246  246 
t Stat 8.13  -0.373 
P(T<= t) two-tail 1.093 10-14  0.355 
t Critical two-tail 1.65  1.65 
Figure 25.   Paired t-test results comparing percentage civilian injuries and deaths in 
the base case and scenario #1.  
 
The t-test results suggest, rather counter-intuitively, that the conditions 
implemented by an emergency response might serve to increase the mean injured 
numbers in the affected population, albeit by only one percent.  This leads to the question 
of why and how scenario #1 demonstrates this difference.  To answer this, regression tree 
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analysis was performed to determine which controllable factors, and at what values, were 
the most significant in influencing the mean deaths.  The analysis disregarded the 
considerably low R-square value and kept in mind that the regression tree only 
considered controllable factors.   
a. Entry Time of Division Police Leader and SOC 
   The entry time of the division police leader into the AO occupies the top-
most tier of the regression tree—this is shown in Figure 26.  An arrival time into the 
scenario map before time step 122 (approximately eight minutes) appears to correspond 
with fewer casualties, for both leaders.  If both leaders take a longer time to arrive, then 
the next most significant factor in influencing the response is the maximum influence of 
the FRC patrol officers.   
 
 
Figure 26.   Scenario #1: Regression Tree of first statistically significant factor with 
mean percentage injured civilians as response, taking into account 
controllable factors (R-square = 0.142).  
 
  It is possible that the earlier arrival of the SOC allows for a more rapid 
clearance of civilians out of the incident site, leading to fewer casualties exposed to the 
sarin plume either in the incident building or within the vicinity of the origin of the 
plume.  The entry time for the arrival of the division police leader and SOC to arrive on-
site are surprising—122 time steps, corresponding to eight minutes.  Operationally, this 
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suggests that the arrival of the command group must occur almost as soon as the arrival 
of the FRC and patrol officers.  Only five data points represent time step values below 
122.  This explains the small count on this “leaf.”  Anecdotal reports of efficiency in 
response, particularly in exercise events, demonstrate such a finding (TODAY News 
Desk 2006). Nevertheless, what if this is not operationally feasible?  One must look 
further down the regression tree.  
b. Maximum Influence of FRC Patrol Officers 
  Figure 27 shows the branching of the regression tree continuing from 
Figure 26.  If the patrol officers that arrive with the initial response (i.e., the FRC patrol 
officers) are able to influence at least 10 or more civilians, the mean percentage of 
injuries sustained by the civilian population can be improved by 3%.  The data indicated 
suggests a large standard deviation, but the mean improvement is substantial, if coming 
from the viewpoint that a small improvement in civilian survival remains operationally 
useful.  This effect translates into requiring the fast response force to control and 
communicate to civilians at a higher —not one or a few civilians, but 10 at a time!  One 
feasible method would be to equip these first responders with loudspeakers.  However, 
their use when in a protective posture would naturally be a technical complication.  Thus, 
a suggestion would be to incorporate personal audio speaker systems that are compatible 
with existing individual protective equipment (IPE).  This observation is not a new one—
such devices exist and serve to reduce the difficulty of man-to-man communication in 
troops during gas mask use. Future research into procurement might consider loudspeaker 
functions as well. 
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Figure 27.   Scenario #1: Continuation of regression tree for MOP 1.  Subsequent significant controllable factors given that the 
arrival of the division police leader and SOC units arrive after eight minutes (R-square 0.142). 
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 Where influence over the civilian population by the FRC patrol officers 
can be achieved at 10 persons per responder, their earlier arrival will further reduce 
civilian injury rates by 4%, if arrival time occurs before 269 time steps (18 minutes). 
When the influence over the civilian population by the FRC patrol officers is less than 10, 
then the next significant factor would be to employ more than five follow-on patrol 
officers.  If this is achievable and the entry time of these follow-on officers can occur 
within 24 to 25 minutes of the start of the incident, then the mean percentage of injured 
could be equivalent to that incurred when the FRC patrol officers are able to influence at 
least 10 civilians.   
  Conditions reducing the maximum influence by the FRC patrol officers 
would necessitate a larger follow-on force in several ways.  For instance, a fast-degrading 
condition of public calm might reduce police influence on the public.  The data analysis 
considers a linear regression for scenario #1 and generates the interaction plots for the 
controllable factors.  Where it is not possible to have the follow-on force arrive with a 
sizable number of patrol officers (e.g., when available officers are engaged in other 
activities such as deliberate operations, or are too far away to respond in time), the 
response force’s capacity to reduce civilian injuries then depends solely on how early the 
first responders arrive on site. An earlier arrival (within eight minutes) would improve the 
mean percentage of civilian injuries by 3 percent.   
   Given the low R-square values for the regression tree, a stepwise 
regression with all 29 controllable and uncontrollable factors determined which factors 
were most significant in estimating MOP 1.  See Appendix F for the regression output 
form JMP 7.0.  In general, the regression better accounted better for the variability, but 
showed the greater significance of the environmental factors in the process.  The 
parametric expression of the regression fit resulted in the inclusion of 38 regressor terms, 
21 of which are interaction and quadratic terms.  While taking into account that the 
regression represents a multi-dimensional problem and that responses may not 
necessarily be directly associated with regressor values, the analysis investigated two 
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regressor terms, as both involved controllable factors only.  To analyze their influence on 
MOP 1, the contour plots shown in Figure 28 and Figure 29 were generated.  
 
 
Figure 28.   Contour plot for maximum influence hazmat rescuers vs. # follow-on 
medical teams. 
 
  From Figure 28, it becomes obvious that there is an optimum region 
associated with the two factors.  The contour plot suggests that if the maximum influence 
of the hazmat rescuers is seven per rescuer and the number of follow-on medical teams 
stands at four, the MOP 1 value associated with it is 0.15 (15%) or less.  This observation 
must be taken with some caution as a plot of the data points contributing to the contour 
plot (which is not shown here), indicate that this “ideal” contour area is represented by 
only one design point, which was found to have no representation of neutral civilians.  
Subsequent referencing in the data set revealed that the design point representing the 
response in the outlined area only has 29 persons at any single location—15 compliant, 
14 non-compliant, and no neutrals.  Similar trends surface in subsequent contour plots, all 
shown in Appendix F.   
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Figure 29.   Contour plot for maximum influence of FRC patrol officers vs. maximum 
influence of hazmat rescuers. 
 
  From Figure 29, a “valley” of contours suggests a trend worth investigating.  The 
outlined area suggests that if the  maximum influence of the hazmat rescuers is slightly 
above par with the maximum influence of the FRC patrol officers, by one person, MOP 1 
does not go beyond 0.221 (22%).  As the contour plot only explores the data set in three 
dimensions (two factors and a response), where, in fact, the data set is for a multi-
dimensional problem, the proof of any relationship would have to be done on separate 
runs focusing on these two factors.  
2. MOP 2: Analysis and Categorical Regression Tree 
 MOP 2 for scenario #1 determines which controllable factors are significantly 
associated to a mean percentage injury rate of less than 20%, the overall mean civilian 
injuries observed from the base case.  A histogram illustrating the classification of the 
design-point specific responses for MOP 2 is shown in Figure 30.  Included is the 
corresponding histogram for the base case when scored on the same condition.  
Approximately one-third of the data set appears to support MOP 2 =1, indicating brevity 
of conditions that might potentially be studied to limit civilian injuries from being 
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exacerbated by the response.  Although the base case presents slightly more counts which 
qualify for MOP 2 =1, this stage of the analysis focuses on the controllable factors.  
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Figure 30.   Base case and Scenario #1: Histogram for MOP 2 occurrence and 
probabilities. 
 
  This stage of the analysis uses a categorical regression tree to determine which 
factors best predict for a higher probability for MOP 2 = 1.  The tree is shown in 
Figure 31.   
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Figure 31.   Scenario #1: Categorical regression tree for MOP 2 (R-square 0.094).  The 
red bar represents the proportion of count above 20%.  The blue bar 
represents the proportion below 20%.  
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Figure 31 suggests various conditions associated with a higher probability of the 
mean percentage of civilian injuries being lower than the benchmark.  As the arrival of 
the first responders (inclusive of the FRC patrol officers) is often the first task on the 
response cascade, its influence is accounted for first.  Interestingly, the most significant 
factors identified in the categorical regression tree differ from that shown in Figure 26 
and Figure 27. 
  If SOC tactical officers influence fewer than nine persons, the probability of the 
response being below 20% is twice as much than if the officers influence more—0.326 
compared to 0.106.  If the entry time of the follow-on patrol officers occurs in less than 
194 time steps (13 minutes), the probability improves to 0.487.  If the entry time of the 
follow-on officers occurs in 13 minutes or longer, then the entry time of the SCDF leader 
is the next significant factor, whereby a later arrival is associated with a higher 
probability of mean injured being below 20%.  Following this, a CAD broadcast range 
longer than six meters is favored over a shorter range.    
3.  Observations 
a. There is No Direct Association of Medical Assets to Improving 
Civilian Survivorship 
  Surprisingly, the regression tree results for both MOP 1 and 2 do not 
indicate the involvement of any medical assets.  This suggests that the improvement of 
civilian survival may not necessarily lie in changing the behavior or means for medical 
support elements committed to the response.  Given the configuration of the scenarios 
and the emergency activation process, these elements may be indirectly associated with 
the SCDF leader’s arrival and the entry time of the first responders.   
b. Implementing an Emergency Response is Associated in a 
Marginal, but Significant Increase in Civilian Injury 
   With no real-life incidents ever indicating the effectiveness of an 
emergency response as opposed to no response, it is difficult to discern if an actual 
response truly translates to a reduction in the morbidity of injury in the affected 
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population.  The simulation results showed that the mean percentage of injuries 
associated with an emergency response to an indoor CIED was statistically higher than 
that associated with no response.  The operational loss due to this difference is debatable, 
but the result is not far-fetched or inconceivable.  Medical assets configured in the 
scenarios do not impart complete regeneration on civilians.  Moreover, the continued 
retention of injured civilians at the incident site corresponds to the current SOPs for 
civilian decontamination.  This suggests a reasonable representation of the real response.  
Focus should shift to eliminating conditions that exacerbate civilian injuries, and 
committing to actions and procedures that may present a higher probability of keeping 
mean percentage of injured civilians to a minimum.   
c.  The Effect of Entry Time on Civilian Injuries Varies with 
Different Response Elements. 
   Both Figure 27 and Figure 28 suggest that earlier arrival of response 
elements does not necessarily translate to improved civilian survivorship.  When scored 
on MOP 1 (percent civilian injured), earlier entry times shown in Figure 27 are generally 
noted to be associated with a lower value for MOP 1.  When scored based on MOP 2, the 
later arrival of the SCDF leader is associated with a higher, and thus preferred, 
probability for the mean percentage injured to be less than the benchmark.  Two possible 
reasons account for this.  The earlier arrival of the SCDF leader improves the currency of 
the leader’s information, allowing the earlier activation and arrival of hazmat, medical 
and decontamination elements.  These forces may retain panicked but uninjured civilians 
(who would otherwise flee the incident site) to enable triage and medical 
decontamination while the threat is still active.  Alternatively, the statistical significance 
of the regression tree splitting at SCDF leader time could possibly be happenstance and 
the entry times for the SCDF leader correspond with a more appropriate uncontrollable 
factor.   
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d. Varying the Influence of Security Elements is Associated with 
the Morbidity of Injury. 
 The association between responder influence over civilians and the 
corresponding MOPs is varied.  If the FRC patrol officer can influence more than 10 
civilians to move to the triage, a lower value for MOP 1 is associated.  In the case of the 
SOC tactical officers, their capacity to influence fewer than nine civilians is associated 
with a higher probability that injured civilian proportions remain below 20%. Both 
responders carry weapons, give orders to civilians to move to the triage site, and operate 
in different locations on the incident site. No operational explanations can account for 
this result.  Simulation settings for the interaction between SOC officers and any civilians 
allow for the calming of panicked civilians or the subversion of non-compliant 
individuals to compliancy.  It may be possible that increased influence over the civilian 
population reduces further exposure to the chemical threat and prevents them from dying.  
This reduction in percentage dead would translate to an increase in percentage injured.    
D. SCENARIO #2:  EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO OUTDOOR DEVICE 
 As scenario #2 did not have a separate control case generated to analyze the 
impact of the outdoor emergency response (such as the base case and scenario #1), the 
data set is analyzed in isolation, but will draw some insight from the indoor case.  A 
major point to note is that scenario #2 involves a different hazard zoning template.  The 
location of emergency responders, less the security cordon elements (TP and SOC tactical 
team patrol routes) are shifted away from the department store at which the outdoor 
device is located. 
1. MOP 1: Regression Tree and Linear Regression 
  The regression tree shown in Figure 33 was generated using MOP 1 results for 
scenario #2. 
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Figure 32.   Scenario #2: regression tree (R-Square 0.109). 
 
A lower mean value for MOP 1 was associated with a maximum influence of less 
than three civilians by the SOC officers.  Following this branch, MOP 1 was significantly 
lower if FRC patrol officers were able to influence eight or more persons.  If such a 
condition were achieved, then the associated value for MOP 1 (16.3%) would be 2% 
lower than the aggregate mean for the scenario (18.9%).  When SOC tactical officers are 
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able to influence more than three civilians, the next significant factor would be their entry 
time with the division police leader, in which case a lower value for MOP 1 is associated 
with an arrival time no later than 25.8 minutes.  In this case, having three or more hazmat 
rescuers is associated with a lower MOP 1 value.  After this, the operational significance 
of the change in MOP 1 diminishes and values fall between 17 and 18%.  
  Given the low R-square values for the regression tree, a linear regression with all 
29 controllable and uncontrollable factors determined which factors were most significant 
in estimating MOP 1.  Appendix E shows the results of the linear regression.  The 
regression results are in agreement with the base case linear regression, that the numbers 
and non-compliance of civilians were dominant estimators for the percentage of civilians 
injured.  In addition, two controllable factors—the number of pump engine rescuers and 
the entry time of first responders—were associated into the parametric equation, 
suggesting their significance in predicting MOP 1.  Their coefficients are exceptionally 
small (0.002 and -1.625 10-5), but comparable to the coefficients of other factors 
included in the fit.  The negative polarity of the coefficient for the term corresponding to 
first responder entry time suggests an inverse relationship with the mean percentage of 
injuries.  A shorter first responder entry time is therefore associated with a lower 
percentage of civilians injured. 
2. MOP 2: Analysis and Regression Tree 
 For MOP 2, response values were scored on whether they were less than 18.9%, 
the aggregate mean percentage of injured for the whole data set.  The number of design 
points that score “1” and “0” is shown in Figure 31.  A close to equal proportion of 
design points score on both 1 and 0, suggesting that the NOLH design exhibits a good 
degree of conditions that may prevent the exacerbation of civilian injuries, or at the very 
least be associated with conditions supporting this. 
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Figure 33.   Scenario #2: Histogram for MOP 2 occurrence and probabilities. 
 
Figure 34 shows the categorical regression for MOP 2.  Like the analysis for 
scenario #1, the analysis takes into consideration that the significance of factors are 
assessed after the arrival of the first responders.  If the conditions deemed significant on 
the leftmost branching of the regression tree are fulfilled, then the probability of MOP 2 
associated with such conditions is 0.781, an improvement over the probability for the 
whole data set (0.4788).  Entry time of the first responders appears to be most significant 
in predicting the probability of MOP 2 = 1.  Like the MOP 2 analysis for scenario #1, the 
broadcast range of the CAD demonstrates itself to be significant in the categorical 
regression.  The leftmost branch is partitioned along a CAD broadcast range greater than 
six meters, suggesting that this value is significant in predicting for both indoor and 
outdoor incidents.  
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Figure 34.   Scenario #2: Categorical regression tree for MOP 2 (R-square 0.105).  The 
red bar represents the proportion of count above 18.9%.  The blue bar 
represents the proportion below 18.9%. 
 A  B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 C 
C 
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a. Reduced Influence of Pump Engine Rescuers and Fewer Patrol 
Officers is Associated with a Better Chance of Mean Percentage 
Injury > 18.9%. 
    The reduced influence of the pump engine rescuers and more FRC patrol 
officers are associated with a higher probability for MOP 2 = 1.  It is possible that 
increasing the influence of the rescuers actually allows them to better extract injured 
civilians before exposure to the CA causes them to die.  A reasonable expectation when 
this occurs is when the proportion of civilian deaths decrease with the increase of civilian 
injuries.  
b. Earlier First Responder Entry Times are Associated with a Better 
Chance of Mean Percentage < 18.9% 
    This observation can be noted in branches labeled box “A” and “B,” as 
indicated in Figure 35.  This is in agreement with the finding found from the linear 
regression fit described in Section D.1.  In conjunction with the observations made for the 
scenario #1, it might be reasonable to say that the earlier arrival of the first responders is 
beneficial to limiting the exacerbation of civilian injuries in a CIED incident.   
c. Longer CAD Broadcast Range is Beneficial in Scenario #1 and 
#2.  
    Interestingly, CAD broadcast range, which can be interpreted simply as 
the sound the device makes when it detects the chemical agent, is statistically significant 
in predicting civilian injury rates.  There is no configured interaction between the 
civilians and the CAD; the CAD is a device used by the pump engine rescuers and the 
hazmat personnel. It is possible that the longer broadcast range allows for one rescuer to 
alert the others and primes them to adopt a “masked” condition.  This masked condition 
improves their capacity to move about in the contaminated area and enhances the 
rescuers’ capacity to extract civilians that are trapped in the contaminated area.   
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3.  MOP 3: Panic 
 The mean values for MOP 3 are obtained and the controllable factors are 
determined that have the highest predictive value for compliant, neutral, and non-
compliant civilian populations.  The expectation was that these factors were likely to be 
different and the emergency response may or may not have the capacity to reduce the 
panic in either one or all three civilian sub-populations.  
 This stage of the analysis focuses on a single area to gain better clarity—in this 
case the pedestrian population moving outside the target shopping mall, codenamed 
ORLP.  Figure 35 illustrates the histogram for the mean panic attribute values recorded 
for the three sub-populations.   
 
 
Figure 35.   Scenario #2: Histograms for mean panic attribute values across compliant, 
neutral and non-compliant civilians.  
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 At a glance, the histograms display a left-skewed distribution of counts.  Civilians 
break the panic threshold once their panic attribute goes beyond 10.  The numerical value 
for the panic attribute would thus describe the intensity of the panic that surrounds the 
location.  As a counter-example, the diagram also shows the panic attribute histogram for 
location “T,” the initial target location for scenario #1.  Situated just adjacent to “ORLP,” 
the neutral civilian population at “T” experiences a far narrower spread for panic attribute 
values, suggesting the population remains better sequestered from the incident site and its 
psychological effects.  It is noted that a portion of the counts for “T” do exceed 10, 
indicating that on average the neutral population represented in “T” does engage in panic 
behavior.  As such, comparison of the spread of panic by such means is proposed to be a 
reasonable way to appreciate the propagation of panic in a Pythagoras scenario.  
  Unfortunately, because of the diverse spread associated with the panic levels for 
affected civilians, regression analysis is not likely to derive any accurate results.  
E. SCENARIO #3: EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO VBIED 
 Recall that the VBIED incident involves a large payload device, which does not 
have any CA associated with it.  It is expected that mean percentage dead is likely to be 
determined by the VBIED, as the simulation does not allow for any other modes of 
damage to be caused by other agents.  The VBIED scenario should, therefore reveal 
responder impact on the MOPs in the absence of a CA, which serves as a continual threat 
that can be mitigated.  The expectation is that with an explosive device, the occurrence of 
deaths and injuries is likely to be harder to influence by an emergency response.  
Ten data points had to be removed as they had zero results for mean percentage 
injured, but positive values for mean percentage dead.  As this was operationally 
unlikely, the data points were removed to prevent skewing in the analysis.  Two hundred 
and forty-seven data points remained for analysis. 
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1. MOP 1: Regression Tree 
 With reference to box “A” in Figure 36, a higher maximum influence by the SOC 
tactical officers serves as a significant indicator of a higher value for MOP 1.   
 
 
Figure 36.   Scenario #3: Regression tree for MOP 1 (R-square 0.400). 
A 
C 
B 
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 Following this, if the entry time of the SCDF leader is kept within 449 times steps 
(30 minutes) or lower, then the next best predictor for limiting MOP 1 is the entry times 
of the security and cordon elements indicated in box “B,” all of which indicate significant 
times that do not precede 30 minutes.  This suggests that in the case of VBIED incident, 
the arrivals of the TP and division police should precede the arrival of the SCDF leader 
and his associated elements.  With this in mind, a suggestion would be to activate security 
elements and implement site control before medical, fire fighting, and mitigation assets 
are called to the incident site.  In simulation, this would require the divisional follow-on 
patrol officers to support the FRC patrol officers in the clearance of the incident site.  
When civilians are diverted away from the site, it is possible that their exposure to any 
injury-causing elements in the scenario is reduced.   
 It is noteworthy that the branch in box “C” accounts for a high degree of 
variability as reflected by the change in R-square value for the regression tree.  This 
branch has a small count, but a very distinct mean value for MOP 1.  This is highly 
suggestive of outliers in the data set, which are identified using cluster and outlier 
analysis.  This is described in Appendix I.  The variability accounted for by this 
regression is also higher compared to the previous two scenarios, despite having a equal 
or fewer number of splits.  This could be due to the smaller standard deviation relative to 
the larger mean response, which in turn could be a reflection of a more defined impact 
created by the VBIED, as compared to the combined effects of the sarin and IED for 
scenario 1 and 2.   
2. MOP 2: Analysis and Regression Tree 
  Scenario #3 was scored for MOP 2 using the mean of the data set (0.468 or 46.8% 
of civilians injured).  As shown in Figure 37, fewer design points score “1” on MOP 2.   
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Figure 37.   Scenario #3: Histogram for MOP 2 occurrence and probabilities. 
 
Refer to Refer to Figure 38.  When conditioned on the probability that MOP 2 =1, 
a categorical regression tree analysis indicates that the most significant group to branch 
along begins with the entry time of the division police leader/SOC teams (box “A”).  
When conditioned on the arrival of this group in 11 minutes or earlier (see box “B”), a 
higher maximum influence by follow-on patrol officers is associated with a higher 
probability for MOP 2 = 1. If the follow-on division police have the capacity to influence 
more than five civilians, the probability of MOP 2 = 1 is much higher (three times as 
much as was expected from the data set).  
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Figure 38.   Scenario #3: Regression tree for MOP 2 (R-square 0.174). 
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If the division police leader and the SOC teams are not able to arrive within 11 
minutes, then a higher probability for MOP 2 = 1 will occur when responders have the 
capacity to influence civilians within a 23 m radius (box “C”).  Subject to this, the first 
responders can afford to arrive at 11 minutes or later.  If this occurs, the maximum 
influence of the pump engine rescuers becomes significant in predicting the response 
(box “D”), after which, the entry time of the division police leader and SOC teams 
become dominant again in predicting MOP 1.  If the pump engine rescuers have the 
capacity to influence more than four persons, then the division police leader/SOC teams 
should enter between 21.8 and 24 minutes.  If the pump engine rescuers influence less 
than four civilians, the next best predictor condition requires the number of follow-on 
medical teams to be three or more to favor a higher probability for MOP 2 =1.   
F. FURTHER ANALYSES AND OBSERVATIONS 
 To account for the variability in all the scenarios, stepwise regression and 
regression tree analysis, using both uncontrollable and controllable factors, was 
conducted.  See Appendix F for the resulting diagrams.  The number of civilians and their 
capacity for non-compliance accounts for much of the variability in all three scenarios.  
This supports the regression analysis conducted for the base case.   
 COADM was used to determine the existence of outliers of interest.  Of the four 
data sets generated, COADM was only able to generate outputs for only two scenarios, 
scenario #1 and scenario #3.  Errors in the compilation process of the cluster and outlier 
analysis occurred for the base case scenario and scenario #2.  The majority of the outliers 
generated in both scenarios #1 and #3, while appearing to have desirable responses in 
terms of MOP 1 and MOP 2, occurred out of design point conditions that have few 
civilians or are lacking a sub-population entirely.  The latter is due to the NOLH design 
and should be improved in future experiments.  Nonetheless, the cluster analyses 
conducted with the other two scenario outputs are in general agreement with the 
regression analysis described in this chapter.     
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 Given the sensitive nature of specific details regarding the TTPs used by the 
Singaporean military and paramilitary, as well as the limitations of the simulation, this 
study avoids proposing of operational revisions to the SOPs implemented by these forces, 
as this will require the need to reference sensitive material and will imply that existing 
measures fall short.  Instead, the findings presented here should be taken in relation to the 
assumptions made and the nature and limitations of the simulation’s design.   
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 From the data analysis, the following was determined: 
 With respect to the percentage of civilians injured by an indoor CIED incident, 
there appears to be a statistically significant, but marginal increase associated with 
emergency response activation, versus a baseline reference of no response.  What 
few actions associated with a statistically significant decrease in the percentage of 
civilians injured, only improve the percentage injured slightly by 1 to 4%.  
 The follow-on force, particularly with respect to the patrol-officers who conduct 
much of the site clearance, must complement the efficiency of the initial FRC 
patrol officers.  A less effective effort in the initial response by the FRC patrol 
officers, or an operational situation that impedes police influence, should 
necessitate more follow-on police officers to compensate.  An increased 
maximum influence on the part of the patrol officers appears to be positively 
associated with a reduction in mean percentage injured, subject to a reduction in 
influence by the SOC tactical officers.  
 To limit the potential increase incurred with an emergency response, factors that 
prevent the exacerbation of civilian injuries include the earlier entry time of first 
responders and follow-on police officers, the reduced maximum influence of SOC 
tactical officers, and potentially the later arrival of larger SCDF elements.   
 The early arrival of response elements, particularly security cordon and 
decontamination elements may inhibit the civilian intentions for self-preservation.  
The data suggests the association of lower mean percentage injuries with the later 
arrival of such elements, and vice-versa.  Interestingly, the earlier arrival of 
follow-on police officers is always associated with positive gains.  
 No direct association of medical assets is observed in the statistical analysis for 
CIED incidents.  If there is any influence, the possible response is likely to tend 
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towards reducing mean percentage deaths and transferring the saving of civilian 
lives to an increase in the mean percentage injured.  This is suggested based on 
the significance of the number of follow-on medical teams during the outdoor 
CIED incident, using regression tree analysis.  
 Panic associated with the incident site demonstrates itself in varying degrees.  In 
the context of the simulation, the representation of panic is subject to sequestering 
and proximity to the incident site. 
 Increasing CAD broadcast range is beneficial in scenarios involving CA.  This 
ranges from six to nine meters.  
 For a VBIED incident, early arrival of security and cordon elements before the 
SCDF leader and his associated elements may be significant in limiting mean 
civilian injuries. 
B. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Implication of Results 
 Assuming that the assumptions used in the design and generation of the 
simulation allow for a good approximation of the emergency response, there appears to 
be little that can be done to drastically improve the survival rates of the civilian 
population if attacked by either a CIED or a VBIED in indoor or outdoor environments.  
This would suggest that existing on-site emergency procedures do little to influence the 
survivorship of the affected population, and that the civilians themselves would have a far 
better chance of influencing their own survival rates.  Recalling the observations made by 
the press during Exercise NorthStar V (shown in Figure 39), certain actions noted by the 
press did not appear to benefit the well-being of the casualties being evacuated (TODAY 
News Desk 2006).  It is therefore interesting that the general impact of the standby 
response appears to be supported by these anecdotal accounts; however circumstantial.  A 
bold claim would thus be that any action undertaken by the emergency response to 
interact with the civilian population might complicate their survival, particularly actions 
requiring the directing and influencing of civilians to remain on-site to be treated.  
Securing, cordoning, and decontamination of persons directly or indirectly affected by the 
incident site, might serve to complicate survival, not because of the quality of the 
treatment, but because the human instinct is far more effective in ensuring its own 
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survival.  This observation is not only counter-intuitive from the standpoint of the 
responder; it also runs against the grain of emergency response, that of the helpless victim 
and the emergency or medical professional who rushes to the rescue.  
 
Figure 39.   Press observations for Exercise NorthStar V.  From: TODAY News Desk 
(2006). 
 This study must therefore re-adjust its assumptions for the intent of the emergency 
response.  A major issue of concern that supports the response in spite of a potential 
increase in casualties is to protect the national healthcare system.  This comes as a 
layered approach towards protecting the rest of Singapore Island against a novel threat.  
With a small land mass and exceptionally porous urban environment, contamination from 
a chemical incident could have the capacity to spread beyond the incident site.  The bulk 
of focus in any emergency response would therefore be towards containment.  Whether 
this dimension is closely analyzed in a national exercise, or can be tested by means of an 
FTX, is unknown by this author.   
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2. On-site Medical Response versus Direct-Throughput to Hospitals 
 If responder actions might hurt instead of help, what can emergency responders 
do to reduce their impact?  An existing debate exists on whether it is preferable to treat 
casualties from a CIED incident (or any CA incident) directly on or near the site of 
exposure, or whether it would be preferable to have these victims transported directly to a 
hospital specifically equipped to handle chemical casualties.  The existing Singaporean 
model of on-scene decontamination and triage contains the chemical hazard to the 
immediate area of exposure (CBRNe World 2007).  This study will not debate on the 
quality of the medical care administered to the civilian casualties, as the simulation’s 
design cannot allow us to determine this.  Rather, given the findings, the study will focus 
on issues regarding the containment of civilians to the incident site. 
Countries that have the capacity to handle CA casualties at hospitals are typically 
equipped to manage combat casualties of war.  A good example is Israel, which uses 
direct evacuation to a medical hospital given a chemical incident.  Certainly, the 
expectations for medical hospitals in Israel vary from those in Singapore – the latter has 
only one hospital equipped to handle chemical casualties and highly infectious diseases.  
Equipping hospitals to be able to engage in chemical decontamination and medical 
treatment would mean that staff, infrastructure, and emergency protocols would have to 
be retrained, re-structured, and revised.  Yet, when considering the instincts of the 
directly affected human population to escape any incident site, it is not hard to appreciate 
that individuals exposed to the CA may seek help at a public hospital without having 
gone through a whole gamut of medical decontamination and triage conducted on site.  
An example of this is the Tokyo subway attacks, when over 5,500 people were reported 
to have sought medical care, but emergency services on site transported only 688 patients 
(Kaplan 2000).  The majority of these individuals were not contaminated, but no 
reference indicates if any of them were at the scene of the chemical release.  In the 
Singaporean context, might it not be better to let fleeing civilians leave the incident site?  
Conversely, might it not be safer to detain all individuals in the affected area for 
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decontamination?  If given the limited capacity of the emergency response to improve 
survivorship, would it be preferable to allow such people out of the secured area?    
  If a reasonable decision is to be made, the consequences that come with these 
civilians potentially affecting the public health system have to be balanced with the 
potential impact the emergency responders might have on their survival.  Two options for 
mitigating such a complication would be to: 
 Define clear ROEs for the TP and the SOC.  Both elements fulfill specific tasks.  
In the case of the simulation, their roles are to ensure law and order, neutralize 
hostile threats and take on the control of the escaping civilian population, if 
necessary.  Train police forces to identify strange and panicked behavior, and 
equipped them with CADs to enable them to discern whether a panicking civilian 
moving out of the warm zone is chemically contaminated or merely part of the 
“worried well” who can physically manage on their own.  Costs incurred would 
be in terms of the total cost of ownership of CADs and related equipment, as well 
as the person-hours spent training forces to use CADs.   
 Put in place “aid stations” outside the warm zone of the incident site, that fleeing 
civilians are able to approach for help once they return to a rational state of mind.  
Assuming that the natural tendency for a person that senses danger would be to 
distance himself from the source of the threat, civilians might seek immediate 
help once they feel safe enough to return to a non-escaping state of mind.  Aid 
stations might be stand-alone tents or ambulances stationed outside the security 
zone and have clear signs indicating their presence.  The arrival of these aid 
stations would possibly have to occur at the start of the acute phase of the 
emergency activation.  
  FTXs and a simulation-based analysis could be used to assess the feasibility of 
these two options.   
3.  Analyzing Civilian Response to the Terrorist Threat 
 If an emergency response were likely to be geared towards protecting the 
unaffected population rather than the affected, it would therefore be logical to analyze the 
behavior of the civilians in simulation as they behave accordingly to the threat.  The 
present scope of this study focuses on what can be done on the part of the emergency 
responder.  The results, however, suggest that the best course of action in improving the 
chances of civilian survival might lie in the measures influencing the environment, and 
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hence the civilian population instead.  The old adage of “prevention is better than the 
cure” would be valid in this case—that civil authorities have the capacity to reduce the 
vulnerability of the population by implementing preventive measures, rather than 
responsive measures.  Such measures could include public education and better human 
factor engineering for the built environment.  The focus of one particular research effort 
at the Nanyang Technological University (NTU) in Singapore involves finding high-
performance means to analyze such human intangibles.  Future efforts can use the data 
generated for this study to validate common assumptions used here and in the NTU 
effort.  
B. OTHER LIMITATIONS 
 It was initially the author’s intent to study how the emergency response can 
influence the panic experienced by the population.  The complexities involved in this 
measure, however, such as the impact of civilian movement, sequestering, civilian-on-
civilian influence, as well as the limitations of the simulation platform and design, makes 
any statistical analysis with the existing data difficult to do.  In addition, as panic is 
abstracted as a numerical attribute, it can be argued that such a representation is invalid. 
 One limitation involves the absence of vehicular traffic in the scenario.  Urban 
traffic conditions will result in the extended arrival times of emergency responders.  
Civilian road users may also form collective sub-populations varying in degrees of 
compliancy, in this case to give way to emergency vehicles en route to the incident site.  
The implication of this limitation is that the preferable times of entry as indicated by the 
regression tree analysis in Chapter V may be difficult to achieve. 
 A limitation concerning the civilian population is that the distribution of the 
civilians may not be entirely representative of the distribution of pedestrians in the actual 
location.  Pedestrian distribution at the incident site is dependent on traffic density, time 
of day and even the day of the week.  These factors will influence the locations of 
civilians, their exposure to the blast, and fragmentation zones of the IEDs.  The results 
presented here may raise several interesting questions, but they should supported by more 
in-depth assessments on the behavior of civilians in the simulation.  The transience of 
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crowd build-up along the interior of buildings and along pedestrian walkways, in itself, 
can be treated as a separate study that focuses more on characterizing behavior than 
analyzing the response operation.  
 Another major limitation in the design of the simulation pertains to the adequacy 
of the medical response as characterized by Pythagoras.  In this study, the role of the 
medical elements was noted to have very little impact on either MOPs.  Casualties were 
not classified by the degree of injury they had sustained.  The data generated could not be 
used to assess how well the medical personnel administered to the casualties.  As such, 
the analysis loses resolution on whether the medical elements are able to limit the number 
of injured civilians dying while waiting for treatment.  The study, therefore cannot 
comment on the performance of the medical elements.  Moreover, to achieve this, there 
needs to be an assessment of the change in civilians injured and dead, scoped specifically 
to determine the number that transition from injury to death.  Data would have to be 
collected over successive time steps (in the case of Pythagoras, which is a discrete time 
simulation).    
C. CONCLUSIONS TO THE EXPERIMENTATION 
 The data presented in this study suggest that an emergency response has many 
more complicated issues than both the media and the civil authorities are keen on making 
known during an exercise.  An objective analysis of the simulation results compared and 
contrasted to the open-source reports on the lessons learned and observations made on 
Exercise NorthStar V, suggests similar trends in observation.  This study revisits the 
research questions again to place our findings in context: 
 How feasible are existing operational templates, TTPs, and information 
making processes? 
 
 How robust are current procedures in containing civilians exposed to chemical 
agents? 
 
 What factors influence the efficiency of emergency response procedures? 
 
 To what degree does civilian compliancy affect the performance of casualty 
treatment? 
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With respect to the research questions: 
 Assessment of the feasibility of the response gave counter-intuitive results.  
When focused on improving civilian survivorship, simulation results prove 
inconclusive in showing that civilian deaths incurred from an indoor CIED 
incident and subsequent an emergency response, vis-à-vis no response.  The 
percentage of civilians injured associated with the emergency response to the 
same device prove significantly higher than would be expected with no 
response.  Key actions associated with the response, however, are inversely 
associated with a decrease in civilian casualties.  In general, earlier arrival of 
the first responders improves civilian survivorship, while increased influence 
over the population by security forces serves to increase civilian injury. 
 
 The robustness of current procedures should be deemed reasonable as the 
flexibility of the initial and follow-on configurations allow IMs and response 
force leaders to manage the consequences of complications, in the time and 
compliancy domains.  If a direct relationship is assumed between the 
responses and the experimental factors, then several follow-on actions can be 
implemented to compensate for problems reducing responder arrival time and 
civilian compliance.  The entry time of the first responders composing the 
initial response is a significant factor in limiting the exacerbation of casualties 
at the incident site.  The maximum influence that each response force exerts 
on the affected population should vary in relation to the impact it has on the 
civilians.  Security and cordon elements should be careful in limiting their 
control of the population.  Rescuer influence should be slightly greater than 
that of patrol officers. 
 
 Assuming that the civilian behavioral model is valid, the intrinsic compliancy 
of civilians is not as dominant a deciding factor of civilian casualties, as much 
as the size of the population is.  This suggests that irrespective of his 
compliance towards an emergency response, the civilian is likely to be able to 
find a way to escape the hazard.  Public compliancy towards an emergency 
response should therefore not be a major concern to emergency planners, who 
should focus instead on the proper identification of persons affected by the 
incident. 
D. ON THE SUITABILITY OF PYTHAGORAS ABM 
 A major aspect of the M&S work was conducted to determine if Pythagoras had 
enough function and flexibility to allow for the design of a terrorist attack scenario, with 
the eventuality that a computer-based simulation could be used to augment the learning 
and developmental value of a mass FTX.  During use, the researcher encountered several 
technical problems that required direct correspondence with the developers. Appendix J 
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describes two of these issues.  Nonetheless, Pythagoras does lend itself well to generating 
a complex scenario such as a terrorist incident.  Major issues encountered in the course of 
this research that can reduce the feasibility of a Pythagoras-based simulation used in 
conjunction with a mass FTX include the following: 
 The time taken to run a single replicate becomes longer as the number of 
agent instances increase.  This will impact the capability of Pythagoras to 
simulate large crowds.  The current study has been able to generate scenarios 
with approximately 900 agent instances on a single scenario map without 
issue, given the use of an HPC cluster.  
 
 The co-ordinate-based design of terrain features requires point by point 
creation of individual elements in the Pythagoras scenario.  Increasing the 
number of terrain features and achieving a high fidelity in terms of terrain 
features is both time and labor intensive.  Future efforts with respect to “after-
market” software supporting Pythagoras 2.0.3, could focus on a terrain 
generator tool that can render terrain in terms of an XY grid co-ordinate 
system and save the data in an XML format that can be “spliced” into the 
scenario file in XML format.  
 
 The decision-making process for an agent instance of movement is based on 
deciding which direction, relative to its center line, it should turn (left or 
right), based on the immediate obstacles, agent preferences to avoid or prefer 
specific terrain, and its intended waypoints and destinations.  Curved features, 
such as roads and interior passages, may cause agent instances to “stick.”  
This is a major problem if the instance is unique and vital the process.  An 
easy solution would to be to script its movement, but in doing so, the 
simulation becomes more deterministic in behavior—the scripted behavior 
that works for one scenario will not work for another.   
E. FUTURE WORK 
 The following is a list of related follow-up research that could branch off from 
this work.  
 Simulation and analysis of the effectiveness of medical decontamination and 
support during an emergency response.  Both processes are essentially queues 
with multiple service-providers.  How these two functions work together in 
unison with the rest of the emergency response force would be interesting to 
research and will complement the findings from this study.  
 
 Simulation and analysis of a secondary device search during an emergency 
response.  As the simulation in this study only represents the first hour of the 
emergency response, the function of a secondary device search is not captured 
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within the simulation.  It would be interesting to study this process while it 
occurs in conjunction with an emergency response.  Various analytical search 
models exist in operational research.  It would therefore be intriguing to 
implement an extension of the Pythagoras simulation to capture this 
operational function and compare the results with an analytical model.   
 
 Analysis of human intangibles via low-resolution simulation.  The reality of 
utilizing physics-based simulations to analyze a crowd is that they are 
intensive and require a high degree of computing power to observe behavior.  
Pythagoras may be a low-resolution option that is accessible to both 
operational planners and defense scientists alike.  
 
 Command, Control and Communications (C3) analysis for emergency 
response.  This research does not touch on the impact of various C3 
architectures on the emergency response.  An interesting study would be to 
address the impact of this on the emergency response, particularly when 
responders are forced into consequence management, i.e., when a secondary 
device is activated, or when responders are attacked by harassing forces. 
 
 Scenario: multi-pronged terrorist incident.  The expanse of the scenario map 
in Pythagoras now allows a sizable area to be designed.  A good application 
would be to use this new improvement to analyze multi-pronged attacks, 
which are quickly becoming a new terrorist mode of operation.  The impetus 
is as current and evident as the recent Mumbai terror attacks (Sengupta & 
Bradsher 2008), which both protracted and complicated emergency response 
operations over four days in November 2008, and demonstrates the capacity 
for terrorist actions to occur as a multi-pronged effort. 
 
  This study represents a combined analysis of emergency response procedures, 
crowd behavior, and a non-physics-based simulation of chemical release and IED effects.  
Granted, the findings found here are controversial and prompt more questions than this 
study can currently answer.  The insights, data, and calculations performed, however, 
provide a good foundation for planning and analyzing effective response from an 
operational research point of view.  
 133 
 
 
APPENDIX A. CALIBRATION OF BOMB EFFECTS 
A.  CONCEALED INDOOR/OUTDOOR CIED: EXPLOSIVE PAYLOAD 
 5300 m/s (17,384 fps)  modelled as instantaneous effect  
 Relative Effectiveness Factor = 0.83 (TNT = 1.0) 
 Bowen Impulse Pressure for 1% Probability of Survival = 90 PSI = 105 Pa 
 Lethal Range assuming relative effectiveness is true = 15 meters lethal radius 
 Considering Casing Factor of 5 kg Drum, by Proctor Equation: 
 C = 0.47 + 0.53/(1+5/(7.07) = 0.78 
  C = 0.47 + 0.53/(1+5/(8.5) = 0.803 
B. VEHICLE-BORNE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (VBIED) 
 For the VBIED, the hypothetical casing factor and scaled distance for the charge 
is determined:  
 
Casing Factor  = 0.47 + 0.53/ (1 + casing weight/payload weight in TNT) 
= 0.47 + 0.53/ (1 + (3610/3334 kg)) = 0.724 
Q  = 2415.3754  
          Scaled Distance = R / Q1/3 = 13.41684  
 
For an overpressure of 105 Pa, R, the blast radius, must be from 53.667 to 107.335 
meters.  This value does not deviate from that used in Roginski’s analysis.  As such, the 
design of scenario #3 does not deviate from the simulation design implemented by him.  
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APPENDIX B. WEAPONS, INFLUENCE TOOLS AND 
RESTORATIVE CAPABILITIES 
 
 
Table 10.  Characteristics of weapons, influence tools, and restorative capabilities 
related to Pythagoras input data (From: Roginski 2006). 
 
 
Table 11. Attribute changer settings for weapons, influence tools, and restorative 
capabilities (From: Roginski, 2006). 
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Table 12. Working agent pair-wise color comparisons, showing relationship among 
pairs of agents (From: Roginski, 2006). 
 
 
 
Table 13. Probability of effectiveness given hit (From: Roginski, 2006). 
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APPENDIX C. SIDEDNESS SETTINGS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14. Color sidedness settings for agents configured in Pythagoras simulation.  
(From: Bitinas, Henscheid & Truong, 2003). 
 
Table 15. Working agent pair-wise color comparisons, showing relationship among 
pairs of agents (From: Bitinas, Henscheid & Truong, 2003). 
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APPENDIX D. AGENT BEHAVIORS 
 The following event state diagrams attempt to implement a universal method of 
recording and display alternate behavior routines that are configured in Pythagoras.  The 
absence of such a format delays the learning curve of Pythagoras, as a visual 
representation is useful for drafting alternate behaviors and the related conditions 
necessary for transition.   
The following graphs are based loosely on the drawing of discrete event 
simulation (DES) methodology (Schruben 1983).  This does not mean that Pythagoras 
implements DES.  Rather, the use of this drawing scheme is preferred as it associates 
alternate behaviors (loosely associated with the “state”) and trigger conditions (required 
transition “event”), allowing the user to visualize the flow of functions for each agent 
type.  One must keep in mind that for every agent instance in Pythagoras, a reference of 
an instance’s characteristics is kept in memory.  Thus, as an agent instance transits from 
one behavior to another, and its prior characteristics may be switched or remain the same.  
These can be related to the variables of a DES.  
While every effort has been made to include as much of the critical modeling 
details as possible, the following diagrams do not show all the configuration details of the 
agents.  Figure descriptions will indicate which agents have the same scheme of alternate 
behavior changes. 
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Figure 40.   Graph for civilian behavior. 
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Figure 41.   Graph for Improvised explosive device behavior. 
 
Figure 42.   Graph for sarin gas and plume behavior. 
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Figure 43.   Graph for Incident Command Post behavior. 
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Figure 44.   Graph for SCDF hazmat decontamination pod behavior.  The SCDF Pump Engine Agent follows the same design.  
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Figure 45.   Generic graph for incident management behavior for force leaders.  This represents a generic form for information 
collection by the force leaders.  
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Figure 46.   Graph for division police leader behavior.  The “listener” box indicates that friendly units that belong to the same side 
and have either have communications with the leader, or always know about the leader, are aware of the ordered 
behavior from the leader.  
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Figure 47.   Graph for SCDF leader behavior. 
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Figure 48.   Graph for TP leader behavior. 
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Figure 49.   Graph for FRC patrol officer behavior.  “MOVE TO SITE STOP,”“MASK,” and “MASK AND DOSE” use previous 
behavior settings of “FRC MOVE TO SITE.”  “MOVE TO SITE STOP” is a “clone” of “FRC MOVE TO 
SITE,”necessary to retain the triggers unique to “FRC MOVE TO SITE.”  This is replicated in subsequent graphs.  
 149 
 
 
 
Figure 50.   Graph for follow-on police officer behavior. 
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Figure 51.   Graph for traffic police officer behavior. 
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Figure 52.   Graph for SOC tactical officer behavior.  ”ENFORCE CORDON …SIDE” indicates that two different routes exist. 
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Figure 53.   Graph for SCDF hazmat decontamination team behavior.  The SCDF hazmat rescuers are configured to perform the 
casualty extraction operation from the incident site in the same format as above.  
 153 
 
 
 
Figure 54.   Sub-graph for immediate action drill against a chemical vapor hazard (Kent 2007). 
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APPENDIX E. ANALYSIS OF CORRELATION IN PARAMETERS 
Prior to running the full experiment, the study analyzed the correlation between 
the chosen factors.  The study used JMP 7.0 to generate a matrix of correlation 
coefficients that summarizes the strength of the linear relationships between each pair of 
response variables (Y).  Figure 54 summarizes this analysis in the form of a color matrix, 
showing the correlations among variables on a scale from red (+1) to blue (-1).  
Numerically, the maximum correlation coefficient between any two factors is 0.0786.  As 
most of the factors chosen for this study involve a combination of both physical and 
intangible characteristics (such as abstractions of psychological and social factors), the 
study deems this value acceptable for our purposes.  The following numbered key 
corresponds to the factors in color matrix.  As counter-examples, note that factors one 
through six are highly correlated in the positive and negative range.  This is because they 
are interpretations of the total number of compliant, neutral, and non-compliant civilians 
in each area.  The calculations for values 1 through 3 are based on values 4 through 6.  As 
such, the study avoids using the percentage values for our regression when analyzing the 
uncontrollable (environmental) factors.  
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1. Percent Affected Popn. Compliant 
2. Percent Affected Popn.Neutral 
3. Percent Affected Popn.Non-compliant 
4. # Compliant Civilians 
5. # Neutral Civilians 
6. # Non-compliant Civilians 
7. Non-compliance Compliant Civilians 
8. Non-compliance Neutral Civilians 
9. Non-compliance Non-compliant Civilians 
10. P(Influence) by Compliant Civilians 
11. P(Influence) Panicking Civilians 
12. # FRC Patrol Officers 
13. # FR Medical Teams 
14. # Follow-on Med Teams 
15. # Hazmat Rescuers 
16. # Pump Engine Rescuers 
17. Broadcast Range of Orders to Civilians 
18. Max Influence FRC Patrol Officers 
19. Max Influence Div Follow-on Police 
20. Max Influence Hazmat Rescuers 
21. Max Influence Pump Engine Rescuers 
22. Max Influence SOC Tactical Officers 
23. Max Influence TP Officers 
24. Entry Time First Responders 
25. Entry Time SCDF Leader 
26. Entry Time TP Leader 
27. Entry Time Div Police Leader/SOC 
28. Entry Time Follow-on Patrol Officers 
29. Chem Detection Range 
30. CAD Broadcast Range 
31. # Follow On Patrol Officers 
32. # Decon Pods and Teams 
Figure 55.   Color map summarizing the degree of correlation of 29 factors 
(controllable and uncontrollable) used in the experiments.  
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APPENDIX F. LINEAR REGRESSION FOR SCENARIO 
OUTPUTS 
 JMP 7.0 allows the user to generate a “best-fit” parametric model to estimate the 
chosen response, using the scoring characteristics of a step-wise regression, followed by a 
“least-squares” fit to generate a regression model that best plots an estimator line through 
the data set of observations.  Stepwise regression is an approach for selecting variables 
for a regression model and is used when there is little theory to guide the selection of 
terms for a model and when the intent is to determine what can potentially provide a good 
fit.  
In this study, the responses are MOP 1 and MOP 2.  The analysis scopes the 
regression to estimates for MOP 1.  In all four scenarios, the linear plot of the estimate 
generated by the parametric equation does not fit perfectly with the scatter plot of the 
data.  This is expected given the high variability in scatter, the less than perfect R-square 
values for the regression, and the possibility that the relationships between the regressor 
and the response are poorly defined.  As such, the study attaches a lower priority to the 
estimative capabilities of the regression, and focuses on the regressor term selection, 
which determines what factors prove (statistically) significant to estimating the response 
and what interactions exist among factors that are strongly associated with the outcome.   
 StepAIC allows the user to configure selection criteria to include or exclude any 
factor or combination of factors desired by the user.  For this study, interaction terms and 
polynomial terms up to 3 orders (i.e., cubic terms and triple factor interaction terms) were 
allows.  The probability for terms to enter selection was set to 0.001.  The probability for 
terms to be excluded was set to 0.1.  
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Figure 56.   Entry prompt showing control settings for stepwise regression 
As the analyses are interested in the relationships between the controllable factors 
with respect to how they influence MOP 1, interaction terms with two controllable factors 
were analyzed as contoured plots using MOP 1 as the response.  The only exception is the 
base case, where contour plots were used instead to analyze the relationship among the 
most significant environmental factors.  
A. BASE CASE 
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B. SCENARIO #1: INDOOR CIED 
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C. SCENARIO #2: OUTDOOR CIED 
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D. SCENARIO #3: OUTDOOR VBIED  
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APPENDIX G. MOP 3: HISTOGRAMS FOR PANIC ATTRIBUTES 
 The panic attribute is a numerical attribute that accumulates under the influence of 
effects that are expected to induce panic.  Civilians will have their panic attributes altered 
depending on where they are located and how exposed they are to panic inducing agents.  
The location of the civilians will influence how much panic they display.  The CIED 
explosive and SA effects both induce panic on whatever civilian is present.  As 
Pythagoras records the panic of the civilian agents as an average value across the instance 
for each civilian agent type, it is impossible to determine the proportions to which each 
sub-population develops.  Nonetheless, a mean panic value for a sub-population over 
multiple replicates can serve as an average indication of level of exposure experienced by 
this crowd.  From the histograms below, it is observed that sub-populations at ORWM, 
ORLP, PRGN, WM, and TKA experience a more intense display of panic, compared to 
sub-populations at T, FE, and SHW.  Scenario #2 results in a chemical plume migrating 
downwind from T in the direction of PRGN and TKA.  Thus, this flow of hazard results 
in an expected response from population.   
 
 
Figure 57.   Scenario #2: Locations of sub-populations of civilians in coded names.  
 
T LP PRGN
TKA
WM
ORLP
ORWM
SHW 
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Mean Panic Attribute (Non-compliant Civilians Specific to Location) 
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APPENDIX H.   SUPPLEMENTARY REGRESSION TREES FOR 
SCENARIOS 
 The following regression trees were conducted using all 29 factors to determine 
which types of factors were most significant in predicting the mean percentage of injury.  
In general, uncontrollable factors demonstrated the most significance, in particular the 
number of compliant, neutral, and non-compliant civilians located at each populated area, 
and the intrinsic non-compliance of civilians are the most significant.  The variability of 
the regression trees is also best explained by these factors.  Regression trees shown here 
are spilt to the point of diminishing returns in the form of improved explanation of 
variability (in terms of R-square value).   
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A.  REGRESSION TREE FOR SCENARIO #1  
 
Figure 58.   Regression Tree for mean percentage civilian injuries (R-square = 0.525; Splits = 10). 
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B.  REGRESSION TREE FOR SCENARIO #2  
 
Figure 59.   Regression Tree for mean percentage civilian injuries in scenario #2 (R-square = 0.745; Splits = 9). 
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C.  REGRESSION TREE FOR SCENARIO #3  
 
Figure 60.   Regression Tree for mean percentage civilian injuries in scenario #3 (R-square = 0.781; splits = 7). 
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APPENDIX I. CLUSTERING AND OUTLIER ANALYSIS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The analysis shown here supplements the statistical analysis conducted in Chapter 
V, and implements the software package, COADM written by DSO National 
Laboratories, Singapore.   
B.  OBJECTIVE 
Cluster analysis allows the user to create a global view of the data set in terms of 
the commons traits shared among each data point.  This allows for the quick 
identification of general trends of factor settings that attribute to “good” and “bad” 
performances in terms of the defined MOEs.  By the virtue of this “clustering” effect, the 
researcher can identify small groups or individual outliers representing observations of 
interest.  Parameters contributing to this “bad” performance can subsequently be input 
back into the simulation to examine why such conditions were unsatisfactory. 
C. CORRELATION PLOTS FOR SCENARIO #1: INDOOR CIED 
 Figure 60 shows the overview of the factor settings used as inputs for the 
Pythagoras scenario run for an indoor CIED incident.  As can be expected, the input 
parameters for the scenario demonstrate no apparent correlation in their cluster patterns.  
With respect to the cluster pattern of MOP 1 (boxed “MOP 1”), it is noted that the cluster 
patterns for the percentage affected population that is non-compliant (box “A”) and non-
compliant civilian numbers (box “B”) appear very similar to that of MOP 1.  As 
established in Chapter V, the non-compliant population number and the associated 
percentage value out of the affected population serves best to predict the value of MOP 1 
in the base case.  Given the cluster pattern shown here, it is likely to be the same for 
scenario #1 as well.  As expected, the cluster diagrams for MOP 1 and MOP 2 appear to 
be correlated.  Overall, it appears that the controllable factors implemented do not 
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correspond well with the cluster pattern of MOP 1.  This seems to agree with the poor 
explanation of variability when regressing solely on the controllable factors.  
 
  
Figure 61.   Overview of correlation plots for scenario #1. 
 
D. CLUSTERING ANALYSIS FOR SCENARIO #1: INDOOR CIED 
 Figure 61 shows three dominant clusters representing the 257 data points used in 
the simulation run.  Values in parenthesis represent the number of data points that sit 
inside each cluster.  Outliers, identified by a black hexagon, appear to occur in this data 
set.  Each cluster is associated with a series of mean values, allowing us to classify the 
clusters as “good” and “bad.”  To do this, analysis uses the means of the attributes in 
clusters generated in COADM to determine which cluster is the best for our purposes.  
With reference to Table 15, cluster 2 is a “good” cluster as it has a mean for MOP 1 of 
 
 
 
MOP 1 
 
 
 
MOP 2 
 
 A  B 
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0.190, which translates to a mean percentage level of 19% for civilian injury.  Compared 
to the base case reference of 20.0%, conditions in this cluster may reveal slight 
improvements in MOP 1.  Three black cluster cells appear in cluster 2.  The cluster cell 
containing design points 1, 2, 3, and 4 appear to have significantly lower conditions were 
one of the three compliance groups is missing from the scenario.  In addition, the civilian 
numbers are too small to be operationally realistic (rather, they represent the area in the 
wee hours of the working day!).  The MOP 1 value for design point 240 is the same as 
that for cluster 2; therefore, it is deemed not of interest.  
 
 
Figure 62.   Clustering analysis for scenario #1. 
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CLUSTER 1  CLUSTER 2  CLUSTER 3 
beta_comp 46.000 +/‐ 28.758 
beta_nc 47.000 +/‐ 27.211 
beta_neut 45.000 +/‐ 26.874 
BROC 35.000 +/‐ 9.163 
CBR 6.000 +/‐ 2.251 
CDR 55.000 +/‐ 15.246 
comp_civ 16.000 +/‐ 8.165 
ET_DPLSOC 290.000 +/‐ 88.047 
ET_FOPO 281.000 +/‐ 94.848 
ET_FR 275.000 +/‐ 96.679 
ET_SL 268.000 +/‐ 103.010 
ET_TPL 292.000 +/‐ 100.602 
Mean_PA 0.979 +/‐ 0.003 
Mean_PD 0.021 +/‐ 0.003 
Mean_PI 0.218 +/‐ 0.021 
MI_DFOP 5.000 +/‐ 2.638 
MI_FRPO 6.000 +/‐ 2.477 
MI_HR 6.000 +/‐ 2.635 
MI_PER 6.000 +/‐ 2.434 
MI_STO 6.000 +/‐ 2.738 
MI_TPO 6.000 +/‐ 2.685 
MOP 2_dead 1.000 +/‐ 0.000 
MOP 2_injured 0.000 +/‐ 0.000 
N_Rows 10.000 +/‐ 0.588 
nc_civ 16.000 +/‐ 7.290 
neut_civ 14.000 +/‐ 8.807 
No_DPT 2.000 +/‐ 1.053 
No_FOMT 2.000 +/‐ 1.032 
No_FPO 3.000 +/‐ 0.903 
No_FRMT 3.000 +/‐ 0.934 
No_HR 2.000 +/‐ 0.941 
No_OPO 4.000 +/‐ 1.307 
No_PER 2.000 +/‐ 1.043 
PAP_Comp 0.350 +/‐ 0.151 
PAP_nc 0.346 +/‐ 0.142 
PAP_Neut 0.316 +/‐ 0.149 
PI_comp 0.500 +/‐ 0.258 
PI_panic 0.510 +/‐ 0.308 
SD_PA 0.015 +/‐ 0.005 
SD_PD 0.015 +/‐ 0.005 
SD_PI 0.033 +/‐ 0.015 
beta_comp 47.000 +/‐ 24.814 
beta_nc 44.000 +/‐ 25.834 
beta_neut 45.000 +/‐ 27.003 
BROC 35.000 +/‐ 8.666 
CBR 6.000 +/‐ 2.524 
CDR 57.000 +/‐ 14.541 
comp_civ 17.000 +/‐ 8.833 
ET_DPLSOC 284.000 +/‐ 106.615 
ET_FOPO 269.000 +/‐ 100.412 
ET_FR 281.000 +/‐ 91.630 
ET_SL 286.000 +/‐ 92.090 
ET_TPL 283.000 +/‐ 100.908 
Mean_PA 0.980 +/‐ 0.004 
Mean_PD 0.021 +/‐ 0.015 
Mean_PI 0.190 +/‐ 0.011 
MI_DFOP 5.000 +/‐ 2.447 
MI_FRPO 6.000 +/‐ 2.664 
MI_HR 6.000 +/‐ 2.718 
MI_PER 5.000 +/‐ 2.748 
MI_STO 5.000 +/‐ 2.537 
MI_TPO 5.000 +/‐ 2.748 
MOP 2_dead 1.000 +/‐ 0.321 
MOP 2_injured 1.000 +/‐ 0.180 
N_Rows 10.000 +/‐ 0.000 
nc_civ 6.000 +/‐ 3.530 
neut_civ 17.000 +/‐ 8.248 
No_DPT 2.000 +/‐ 0.923 
No_FOMT 3.000 +/‐ 0.922 
No_FPO 2.000 +/‐ 0.959 
No_FRMT 2.000 +/‐ 0.942 
No_HR 3.000 +/‐ 0.942 
No_OPO 4.000 +/‐ 1.078 
No_PER 3.000 +/‐ 0.886 
PAP_Comp 0.397 +/‐ 0.205 
PAP_nc 0.161 +/‐ 0.083 
PAP_Neut 0.396 +/‐ 0.210 
PI_comp 0.520 +/‐ 0.320 
PI_panic 0.450 +/‐ 0.266 
SD_PA 0.014 +/‐ 0.004 
SD_PD 0.014 +/‐ 0.004 
SD_PI 0.032 +/‐ 0.011 
beta_comp 42.000 +/‐ 23.126 
beta_nc 43.000 +/‐ 25.190 
beta_neut 46.000 +/‐ 24.779 
BROC 34.000 +/‐ 8.463 
CBR 6.000 +/‐ 2.310 
CDR 54.000 +/‐ 13.704 
comp_civ 14.000 +/‐ 8.836 
ET_DPLSOC 273.000 +/‐ 102.037 
ET_FOPO 296.000 +/‐ 100.175 
ET_FR 286.000 +/‐ 104.226 
ET_SL 289.000 +/‐ 94.213 
ET_TPL 285.000 +/‐ 91.209 
Mean_PA 0.974 +/‐ 0.004 
Mean_PD 0.028 +/‐ 0.009 
Mean_PI 0.222 +/‐ 0.048 
MI_DFOP 6.000 +/‐ 2.672 
MI_FRPO 5.000 +/‐ 2.798 
MI_HR 5.000 +/‐ 2.616 
MI_PER 6.000 +/‐ 2.765 
MI_STO 6.000 +/‐ 2.633 
MI_TPO 5.000 +/‐ 2.566 
MOP 2_dead 0.000 +/‐ 0.000 
MOP 2_injured 0.000 +/‐ 0.291 
N_Rows 10.000 +/‐ 0.000 
nc_civ 19.000 +/‐ 6.969 
neut_civ 13.000 +/‐ 8.466 
No_DPT 3.000 +/‐ 0.874 
No_FOMT 3.000 +/‐ 0.913 
No_FPO 2.000 +/‐ 1.043 
No_FRMT 2.000 +/‐ 0.983 
No_HR 3.000 +/‐ 0.994 
No_OPO 4.000 +/‐ 1.244 
No_PER 2.000 +/‐ 0.896 
PAP_Comp 0.309 +/‐ 0.172 
PAP_nc 0.393 +/‐ 0.150 
PAP_Neut 0.287 +/‐ 0.168 
PI_comp 0.490 +/‐ 0.312 
PI_panic 0.500 +/‐ 0.286 
SD_PA 0.017 +/‐ 0.005 
SD_PD 0.017 +/‐ 0.005 
SD_PI 0.034 +/‐ 0.018 
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Table 15. Table of mean cluster attributes by variables.  MOP 1 and MOP 2 are in 
bold. 
 
E. CORRELATION PLOTS FOR SCENARIO #3: OUTDOOR VBIED 
 The correlation plots for scenario #3 demonstrate the same characteristics as that 
for scenario #1.  MOP 1 and MOP 2 are in close agreement.  When compared to the 
regression tree analysis conducted on Figure 62, factors noted to be significant (boxed 
“A,” “B1,” “B2,” and “C”) correspond in terms of cluster correlation.  In addition, it can 
be seen from the correlation charts that a few other factors are positively correlated to the 
color strength noted for MOP 1.  In particular, the maximum influence of hazmat 
responders (“D”) and number of pump engine rescuers (“E”) may be used to improve 
MOP 1 given this slight positive correlation.  
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Figure 63.   Overview of correlation plots for scenario #3. 
 
F. CLUSTERING ANALYSIS FOR SCENARIO #3: INDOOR VBIED 
 Figure 63 shows the clusters generated for scenario #3, which is more diverse 
than previously seen for scenario #1.  Ten clusters were generated by COADM.  Based 
on the data shown in tables 16 through 18, clusters 9 and 10 are identified as “good” 
clusters.  From these clusters, outlier cells exist only in cluster 10.  All these outliers lack 
either one sub-population of civilians, or they have very low population numbers set by 
the design matrix.   
 Of better interest are the cluster cells 42 and 212, which are located in clusters 4 
and 6; both have a mean percentage injured civilian value of 49%.  Cluster cells 42 and 
212 have MOP 1 values of 43% and 45%, whereas the cluster they are in has a 49% mean 
value for MOP 1.  Conditions corresponding to these two points were implemented as 
scenario files for further analysis.  However, error messages from Pythagoras indicate 
that both scenarios cannot load.  This is still under investigation.  
 
 
Figure 64.   Clustering analysis for scenario #3 
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CLUSTER 1 CLUSTER 2 CLUSTER 3 CLUSTER 4 
beta_comp 41.000 +/‐ 25.224 
beta_nc 51.000 +/‐ 24.906 
beta_neut 45.000 +/‐ 24.913 
BROC 34.000 +/‐ 8.338 
CBR 6.000 +/‐ 2.526 
CDR 56.000 +/‐ 12.617 
comp_civ 19.000 +/‐ 7.933 
ET_DPLSOC 290.000 +/‐ 104.040 
ET_FOPO 288.000 +/‐ 105.681 
ET_FR 289.000 +/‐ 95.206 
ET_SL 277.000 +/‐ 92.370 
ET_TPL 271.000 +/‐ 99.554 
Mean_PA 0.948 +/‐ 0.011 
Mean_PD 0.052 +/‐ 0.011 
Mean_PI 0.490 +/‐ 0.016 
Mean_TCA 360.400 +/‐ 67.176 
Mean_TCD 18.444 +/‐ 3.258 
Mean_TCI 187.600 +/‐ 33.882 
MI_DFOP 5.000 +/‐ 2.335 
MI_FRPO 5.000 +/‐ 2.755 
MI_HR 6.000 +/‐ 2.443 
MI_PER 6.000 +/‐ 2.582 
MI_STO 6.000 +/‐ 2.640 
MI_TPO 5.000 +/‐ 2.609 
MOP 2_Injured 0.000 +/‐ 0.000 
N_Rows 9.000 +/‐ 1.908 
nc_civ 22.000 +/‐ 4.931 
neut_civ 15.000 +/‐ 7.685 
No_DPT 2.000 +/‐ 0.983 
No_FOMT 2.000 +/‐ 0.933 
No_FPO 2.000 +/‐ 0.969 
No_FRMT 2.000 +/‐ 0.966 
No_HR 3.000 +/‐ 0.890 
No_OPO 4.000 +/‐ 1.223 
No_PER 2.000 +/‐ 0.902 
PAP_Comp 0.340 +/‐ 0.121 
PAP_nc 0.390 +/‐ 0.098 
PAP_Neut 0.270 +/‐ 0.131 
PI_comp 0.500 +/‐ 0.316 
PI_panic 0.480 +/‐ 0.276 
SD_PA 0.085 +/‐ 0.008 
SD_PD 0.085 +/‐ 0.008 
SD_PI 0.090 +/‐ 0.010 
SD_TCA 32.182 +/‐ 3.832 
SD_TCD 32.182 +/‐ 3.832 
SD_TCI 33.629 +/‐ 5.519 
beta_comp 49.000 +/‐ 31.443 
beta_nc 42.000 +/‐ 24.196 
beta_neut 45.000 +/‐ 19.998 
BROC 35.000 +/‐ 10.687 
CBR 7.000 +/‐ 2.275 
CDR 53.000 +/‐ 10.790 
comp_civ 14.000 +/‐ 5.351 
ET_DPLSOC 269.000 +/‐ 88.357 
ET_FOPO 286.000 +/‐ 88.358 
ET_FR 280.000 +/‐ 89.350 
ET_SL 289.000 +/‐ 108.040 
ET_TPL 290.000 +/‐ 121.967 
Mean_PA 0.949 +/‐ 0.020 
Mean_PD 0.053 +/‐ 0.027 
Mean_PI 0.486 +/‐ 0.032 
Mean_TCA 231.400 +/‐ 86.768 
Mean_TCD 11.900 +/‐ 4.962 
Mean_TCI 117.100 +/‐ 48.661 
MI_DFOP 6.000 +/‐ 3.049 
MI_FRPO 6.000 +/‐ 2.151 
MI_HR 5.000 +/‐ 2.125 
MI_PER 6.000 +/‐ 2.393 
MI_STO 5.000 +/‐ 2.746 
MI_TPO 5.000 +/‐ 2.275 
MOP 2_Injured 0.000 +/‐ 0.000 
N_Rows 9.000 +/‐ 3.143 
nc_civ 13.000 +/‐ 9.326 
neut_civ 6.000 +/‐ 7.004 
No_DPT 3.000 +/‐ 1.073 
No_FOMT 3.000 +/‐ 1.073 
No_FPO 3.000 +/‐ 1.073 
No_FRMT 3.000 +/‐ 0.793 
No_HR 2.000 +/‐ 1.231 
No_OPO 4.000 +/‐ 0.905 
No_PER 2.000 +/‐ 0.905 
PAP_Comp 0.397 +/‐ 0.230 
PAP_nc 0.356 +/‐ 0.232 
PAP_Neut 0.188 +/‐ 0.144 
PI_comp 0.530 +/‐ 0.289 
PI_panic 0.520 +/‐ 0.272 
SD_PA 0.084 +/‐ 0.032 
SD_PD 0.084 +/‐ 0.032 
SD_PI 0.089 +/‐ 0.032 
SD_TCA 19.050 +/‐ 7.782 
SD_TCD 19.050 +/‐ 7.782 
SD_TCI 19.789 +/‐ 7.522 
beta_comp 47.000 +/‐ 23.161 
beta_nc 46.000 +/‐ 22.149 
beta_neut 40.000 +/‐ 20.961 
BROC 34.000 +/‐ 9.720 
CBR 6.000 +/‐ 2.366 
CDR 53.000 +/‐ 16.823 
comp_civ 18.000 +/‐ 6.546 
ET_DPLSOC 277.000 +/‐ 74.091 
ET_FOPO 314.000 +/‐ 125.341 
ET_FR 260.000 +/‐ 66.819 
ET_SL 319.000 +/‐ 83.295 
ET_TPL 307.000 +/‐ 98.175 
Mean_PA 0.945 +/‐ 0.002 
Mean_PD 0.055 +/‐ 0.002 
Mean_PI 0.486 +/‐ 0.010 
Mean_TCA 280.100 +/‐ 20.592 
Mean_TCD 15.600 +/‐ 1.361 
Mean_TCI 140.200 +/‐ 10.085 
MI_DFOP 6.000 +/‐ 2.898 
MI_FRPO 5.000 +/‐ 2.501 
MI_HR 5.000 +/‐ 2.339 
MI_PER 4.000 +/‐ 2.760 
MI_STO 6.000 +/‐ 2.240 
MI_TPO 6.000 +/‐ 2.914 
MOP 2_Injured 0.000 +/‐ 0.000 
N_Rows 9.000 +/‐ 0.000 
nc_civ 14.000 +/‐ 5.679 
neut_civ 9.000 +/‐ 4.202 
No_DPT 2.000 +/‐ 1.128 
No_FOMT 3.000 +/‐ 1.027 
No_FPO 3.000 +/‐ 0.831 
No_FRMT 3.000 +/‐ 1.120 
No_HR 2.000 +/‐ 0.944 
No_OPO 4.000 +/‐ 1.104 
No_PER 3.000 +/‐ 0.874 
PAP_Comp 0.407 +/‐ 0.164 
PAP_nc 0.344 +/‐ 0.129 
PAP_Neut 0.233 +/‐ 0.107 
PI_comp 0.450 +/‐ 0.269 
PI_panic 0.530 +/‐ 0.271 
SD_PA 0.090 +/‐ 0.004 
SD_PD 0.090 +/‐ 0.004 
SD_PI 0.093 +/‐ 0.006 
SD_TCA 25.285 +/‐ 2.222 
SD_TCD 25.285 +/‐ 2.222 
SD_TCI 26.576 +/‐ 3.209 
beta_comp 46.000 +/‐ 25.401 
beta_nc 44.000 +/‐ 28.653 
beta_neut 40.000 +/‐ 23.324 
BROC 34.000 +/‐ 8.640 
CBR 6.000 +/‐ 2.373 
CDR 58.000 +/‐ 15.721 
comp_civ 13.000 +/‐ 6.815 
ET_DPLSOC 285.000 +/‐ 100.655 
ET_FOPO 280.000 +/‐ 99.521 
ET_FR 285.000 +/‐ 97.841 
ET_SL 267.000 +/‐ 102.737 
ET_TPL 269.000 +/‐ 101.759 
Mean_PA 0.938 +/‐ 0.007 
Mean_PD 0.062 +/‐ 0.007 
Mean_PI 0.492 +/‐ 0.025 
Mean_TCA 320.300 +/‐ 38.879 
Mean_TCD 21.500 +/‐ 2.617 
Mean_TCI 166.900 +/‐ 23.913 
MI_DFOP 5.000 +/‐ 2.760 
MI_FRPO 6.000 +/‐ 2.421 
MI_HR 5.000 +/‐ 2.576 
MI_PER 7.000 +/‐ 2.823 
MI_STO 5.000 +/‐ 2.421 
MI_TPO 6.000 +/‐ 2.772 
MOP 2_Injured 0.000 +/‐ 0.315 
N_Rows 9.000 +/‐ 2.401 
nc_civ 15.000 +/‐ 7.539 
neut_civ 21.000 +/‐ 5.960 
No_DPT 2.000 +/‐ 0.765 
No_FOMT 2.000 +/‐ 1.006 
No_FPO 2.000 +/‐ 0.990 
No_FRMT 3.000 +/‐ 1.042 
No_HR 2.000 +/‐ 0.901 
No_OPO 4.000 +/‐ 1.449 
No_PER 2.000 +/‐ 0.978 
PAP_Comp 0.278 +/‐ 0.129 
PAP_nc 0.308 +/‐ 0.165 
PAP_Neut 0.418 +/‐ 0.117 
PI_comp 0.550 +/‐ 0.262 
PI_panic 0.450 +/‐ 0.291 
SD_PA 0.100 +/‐ 0.009 
SD_PD 0.100 +/‐ 0.009 
SD_PI 0.097 +/‐ 0.015 
SD_TCA 34.435 +/‐ 4.380 
SD_TCD 34.435 +/‐ 4.380 
SD_TCI 34.493 +/‐ 5.714 
Table 16. Table of mean cluster attributes by variables, for clusters 1-4.  MOP 1 and 
MOP 2 are in bold. 
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CLUSTER 5 CLUSTER 6 CLUSTER 7 CLUSTER 8 
beta_comp 49.000 +/‐ 24.774 
beta_nc 53.000 +/‐ 17.681 
beta_neut 36.000 +/‐ 21.625 
BROC 34.000 +/‐ 7.786 
CBR 6.000 +/‐ 1.913 
CDR 55.000 +/‐ 14.241 
comp_civ 18.000 +/‐ 5.429 
ET_DPLSOC 309.000 +/‐ 53.177 
ET_FOPO 288.000 +/‐ 117.177 
ET_FR 300.000 +/‐ 90.008 
ET_SL 292.000 +/‐ 100.819 
ET_TPL 302.000 +/‐ 70.314 
Mean_PA 0.942 +/‐ 0.004 
Mean_PD 0.058 +/‐ 0.004 
Mean_PI 0.487 +/‐ 0.008 
Mean_TCA 284.100 +/‐ 22.024 
Mean_TCD 17.600 +/‐ 2.070 
Mean_TCI 145.600 +/‐ 11.843 
MI_DFOP 5.000 +/‐ 2.480 
MI_FRPO 6.000 +/‐ 2.570 
MI_HR 6.000 +/‐ 2.902 
MI_PER 5.000 +/‐ 2.691 
MI_STO 6.000 +/‐ 2.290 
MI_TPO 6.000 +/‐ 2.811 
MOP 2_Injured 0.000 +/‐ 0.000 
N_Rows 10.000 +/‐ 1.730 
nc_civ 12.000 +/‐ 5.895 
neut_civ 12.000 +/‐ 3.473 
No_DPT 2.000 +/‐ 1.138 
No_FOMT 3.000 +/‐ 0.793 
No_FPO 3.000 +/‐ 1.115 
No_FRMT 3.000 +/‐ 0.996 
No_HR 2.000 +/‐ 0.866 
No_OPO 4.000 +/‐ 1.193 
No_PER 3.000 +/‐ 0.996 
PAP_Comp 0.400 +/‐ 0.134 
PAP_nc 0.289 +/‐ 0.126 
PAP_Neut 0.297 +/‐ 0.083 
PI_comp 0.420 +/‐ 0.326 
PI_panic 0.520 +/‐ 0.320 
SD_PA 0.094 +/‐ 0.003 
SD_PD 0.094 +/‐ 0.003 
SD_PI 0.095 +/‐ 0.009 
SD_TCA 27.897 +/‐ 2.288 
SD_TCD 27.897 +/‐ 2.288 
SD_TCI 28.612 +/‐ 2.457 
beta_comp 42.000 +/‐ 27.982 
beta_nc 44.000 +/‐ 24.803 
beta_neut 39.000 +/‐ 22.592 
BROC 35.000 +/‐ 9.932 
CBR 6.000 +/‐ 2.456 
CDR 56.000 +/‐ 14.563 
comp_civ 21.000 +/‐ 6.208 
ET_DPLSOC 314.000 +/‐ 89.569 
ET_FOPO 276.000 +/‐ 85.017 
ET_FR 279.000 +/‐ 101.597 
ET_SL 283.000 +/‐ 100.900 
ET_TPL 286.000 +/‐ 101.507 
Mean_PA 0.942 +/‐ 0.006 
Mean_PD 0.057 +/‐ 0.006 
Mean_PI 0.492 +/‐ 0.026 
Mean_TCA 389.333 +/‐ 53.452 
Mean_TCD 23.667 +/‐ 3.975 
Mean_TCI 201.500 +/‐ 27.471 
MI_DFOP 5.000 +/‐ 2.929 
MI_FRPO 6.000 +/‐ 2.552 
MI_HR 6.000 +/‐ 2.680 
MI_PER 5.000 +/‐ 2.536 
MI_STO 5.000 +/‐ 2.910 
MI_TPO 5.000 +/‐ 2.552 
MOP 2_Injured 0.000 +/‐ 0.389 
N_Rows 9.000 +/‐ 2.451 
nc_civ 19.000 +/‐ 7.852 
neut_civ 22.000 +/‐ 5.741 
No_DPT 3.000 +/‐ 1.095 
No_FOMT 2.000 +/‐ 1.069 
No_FPO 2.000 +/‐ 0.996 
No_FRMT 3.000 +/‐ 0.913 
No_HR 2.000 +/‐ 1.016 
No_OPO 4.000 +/‐ 1.030 
No_PER 3.000 +/‐ 0.923 
PAP_Comp 0.348 +/‐ 0.101 
PAP_nc 0.319 +/‐ 0.111 
PAP_Neut 0.353 +/‐ 0.094 
PI_comp 0.480 +/‐ 0.288 
PI_panic 0.530 +/‐ 0.273 
SD_PA 0.094 +/‐ 0.006 
SD_PD 0.094 +/‐ 0.006 
SD_PI 0.094 +/‐ 0.012 
SD_TCA 38.682 +/‐ 6.197 
SD_TCD 38.682 +/‐ 6.197 
SD_TCI 39.433 +/‐ 7.704 
beta_comp 48.000 +/‐ 29.455 
beta_nc 49.000 +/‐ 25.426 
beta_neut 40.000 +/‐ 23.656 
BROC 34.000 +/‐ 9.977 
CBR 6.000 +/‐ 2.270 
CDR 53.000 +/‐ 14.589 
comp_civ 7.000 +/‐ 3.560 
ET_DPLSOC 276.000 +/‐ 84.784 
ET_FOPO 258.000 +/‐ 78.595 
ET_FR 276.000 +/‐ 99.304 
ET_SL 280.000 +/‐ 103.025 
ET_TPL 272.000 +/‐ 105.197 
Mean_PA 0.945 +/‐ 0.005 
Mean_PD 0.055 +/‐ 0.005 
Mean_PI 0.488 +/‐ 0.012 
Mean_TCA 203.200 +/‐ 52.259 
Mean_TCD 11.400 +/‐ 2.881 
Mean_TCI 102.300 +/‐ 26.034 
MI_DFOP 6.000 +/‐ 3.022 
MI_FRPO 6.000 +/‐ 3.007 
MI_HR 5.000 +/‐ 2.522 
MI_PER 5.000 +/‐ 2.009 
MI_STO 6.000 +/‐ 3.064 
MI_TPO 5.000 +/‐ 3.186 
MOP 2_Injured 0.000 +/‐ 0.000 
N_Rows 10.000 +/‐ 0.229 
nc_civ 16.000 +/‐ 7.152 
neut_civ 6.000 +/‐ 4.012 
No_DPT 3.000 +/‐ 1.124 
No_FOMT 2.000 +/‐ 1.049 
No_FPO 2.000 +/‐ 1.012 
No_FRMT 3.000 +/‐ 0.911 
No_HR 3.000 +/‐ 0.749 
No_OPO 4.000 +/‐ 1.134 
No_PER 3.000 +/‐ 1.124 
PAP_Comp 0.271 +/‐ 0.144 
PAP_nc 0.453 +/‐ 0.178 
PAP_Neut 0.206 +/‐ 0.119 
PI_comp 0.530 +/‐ 0.238 
PI_panic 0.430 +/‐ 0.324 
SD_PA 0.089 +/‐ 0.006 
SD_PD 0.089 +/‐ 0.006 
SD_PI 0.092 +/‐ 0.010 
SD_TCA 18.362 +/‐ 4.722 
SD_TCD 18.362 +/‐ 4.722 
SD_TCI 19.201 +/‐ 5.233 
beta_comp 49.000 +/‐ 25.391 
beta_nc 41.000 +/‐ 25.658 
beta_neut 33.000 +/‐ 19.401 
BROC 36.000 +/‐ 7.933 
CBR 6.000 +/‐ 2.274 
CDR 56.000 +/‐ 15.700 
comp_civ 11.000 +/‐ 8.221 
ET_DPLSOC 276.000 +/‐ 102.720 
ET_FOPO 283.000 +/‐ 97.142 
ET_FR 288.000 +/‐ 103.285 
ET_SL 300.000 +/‐ 85.785 
ET_TPL 293.000 +/‐ 87.521 
Mean_PA 0.939 +/‐ 0.004 
Mean_PD 0.062 +/‐ 0.011 
Mean_PI 0.487 +/‐ 0.028 
Mean_TCA 230.600 +/‐ 45.138 
Mean_TCD 15.000 +/‐ 3.708 
Mean_TCI 119.900 +/‐ 24.131 
MI_DFOP 6.000 +/‐ 2.352 
MI_FRPO 6.000 +/‐ 2.958 
MI_HR 6.000 +/‐ 3.059 
MI_PER 6.000 +/‐ 2.322 
MI_STO 6.000 +/‐ 2.575 
MI_TPO 6.000 +/‐ 2.712 
MOP 2_Injured 0.000 +/‐ 0.364 
N_Rows 10.000 +/‐ 0.364 
nc_civ 8.000 +/‐ 4.955 
neut_civ 14.000 +/‐ 5.867 
No_DPT 3.000 +/‐ 0.966 
No_FOMT 3.000 +/‐ 0.854 
No_FPO 3.000 +/‐ 0.833 
No_FRMT 2.000 +/‐ 0.936 
No_HR 3.000 +/‐ 1.021 
No_OPO 4.000 +/‐ 1.156 
No_PER 3.000 +/‐ 0.893 
PAP_Comp 0.308 +/‐ 0.217 
PAP_nc 0.260 +/‐ 0.149 
PAP_Neut 0.396 +/‐ 0.203 
PI_comp 0.430 +/‐ 0.308 
PI_panic 0.500 +/‐ 0.269 
SD_PA 0.098 +/‐ 0.005 
SD_PD 0.098 +/‐ 0.005 
SD_PI 0.096 +/‐ 0.012 
SD_TCA 23.688 +/‐ 4.378 
SD_TCD 23.688 +/‐ 4.378 
SD_TCI 23.763 +/‐ 4.572 
Table 17. Table of mean cluster attributes by variables, for clusters 5-8.  MOP 1 and 
MOP 2 are in bold. 
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Cluster 9  Cluster 10 
beta_comp 39.000 +/‐ 27.211 
beta_nc 41.000 +/‐ 25.434 
beta_neut 66.000 +/‐ 28.733 
BROC 35.000 +/‐ 8.465 
CBR 6.000 +/‐ 2.054 
CDR 56.000 +/‐ 15.225 
comp_civ 16.000 +/‐ 8.074 
ET_DPLSOC 267.000 +/‐ 100.210 
ET_FOPO 300.000 +/‐ 101.734 
ET_FR 303.000 +/‐ 92.505 
ET_SL 293.000 +/‐ 78.785 
ET_TPL 268.000 +/‐ 89.520 
Mean_PA 0.949 +/‐ 0.005 
Mean_PD 0.051 +/‐ 0.005 
Mean_PI 0.460 +/‐ 0.013 
Mean_TCA 320.900 +/‐ 55.391 
Mean_TCD 17.000 +/‐ 3.494 
Mean_TCI 155.900 +/‐ 27.231 
MI_DFOP 6.000 +/‐ 2.328 
MI_FRPO 4.000 +/‐ 2.704 
MI_HR 5.000 +/‐ 2.760 
MI_PER 5.000 +/‐ 2.703 
MI_STO 5.000 +/‐ 2.630 
MI_TPO 6.000 +/‐ 2.901 
MOP 2_Injured 1.000 +/‐ 0.000 
N_Rows 9.000 +/‐ 2.122 
nc_civ 19.000 +/‐ 6.984 
neut_civ 14.000 +/‐ 6.943 
No_DPT 3.000 +/‐ 0.913 
No_FOMT 2.000 +/‐ 0.859 
No_FPO 3.000 +/‐ 0.848 
No_FRMT 2.000 +/‐ 0.945 
No_HR 2.000 +/‐ 1.012 
No_OPO 4.000 +/‐ 1.065 
No_PER 2.000 +/‐ 0.964 
PAP_Comp 0.333 +/‐ 0.149 
PAP_nc 0.367 +/‐ 0.135 
PAP_Neut 0.300 +/‐ 0.119 
PI_comp 0.510 +/‐ 0.305 
PI_panic 0.560 +/‐ 0.310 
SD_PA 0.083 +/‐ 0.008 
SD_PD 0.083 +/‐ 0.008 
SD_PI 0.086 +/‐ 0.008 
SD_TCA 27.658 +/‐ 4.869 
SD_TCD 27.658 +/‐ 4.869 
SD_TCI 28.301 +/‐ 5.109 
beta_comp 42.000 +/‐ 26.407 
beta_nc 44.000 +/‐ 26.235 
beta_neut 62.000 +/‐ 25.728 
BROC 36.000 +/‐ 7.922 
CBR 6.000 +/‐ 2.745 
CDR 54.000 +/‐ 14.060 
comp_civ 15.000 +/‐ 7.612 
ET_DPLSOC 268.000 +/‐ 109.827 
ET_FOPO 294.000 +/‐ 102.730 
ET_FR 286.000 +/‐ 93.373 
ET_SL 281.000 +/‐ 101.842 
ET_TPL 262.000 +/‐ 99.126 
Mean_PA 0.952 +/‐ 0.008 
Mean_PD 0.053 +/‐ 0.019 
Mean_PI 0.460 +/‐ 0.080 
Mean_TCA 235.900 +/‐ 63.254 
Mean_TCD 12.700 +/‐ 3.590 
Mean_TCI 113.400 +/‐ 33.626 
MI_DFOP 6.000 +/‐ 2.637 
MI_FRPO 5.000 +/‐ 2.503 
MI_HR 6.000 +/‐ 2.477 
MI_PER 5.000 +/‐ 2.600 
MI_STO 5.000 +/‐ 2.724 
MI_TPO 5.000 +/‐ 2.086 
MOP 2_Injured 1.000 +/‐ 0.186 
N_Rows 10.000 +/‐ 0.000 
nc_civ 10.000 +/‐ 6.055 
neut_civ 8.000 +/‐ 8.329 
No_DPT 3.000 +/‐ 0.797 
No_FOMT 3.000 +/‐ 0.871 
No_FPO 3.000 +/‐ 1.021 
No_FRMT 2.000 +/‐ 0.940 
No_HR 2.000 +/‐ 0.967 
No_OPO 4.000 +/‐ 1.320 
No_PER 3.000 +/‐ 0.829 
PAP_Comp 0.417 +/‐ 0.197 
PAP_nc 0.296 +/‐ 0.169 
PAP_Neut 0.247 +/‐ 0.269 
PI_comp 0.520 +/‐ 0.287 
PI_panic 0.550 +/‐ 0.291 
SD_PA 0.079 +/‐ 0.013 
SD_PD 0.079 +/‐ 0.013 
SD_PI 0.085 +/‐ 0.016 
SD_TCA 19.176 +/‐ 5.837 
SD_TCD 19.176 +/‐ 5.837 
SD_TCI 20.046 +/‐ 6.410 
Table 18. Table of mean cluster attributes by variables, for clusters 9-10.  MOP 1 
and MOP 2 are in bold. 
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G. BASECASE AND SCENARIO #2 
Errors in the compilation process of the cluster and outlier analysis occurred for 
the base case scenario and the scenario #2.  COADM returned “NaN,”“divide by zero” 
and “eig(en) value problem” error messages.  This continued when design matrices for 
both data sets were reset back to the orders indicated by original DOE files.  DSO has 
been informed of this error and the solution is currently being determined.    
H. CONCLUSIONS 
The cluster analysis appears to agree with the analysis conducted in Chapter V.  In 
general, no “bad” outliers exist in “good” clusters, but supposedly “good” outliers can be 
explained as a caveat of the scripted DOE conditions that have little operational worth 
and should be disregarded.   
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APPENDIX J. PYTHAGORAS 2.0.X ISSUES ENCOUNTERED 
A.  DRAWING DISPLAY BUG 
1.  Problem Description 
In the version 2.0.0 alpha release, an issue occurs at maximum scenario map size.  
While implementing a test file to model agent attribute changes, the player was not 
displaying the scenario landscape at the right size.  It was assumed that the problem was 
due to the program not refreshing after implementing a new map size. Saving, reopening 
and resizing did not rectify the problem.  
2.  Follow-Up Actions  
SEED center Research Mary McDonald and Pythagoras developer Ed Bitinas 
were contacted.  A file with some polygons included to illustrate the issue was submitted 
to the developers. 
3.  Remedy  
The issue was noted by developers and was corrected in Pythagoras 2.0.3. 
B.  TERRAIN FEATURE ISSUE 
1.  Problem Description 
In the version 2.0.0 alpha release, scenario files could not be saved when not all 
terrain types were used to generate polygons on the map.  Upon saving the file, the 
program opens an error box with “polygon not represented in scenario.”  One must 
generate and use all terrain types in order to save the scenario file, or else risk an xml 
error. 
2.  Follow-Up Actions 
The issue was submitted to the developers via email and was acknowledged.  
 186 
 
 
3.  Remedy 
None 
C.  CLONE ISSUE 
1.  Problem Description 
While attempting to implement the “Obedience and Orders” tutorial in Pythagoras 
2.0, the scenario file could not be saved immediately after cloning Blue subordinates'.  
The activity prior to this event was the implementation of blue subordinates, as per page 
9 of the Pythagoras 1.10 manual tutorial walk-through for obedience and orders. 
2.  Follow-Up Actions 
 SEED Center researcher Mary McDonald and Pythagoras developer Ed Bitinas 
were contacted.  The issue was acknowledged by the developers  
3.  Remedy 
Renaming the cloned blue forces to have no spaces in their names, or deleting the 
clones, allowed the file to be saved again. 
 
D.  OUTPUT FILE FOR TIME SERIES ISSUE 
1.  Problem Description 
While attempting to record the time series data of MOEs for the scenario, the 
output file indicated a change in behavior for the agent being investigated.  This change, 
however, was only indicated for one time step and void for the remaining time steps in 
the run.  Comparisons of behaviors in the player screen and the behaviors recorded in the 
output do not match.  
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2.  Follow-Up Actions 
 The issue was submitted to SEED Center researcher Mary McDonald and 
Pythagoras developer Ed Bitinas.  A reply is pending.  
3.  Remedy 
There was no remedy for this issue.  The time series investigation of change in 
survivorship and panic was therefore removed from the study. 
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